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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines President W oodrow  Wilson’s relationship with the American labour 
movement, both the politically moderate American Federation of Labour (AFL) and the more 
radical Industrial W orkers of the W orld (IWW).
This thesis will attempt to  show that contrary to  received wisdom the administration of 
W oodrow W ilson was not in fact agolden age forthe American labour movement. The thesis 
will demonstrate how the reforms granted during this period which aided labour were 
frequently passed over Wilson’s opposition o r with nothing more than his passive support. 
It will also be shown that when Wilson cooperated with the AFL during the war, with places 
in the enlarged administration and with pressure on employers to  make pro-labour 
concessions that it was only done for purely short-term reasons, to  ensure labour 
cooperation - and that once the war had ended he withdrew that support.
This thesis will also show how the suppression of the IWW during the war was not solely 
the product of that emergency, but that the desire to  do so actually preceded the beginning 
of the conflict.
These conclusions have been reached after studying President Wilson’s collected papers and 
^  the views of many of his contemporaries, and having read all the accepted leading secondary
sources covering the period in question.
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WOODROW WILSON AND THE AMERICAN LABOUR MOVEMENT
PREFACE
Many leading American historians have argued that Samuel Gompers and the American 
Federation of Labor (AFL) achieved more by way of legislative recognition under the 
Democratically led administrations of Woodrow Wilson than they had ever done under other 
administrations.
This thesis will, however, attempt to show that the American labour movement was in actual 
fact in a structurally weaker position at the close of Wilson’s second administration than it was 
at the beginning of his term of office in 1913.
Although beset by many enemies, both external and internal, in 1913 the AFL was still an 
inherently strong and resolute organisation. Running alongside it were the Socialist Party of 
America (SPA) - the fastest ever growing party in American history and the first socialist group 
to attract large numbers of native-born Americans; and the Industrial Workers of the World 
(IWW) - a syndicalist dominated industrial union movement trying, with some success, to rival 
the AFL in the labour world.
Yet at the close of the second Wilson administration the SPA and IWW were broken and the 
AFL had retreated back into its pre-war bastions and was politically neutered. This was no 
accident. The SPA and IWW were broken by government repression and the AFL was rolled 
back by employer hostility and the withdrawal of government backing in the post-war period.
This thesis will show that Wilson was far from being an active liberal and that he had no real 
understanding of, or great sympathy for, organised labour; and that his conversion to 
progressivism in the 1907-1913 period was one of language and not one of substance.
DIt will also be shown how in his early years as president, certainly up until 1914, Wilson actively 
tried to prevent the spread of advanced progressive and labour doctrines into legislation. This 
thesis will show how it was only political expediency that made him support pro-labour 
measures in the post-1914 period, and that his accommodation with the AFL during the war 
was only done for short term reasons. For all his beguiling jargon his fundamental attitudes 
remained substantially unaltered as the post-war repression of radicals would demonstrate.
It will be shown throughout this thesis that, of those labour measures passed, the majority owed 
little to Wilson; that his support when given frequently tended to be only passive; and that much 
of the new legislation tended to be of only a symbolic nature effecting nothing of any real 
significance. The problems that prompted the AFL political initiative and the Bill of 
Grievances in 1906 remained substantially unrectified in 1921 when Wilson left office.
Perhaps most important of all, this thesis will attempt to show how the Wilson administration 
reined in the SPA and IWW. The seeds of their repression in the second administration were 
actually sown in the first term, and it was only the lack of a legal pretext that prevented action 
sooner.
Thus, far from being an active liberal and a friend of labour, it will be shown that Wilson was 
actually afraid of the organising efforts of working people, and that his attitude towards them 
was not one of benign friendship but was actually one of repressive tolerance. By their inability 
to understand this Samuel Gompers and the AFL not only aided in the repression of their more 
radical union and political associates, but also retarded the development of the American 
labour movement by many years.
This is the story that will be told.
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CHAPTER ONE
AMERICAN LABOUR - AN INTRODUCTION
This chapter will examine the influences that played a part in the formation of the American 
Federation of Labor (AFL) and affected the way in which the organisation worked. Samuel 
Gompers as the movement's first leader had a crucial role in this development and so this 
chapter will open with an examination of his influence. There will then be an analysis of the 
movement's internal and external enemies, all of whom worked hard to undermine the 
organisation. The chapter will close with an examination of how the court's reinterpretation 
of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act pushed a previously reluctant AFL into taking a political stand, 
and why the movement developed a tentative alliance with the Democratic party in preference 
to other possible courses of action.
The Role Of Samuel Gompers
The principal architect of the AFL was Samuel Gompers, who led and shaped the organisation 
during its first forty years. He was bom in London’s East End in 1850 of Dutch-Jewish stock. 
His father was a cigar maker by trade, a profession his son also entered. In 1863 the family 
moved to America. After a short flirtation with radicalism he became interested in the union 
movement, which he felt was a purer expression of working class solidarity. The cigar shops 
of America were hotbeds of political protest: Gompers acknowledged this when saying ‘ ‘from 
this little group (the New York Cigar Makers’ Union) came the purpose and the initiative that 
finally resulted in the American labor movement. We did not ‘create’ the movement... but 
we did create the techniques and formulate the fundamentals that guide unions” (l). Throughout 
his life ‘ ‘the best possible conditions obtainable for the workers” (2) was the light that guided 
him. In 1912 whilst speaking before the Commission on Industrial Relations he observed that 
the role of the AFL was ‘ ‘to work along the line of least resistance; to accomplish the best results 
in improving the conditions of the working people, men, women, children, today, tomorrow 
and tomorrow’s tomorrow, and making each day a better day than the one before. That is the 
guiding principle, and the philosophy of the labor movement”  (3). This lack of ultimate ends 
and a concentration on ‘ ‘bread and butter’ ’ issues was not just Gompers’ theory, in time it came
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to represent mainstream AFL policy. It was certainly in line with Gompers' words to the House 
Lobby Investigating Committee in 1913: “  it is our duty to live our lives as workers in the 
society in which we live, and not to work for the downfall, or the destruction or the overthrow 
of that society’ ’(4). Gompers never actually controlled any large union, and for most of his 
presidency was faced with bitter opposition. His power rested ultimately upon his influence, 
intelligence and personality. His forty year survival shows a unique talent for compromise and 
negotiation. Gompers was highly typical of the kind of men who came together to form the 
AFL. A great many of them were, like him, of immigrant stock. A large proportion of them 
were also well schooled in Marxi st theories and were happy to accept the dominance of things 
economic over things political. Trained in the skilled crafts many of these men found work 
in small workshops, places where craftsmen could exert a controlling effect through their 
manipulation of work practices. Their predominantly immigrant status, their belief in the 
primacy of economic matters and their craftmens’ power all helped to give the union structures 
they devised a distinctive shape.
The Organisation Of The AFL
Hoping to work for realisable objectives in the workplace, the AFL leadership devised a 
political programme that was in itself a reaction against earlier labour adventurism, calling as 
it did for the protection of funds; the adoption of uniform apprenticeship rules; the 
encouragement of arbitration; legislation for the inspection of mines, factories and workshops; 
and for laws making employers responsible for industrial safety. These were the kind of 
measures acceptable to stably employed craftsmen, and showed their worries, preoccupations 
and prejudices. Gompers and his co-leaders had the decidedly modest aim of bringing 
industrial legislation and practices in America up to the level of England, and of securing union 
rights as they had been achieved by lobbying at Westminster. Consequently the structure of 
the AFL was consciously modelled on the TUG. Many of the unions which joined the AFL 
were not in themselves new, it was the relationship between them, this new federation that was 
the novelty. The cooperation of national and international unions within the AFL was secured 
by giving them representation at annual conventions on the basis of their membership and the 
freedom to act independently in their own industrial spheres. The autonomy given member 
unions obviously affected the movement’s strength, but was the only way to get many unions
to affiliate, for as Gompers told M.P. McBryde, “ the AFL is a voluntary organization. The 
resolutions or platforms adopted by it at its conventions are expressions of the sentiments and 
demands of the majority of the workers affiliated. The resolutions and platforms adopted 
cannot be imposed on any affiliated organization” (5). As a result of this, the bulk of the 
movement’s decision making was not done in convention but at local level, thus giving unions 
maximum freedom.
In addition to the president and his secretary-treasurer the AFL had eight vice-presidents 
graded in seniority, all of whom were elected annually. The personnel of this executive council 
seldom changed. These men tended to be elected on a personal basis rather than because of 
the strength of the union they represented, their longevity in office showing their ability to 
3  succeed in the field of inter-union politics. The primary units within the AFL were their
national unions, organisations distinguished by their claim to an exclusive jurisdiction within 
an area of industry rather than by their success in actually recruiting all the workers therein. 
Member unions were only willing to remain affiliated as long as he respected their autonomy. 
As a result the president and executive council were never given any real power to interfere 
in the internal affairs of member unions, and so many unions were permitted to discriminate 
against negroes, carry out racist attacks on Asians, operate restrictive practices, and to remain 
indifferent to the plight of the unskilled. Gompers and his co-leaders’ main purpose remained 
that of mediation in strikes between unions and employers, and to lobby state legislatures and 
Congress for pro-labour measures.
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AFL Opponents - The SPA And The IWW
The years 1904-1911 were particularly hard ones for the AFL. A nationwide depression was 
compounded by an aggressive open-shop campaign and the courts putting them under intense 
pressure. Whilst having to weather these storms the movement was also being challenged by 
socialists calling upon the movement to endorse independent political action, and a dualist 
threat in the shape of the Industrial Workers of the World.
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The socialistpresence in Americahad grown steadily during the nineteenth century with much 
impetus coming from European immigrants. Socialism was so strong among European 
workers that many native bom Americans considered it to be both alien and unAmerican. It 
would be a gross over-simplification, however, to think that all socialists were non-American. 
As John Laslett shows, large segments of the American radical and socialist movements were 
in fact native bom, their adoption of socialist or other radical credos being linked to unique 
conditions and circumstances in their geographical areas or trades. What was so remarkable 
about the Socialist Party of America (SPA) was indeed its strength among native bom 
Americans. In 1912 only 13% of SPA members were in foreign language federations (6).
Many radicals, whether they were socialists, anarchists or syndicalists, supported the union 
movement and hoped for advantages from it in tum. There were obvious differences among 
these radicals over the best methods to follow with the ‘ ‘ opportunists’ ’ favouring ‘ ‘boring from 
within” - entering the AFL and changing the direction in which it was moving - while the 
“ impossiblists”  favoured “ dual unions”  - the establishment of an opposing movement 
organised along industrial lines. The SPA embraced both methods at different times. Clearly 
radical influence was growing as some of the AFL’s largest unions were electing socialist 
leaders and delegates, in fact, one half of the United Mine Workers delegates to the 1908 annual 
convention were actively socialist. In the frontier areas of the West, socialism, often of the 
more violent kind, was common; although this was often simply a reaction against over­
cautious AFL methods.
Tme to its business union philosophy the AFL held to a policy of refusing affiliation to 
organisations which expounded a political cause. Socialists, however, believing that their 
party was different to all others, disagreed with this and felt that they deserved special 
treatment, not that the AFL hierarchy ever agreed. Most of the demands advanced by the SPA 
were actually supported by the AFL, where they differed was over the socialist calls for the 
common ownership of the means of production and for independent political action supported 
by the union movement. Their agitation of this issue cost Gompers his leadership of the 
movement for a year and probably accounts for much of his antipathy thereafter. As he once 
said himself, ‘ ‘I say broadly and openly that there is not a noble hope that a socialist may have 
that I do not hold as my ideal [but] .... our methods are different” (7). Many socialists 
eventually refused to work with him, holding him personally responsible for many of the
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AFL’s more reactionary attitudes, which is perhaps unfair on Gompers and short sighted on 
their part as the AFL was probably genuinely closer to representing labour than they were. 
Gompers’ attitude to socialists was one of discriminating opposition and was linked primarily 
to whether people were workers and unionists. He despised Daniel De Leon of the Socialist 
Labor Party (SLP) almost as much as he despised the views he expounded, but De Leon was 
an ex-university lecturer and thus not a worker to Gompers. He was never as hostile to Eugene 
Debs even though he was instrumental in the setting up of the American Railroad Union and 
played a leading role in the American Labor Union and the IWW. Gompers believed that ‘ ‘the 
movement often called a class movement is often nothing more than a party movement”  (8), 
and so he worked hard to stop them interfering in AFL affairs. He actually welcomed debates 
on socialism “ because it armed our fellow unionists with the arguments to best defend the 
unions’ position against the aggressive onslaughts of the so-called socialists ” (9). To a certain 
extent by blowing up the socialist threat he could make his own position more secure, 
convinced as he was that any endorsement of independent political action would mean an 
endorsement of socialism, as they were the group best organised to capitalise on such a move. 
He personally saw to it that the movement came out against all forms of political action, ‘ ‘that 
party politics, whether they be democratic, republican, socialistic, populistic, prohibition or 
any other, should have no place in this convention’ ’(10). He worked hard to have all political 
activists subordinate their political beliefs to the best interests of the AFL for ‘ ‘regardless of 
what the end of the labor movement as a movement between classes may be, they (political 
beliefs) must remain in the background and we must subordinate our convictions and our views 
and our acts to the general good” (11).
Even with the AFL antagonistic towards them between 1905 and 1915 the SPA gained greatly 
in strength. Their rising influence was perhaps not due solely to the attractiveness of their 
programme but was also linked to government, judicial and industrial opposition to organised 
labour. During this period the SPA, a curious mixture of Americanised socialists with no real 
grounding in Marxist theories, intellectuals pushing for gradualist political change, and 
socialists more interested in unionism, was the fastest growing party ever seen in American 
history; between 1905 and 1912 its membership rose from 10,000 to 118,000. Despite its many 
internal divisions, all sections of SPA opinion were united in the call for a regeneration of the 
AFL.
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In Chicago in 1905 another threat to the organising efforts of the AFL materialised in the shape 
of the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW). Elements from the Western Federation of 
Miners (WFM), SLP, SPA and American Labor Union all came together to develop the IWW. 
The movement was to become an interesting synthesis of socialism, industrial unionism and 
revolutionary tactics. Gompers had an informant at the Chicago conference who said ‘ ‘many 
of the delegates who seem to be taking a prominent part in the gathering represent no one but 
themselves and are not even members of trades unions .... I have a number of acquaintances 
who are members of unions affiliated to the AFL, and who are socialists, but none of them are 
representing their unions; indeed a number of them are bitter about this new venture” (12). 
Like other radical movements the IWW was soon plagued by battles between theorists and 
pragmatists. Gompers’ informant saw the whole thing as being “ satisfactory from the 
standpoint of the AFL” (13), although such complacency proved to be premature. The 
Steunenberg trial, where leading WFM officers were accused of bombing ex-govemor 
Steuenenberg, had a shattering effect on the IWW. The case made the WFM moderate their 
behaviour and played a part in the WFM leaving the IWW, which did much to cripple the 
movement in its early days depriving it as it did of its more stable hands, men who knew a lot 
about practical union organisation. With the loss of the WFM the socialist and syndicalist 
elements remaining fought for supremacy, and with the defection of De Leon in 1908 the 
syndicalists won. IWW membership rose swiftly, but the movement did not spring to national 
prominence until 1910 when the “ free speech” campaigns drew it much publicity. With the 
victory in Lawrence it became an object of hostility and fear almost unparalleled in American 
history, it soon replaced the SPA as the nation’s bogeyman.
While setting out to supplant the AFL the IWW had little success in recruiting AFL members, 
the biggest successes were made among the unorganised workers, men long neglected by the 
AFL. The IWW recruited amongst migratory farmworkers. Western loggers, textile workers, 
illiterate Southern whites and new immigrants. The IWW, however, did little in the way of 
systematically organising these workers, instead they tried to concentrate on providing a 
dynamic and sympathetic leadership, especially during strikes. As they claimed to be 
organising for a revolution they did not see the need to develop a conventional union 
organisation. They actually scorned conventional union procedures, fundraising and full-time 
officials. They had little time for collective bargaining, trade agreements, grievance machinery 
and mediation in general. They hoped instead to unite all workers in one central organisation, 
without distinction, thus in contrast to the AFL they organised themselves into thirteen
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departments along industrial union lines covering all possible job types. In nearly every major 
way the IWW attempted to present the movement as the antithesis of the AFL. Their early 
propaganda coups and their growing membership showed that they were not without support.
AFL Opponents - Employers’ Violence And The Open Shop Campaign
Opposition to the AFL was also strong among employers, many of whom felt that they must 
control every area of the industrial process. This was believed to be especially important where 
skilled craft unions had a powerful presence, as through ‘ ‘union rules’ ’ crafts could affect other 
areas of production. To combat this employers used a variety of methods, from violence to 
covert anti-union practices. Many employers felt that unions and moves to enforce a closed 
shop were in themselves unAmerican and felt justified in using violence against employees. 
Henry Frick of US Steel was happy to announce that ‘ ‘I can hire one half of the working class 
to kill the other half ’(14). With employers voicing such opinions it is hardly surprising that 
America has one of the bloodiest histories of labour violence: between 1870 and 1937 there 
were over 700 deaths and thousands of serious injuries in labour disputes. Robert Goldstein 
can find “ no apparent relationship between the degree of violence employed and workers’ 
provocation” (15). What is so striking about this violence is that American labour often seen 
as being the least ideological in the industrial world. Richard Hofstadter and Michael Wallace 
clearly felt that ‘ ‘the rate of industrial violence in America is striking in the light of the fact 
that no major American labor organization has ever advocated violence as a policy... with a 
minimum of ideologically motivated class conflict the United States has somehow had a 
maximum of industrial violence” (16).
Thus what happened under the Wilson administration during and after the war was no new 
thing, Wilson and his subordinates in their dealings with the AFL and the IWW adhered to a 
policy that Herbert Marcuse has called ‘ ‘repressive tolerance," which involved granting minor 
reforms to deflect basic criticisms, whilst utilising the mechanisms of “ political repression” 
when labour dissent or opposition stepped outside the bounds the administration set for it. 
William Preston is correct to say that “ union identity was difficult, if  not dangerous, and the 
powers in control had the wherewithal to tum the heat on if unionism gained a significant 
degree of influence” (17).
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The depression of 1903-1904 helped employers as it turned a labour shortage into a labour 
surplus and gave employers an opportunity to mount an assault upon the closed shop. In 1903 
David Parry and a group of mostly mid-Westem metal manufacturers took over control of the 
National Association of Manufacturers (NAM), which had been formed in 1895, and put it on 
a more overtly anti-union footing. Parry believed that unions were inherently socialist, that 
they countenanced violence and restricted output, ‘ ‘that it (the AFL) did not place its reliance 
upon reason andjustice, but on strikes boycotts and coercion. It denies to those outside its ranks 
the industrial right to dispense of their labor as they see fit’ ’(18). NAM laid the blame for all 
disturbances at the door of labour. Thousands of people believed their propaganda, including 
Woodrow Wilson who used NAM material for his 1909 Baccalaureate address at Princeton, 
and who was a personal friend of many of its more active members, including the McCormicks 
of International Harvester. Wilson’s close friend President Charles Eliot of Harvard went so 
far as to call strikebreakers “ a very good kind of modem hero” (19). In 1908 the National 
Council for Industrial Defence (NCID) became the chief spokesman for all the anti-union 
interests. The organisation was extremely successful at lobbying Congress and was to do a 
great deal to impede the passage of anti-injunction measures and other pro-labour legislation. 
The NCID made AFL lobbying in Washington almost a waste of time. A congressional 
committee in 1913 found an organisation of anti-union employers whose scope and effectiveness 
eclipsed all the other lobbying interests combined.
In 1904 an official at Intemational Harvester reported, “ it would seem that we are in a more 
favorable position today to have a fight with labor, if necessary, than we have been for some 
time past or are likely to be for some time to come” (20). Wage cuts were forced through in 
almost all industrial sections, and there was an acceleration in the introduction of new 
machinery and work procedures. The immediate result of all this was intemal warfare among 
unions, with much AFL time wasted in reconciling differences.
Employers’ main grievances against unions remained: closed shops, boycotts, limitations on 
the right to hire and fire, violence during strikes, corrupt practices, rules affecting output, 
resistance to the use of new machinery, and the limitation of apprentices. The AFL did little 
to come to terms with employers on these issues; although when left to their own devices few 
employers did much either. In their efforts to defeat unions employers encouraged the use of 
yellow dog contracts, played on the rivalries of different ethnic groups and unions, employed
10
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spies, had agitators fired and kept blacklists of known radicals. Pressure was even applied to 
fellow employers to get them to join NAM or an umbrella agency like the American Anti- 
Boycott Association (AABA). Parry supported all of this “ since the principles and demands 
of organized labor are absolutely untenable to those believing in the individualistic social 
order, an attitude of conciliation would mean an attitude of compromise.... the greatest danger 
lies in the recognition of the union.... a government cannot stand, or its free institutions survive 
if the Gompers - Debs ideals of liberty and freedom of speechare allowed to dominate” (21). 
Gompers must have been shocked to hear that people felt that he and Eugene Debs had any kind 
of working relationship! Elements of the press also backed Parry. Colonel G.B.M.Harvey’s 
North American Review, an early backer of Wilson, said ‘ ‘the first duty of legitimate power 
is to emancipate the individual worker from the tyranny of his class. The individual worker 
should not be permitted to commit moral suicide by surrendering his liberty to the control of 
his fellow workers” (22).
The National Civic Federation And Welfarism
In an effort to silence some of his critics, and also win a measure of recognition and 
respectability from powerful employing interests, Gompers accepted an invitation to join the 
National Civic Federation (NCF). This was an organisation bringing together employing and 
labour interests to help foster industrial peace and progress. Gompers served as a vice- 
president from 1900 to 1916. As Marguerite Green shows, a certain amount of ambiguity 
existed as to the NCF’s short and long-term objectives, especially as regards the relationship 
of labour to business, and the specific industrial and political needs it was hoping to fulfil. An 
early leader. Senator Marcus Hanna, saw its mission thus; ‘ ‘my plan is to have organized labor 
Americanized in the best sense, and thoroughly educated to an understanding of its responsibilities 
and in this way to make it the ally of the capitalist, rather than a foe with which to grapple’ ’ (23). 
Ralph Easley, its life long secretary, felt that ‘ ‘I want to get the labor end of our committee with 
you (Hanna) some place where you can read a riot act to them and make them understand what 
they have to do to keep the friendship of you and your friends. They will take anything from 
you because they believe in you’ ’(24). All of this was designed to help the more conservative 
union leader both know his place and beat off his radical foes.
11
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Under Hanna the NCF did have some success, especially in the field of collective bargaining, 
with all the interested parties working hard to promote the value of trade agreements. It was 
not without its enemies, however; Henry Frick, J.P.Morgan and J.D.Rockefeller were all 
extremely anti-NCF simply because it had union members, the very reason Andrew Carnegie 
supported it and underwrote its costs. Curiously many anti-union employers supported it 
financially whilst not recognizing unions in their own plants. NAM wrote it off as an apologist 
for the AFL. Equally, many socialists opposed it, as they saw it as an attempt to pull the teeth 
of labour militancy. There is no real evidence that Gompers or any other AFL member was 
constrained in their union duties by it. Clearly socialists were just as keen to cooperate with 
employers on a daily basis as were those who were NCF members; socialists’ main objection 
seems to have been that they were against a formal admission that they should cooperate. The 
NCF did some meaningful work in lobbying for labour legislation and by diluting some of the 
hostility of anti-union employers to collective bargaining. There are similarities between the 
goals of the NCF and those of anti-union employers - both were protests against labour 
extremism. The NCF was perhaps using more sophisticated methods but it was just as bent 
on restraining the more aggressive unionist. It certainly had no tolerance for the strategic or 
sympathetic strike, nor did it help labour to organise any non-union industry.
Employers were sophisticated enough to attack the AFL fi*om many different fronts. Some used 
welfarism to undermine unions. Welfare measures varied greatly, but were aimed at three 
major areas: improving conditions within the plant, wage policies, and the organisation of 
workers' free time activities. Nelson and Campbell see welfarism and Taylorism as the two 
main prongs of the employer assault on labour during the Progressive Era. Taylorism, which 
concentrated upon timing activities in the pursuit of ever greater efficiency, working inside the 
plant, and welfarism concentrating on outside activities. In so doing they somewhat neglect 
the supporting activities of organisations like NAM, and the periodic bouts of coercion used 
to keep workers docile. Certainly though one of the major aims of welfarism was to undermine 
unions. At an NCF Welfare Department meeting in November 1904 an employer spoke of his 
programme as being designed solely to “ get rid of the union” (25). Charles McCormick of 
Intemational Harvester claimed welfarism “ should endeavor to secure for the employee just 
what he most desires firom the union. It should secure for him the results which labor 
organizations declare are their base objects, namely higher wages and shorter hours” (26). 
Thus welfarism was from its very beginning an overtly anti-union operation. The AFL’s 
attitude to welfarism is best illustrated by John Sullivan of the typographical union in his
12
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pamphlet, The Trades Unions’ Attitude Towards Welfare Work. He felt that welfarism 
actually aided existing union programmes and so was laudable, especially in areas outside AFL 
control, thus not recognizing the threat it posed. The surrender of this unorganised area by the 
AFL gave employers a virtual free hand, and was to cost the movement dearly later.
American Labour And The Courts
The power of the courts in the sphere of industrial relations has traditionally provided 
American unionists with few rewards for political action. As the courts were allowed to create 
a legal framework to stabilise and facilitate an individualistic competitive capitalism they were 
soon accepted as an alternative forum of public policy making in the country. The judiciary 
had a greater part to play than the executive or legislative branches of government in defining 
public policies towards organised labour. They could do this by endorsing, or more commonly, 
restraining the policy initiatives and preferences of other areas of government. That being the 
case unionists’ longstanding commitment to collective action has on occasion inadvertently 
set the labour movement on a collision course with the courts. Recognizing labour’s right to 
collective action required considerably more than minor adjustments to existing doctrine. 
Hoping to avoid hostile court action the AFL adopted a strategy of anti-statist voluntarism. 
With hostility in the courts and legislative victories proving traditionally fleeting, the shop 
floor seemed to be a more fertile ground for union mobilisation.
The AFL was soon disappointed for with increasing frequency employers used the courts in 
their fight against unions. Injunctions soon proved to be the most effective way of restraining 
employees, because they provided immediate relief during a dispute, and also avoided recourse 
to a jury who might have been more willing to sympathise with strikers than would a judge. 
By a curious irony the most effective type of injunction for use against unions turned out to 
be one issued under the umbrella of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act 1890, which declared illegal 
any combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade. Injunctions had been previously used 
against labour, but were deemed to be of doubtful legality, and so were restricted mainly to 
stopping strikers committing acts already prescribed by the criminal law. Between 1890 and 
1894 federal courts used injunctions more frequently, largely by linking their issuance to the
13
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Sherman Act or the Interstate Commerce Act. The judges who heard labour cases under 
Sherman could initially find no common law tradition to guide them in interpreting and 
enforcing it, as union existence and striking appeared to be acceptable under the act. The 
situation changed in 1893 when defendants accused of conducting a general strike in New 
Orleans had their strike ended by an injunction issued under Sherman. Judge Billings conceded 
that ordinary strikes were lawful, but added that in New Orleans workers had used violence 
and intimidation. Thus he believed that their actions were a combination in restraint of trade 
as their general strike restrained trade outside the strike sphere. In 1894 Debs’ ARU strike 
against the Pullman company was broken by an injunction issued under the Sherman Act. In 
his judgement on the strike Judge Woods relied on Billings, and felt that labour could be 
included under Sherman in three ways: restraint of trade, combinations in restraint of trade, 
and conspiracies. From then on the theories of Billings and Woods became the basis of 
decisions in other cases involving labour. A circuit judge in Missouri issued a preliminary 
injunction against the officers of a union citing Billings. Judge Morrow in California when 
investigating strike activity in the state used the Billings ruling when he said that a principle 
had been established that strikes accompanied by violence and intimidation were proscribed 
by Sherman. AFL lobbying in Washington brought no relief, leaving many AFL officers to 
conclude that injunctions were actually beginning to weaken the legal status of unions, for 
increasingly the legality of strikes was being linked to their purpose. In 1922 Gompers told 
the Senate Committee on Manufactures in answer to Senator Walsh’s questions, ‘ ‘Do you go 
so far as to say that the judiciary has not any sympathy, or is highly educated towards the rights 
of labor?” that, “ I am certain of that sir! ” (27), showing how badly affected he was by the 
experiences of the early twentieth century.
In 1903 the situation worsened when D.E.Loewe and Company of Danbury, Connecticut sued 
the Hatters Union under Sherman for triple damages for losses incurred as a result of a boycott 
of their products. In February 1908 the Supreme Court upheld the prosecution and later a jury 
allowed the full cost of the damages claimed. Following this the Bucks Stove and Range 
Company initiated another boycott action. This directly affected Gompers for the firm secured 
an injunction against him personally when he included the company on the “ unfair list”  of 
the American Federationist which he edited and published. Gompers ignored the injunction 
and was cited for contempt of court. He was sentenced to a term of imprisonment, never 
actually served, but it hung menacingly over him until it was quashed on a technicality in 1914. 
These two cases were pushed by men active in the campaign against labour, Loewe helped form
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NAM. Also in 1908 the Supreme Court invalidated the important section of the Erdman Act 
of 1898 which made illegal discrimination against unionists on the railways.
Gompers was convinced that the Danbury Hatters ruling would jeopardize all attempts by 
unions to establish collective bargaining agreements in any industry. In a memorial presented 
to the leader of the House, Gompers insisted that the case placed the whole labour movement 
in jeopardy. He told Speaker Cannon that “ it is indeed true that under the decision our very 
organized existence is unlawful” (28). Gompers alarm puzzled many as there was nothing in 
Judge Fuller’s summing up on the legality of trade agreements. Even so Gompers still 
maintained that federal justices might nowuse the Danbury decision to declare the establishment 
of industry wide trade agreements to be unlawful combinations, and in so doing condemn 
almost all forms of labour activism. This was an alarmist view, but it cannot be simply 
dismissed as a figment of Gompers’ imagination coming as it did on top of earlier anti-labour 
decisions. Gompers steadfastly maintained that the inclusion of unions within the ambit of 
Sherman was a perversion of the intent of its drafters, and he was quite right to do so. He was 
convinced that the Danbury ruling could be taken to imply that collective bargaining was an 
unlawful object for labour to engage in. “ The court in its decision takes the very evidence 
of the successful cooperation of the employers with their employees to maintain industrial 
peace as the evidence that these combinations or agreements are in restraint of trade”  (29), and 
as almost all actions by unions promoted this fundamental aim he believed that almost all could 
now be outlawed. Seth Low of the NCF believed that Gompers was incorrect in his analysis, 
but did concede that ‘ ‘nevertheless the leaders of the labor movement were convinced that the 
right to strike, to combine, and to make trade agreements was in jeopardy and no assurance from 
the legal fraternity would make them believe otherwise” (30). Clearly though the Danbury 
judgement showed that the courts now believed that Sherman applied with equal force to 
labour as it did to capital. ‘ ‘The Supreme Court had tended to divide closely in Sherman cases 
involving business, but with the Danbury Hatters case and in other Sherman cases involving 
labor, it acted with unanimity in turning the act labor."(31)
Danbury Hatters cost the AFL the use of the boycott and also made individual members 
responsible for the actions of their unions. The Hitchman Coal and Coke Company versus 
Mitchell case put further heavy obstacles in the way of unions when organising workers. So
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much so that many unionists were beginning to feel that, in the battle between capital and 
labour, the courts had gone over to the employers. These reverses helped to strengthen the hand 
of the radicals in the AFL, they began to claim with greater force, and seeming justification, 
that it was proof of government and court bias, and that the only answer was independent 
political action.
Gompers and the AFL leadership realised that the AFL’s traditional methods were failing to 
meet these challenges and that more radical methods were needed to give the movement some 
relief from its attackers.
Thus as the Progressive Era began that small section of labour that was organised was 
dominated by the AFL. Their philosophy was the product of three decades of cautious growth. 
They entered this new era beset by enemies on all sides, both external and intemal, but with 
the hope that the change in public attitudes and the qualified approval of the Democrats might 
herald better days ahead.
The AFL Response - The Bill Of Grievances
Any AFL programme to secure relief from the injunction threat was hampered by the fact that 
‘ ‘ our affiliates are guaranteed autonomy and independence. If they deem independent political 
action advisable, or if they desire to take political action by which to pledge candidates for 
public office, to stand by the advocates of labor measures and reward them, or to punish at the 
polls those who are inimical to their interests, these are matters entirely delegated to each 
organization” (32). Not only was the AFL’s traditional autonomy a hindrance but Gompers 
was also aware of the growing socialist presence in the movement and was worried that any 
acceptance of independent action would not only be objectionable to those members who were 
active in the two main parties, but that it might be tantamount to a recognition of socialism.
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Another reason for caution was the importance of state legislatures to the movement. Many 
matters could be adequately solved at a local level. State federations had responsibility for 
drafting legislation for these bodies and then lobbying for its adoption. Not only were they 
keen to retain this power but it had also produced many successes. Thus the AFL leadership 
felt that the policies followed by State federations and city centrals were the right ones, and 
could be equally profitable on a national level. The occasional successes these local actions 
produced, despite labour’s overall numerical weakness, made the AFL hierarchy realise that 
local politicians were frequently more susceptible to well organised pressure group activity 
than they were to party orders, which could be to the movement’s advantage if it could be 
replicated nationally. It seemed to offer the AFL the hope of success without expense, and it 
also had the additional advantage of keeping the socialists out of power within the movement, 
which an endorsement of independent political action might otherwise entail.
Throughout their existence the AFL had actually evaluated numerous ways of securing 
representation: electing unionists to office without the formality of a separate political 
organisation; endorsing the SPA as their political agency; forming a separate labour party; 
allying themselves to other groups to create a larger party, such as the People’s Party; or 
supporting the existing parties when they promised labour legislation. They wavered uneasily 
between these methods but in 1906 after much intemal struggle they endorsed the last strategy 
and the organisation decided to support their friends and punish their enemies at the ballot box. 
Gompers was instmmental in this decision, for while he considered lobbying to be a proper 
activity he remained totally opposed to independent electoral action. He knew that most AFL 
members voted for the two main parties, and that many union officers were party officials, and 
so he felt that any call for their vote would fall on deaf ears. He merely hoped that he could 
stop people from blindly voting the party ticket. Thus he hoped that he had devised a political 
strategy for AFL problems, one that would mollify members while causing the least political 
dissension. Clearly, Gompers’ endorsement of this strategy and the 1906 ‘ ‘Bill of Grievances’ ’ 
was as much prompted by his own personal ideology as it was by the belief that he could secure 
relief in no other way. He always believed that ‘ ‘ securing the enactment of a law does not mean 
the solution of the problem as I leamed in my legislative experience. The power of the courts 
to pass upon the constitutionality of a law so complicates reform by legislation as to seriously 
restrict the effectiveness of that method” (33).
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In 1900 the TUC and the Independent Labour Party had formed a Labour Representation 
Committee (LRC) to lobby Westminster for labour reforms. In 1905 they succeeded in 
electing 29 MPs. This left a great impression on the AFL. The following year the AFL set 
up an LRC of their own and submitted to Congress a “ Bill of Grievances” . Among its 
demands were: an eight hour day for Federal employees; restrictions on the manufacture and 
sale of convict produced goods; limits on immigration; and most importantly - limitations 
to be placed on the use of injunctions in labour disputes. President Roosevelt and Congress 
both ignored it. Thus the AFL attempted to carry out their threat to vote strategically in the 
1906 congressional elections. It was not a great success; while the Republican majority in the 
House was reduced, this was due to factors other than labour pressure, if  anything the House 
was more anti-labour than before.
During the 1908 presidential campaign the AFL again submitted a list of demands to both 
parties along the lines of the “ Bill of Grievances” . The Republicans again ignored it, and 
snubbed the AFL by picking William Taft, known as “ the father of the injunction,”  as their 
candidate. The Democrats, however, took the bulk of the programme on board, giving 
Gompers the opportunity to write the labour planks in their platform. The fact that the 
Democrats had been out of national office since 1894 may, in part, have accounted for their 
new interest in labour issues. AFL political assertiveness clearly served primarily to forge an 
alliance of sorts between respectable organised labour and the Democrats. The Democrats had 
good reason to seek union support for as a minority party nationally they needed allies 
wherever they could be found. Whilst still not fully endorsing the Democrats, Gompers and 
the AFL hierarchy vigorously attacked the Republicans. Socialists both inside and outside the 
movement were disappointed with this new approach. Their disappointment became even 
greater in 1910, following elections that year 15 labour representatives entered the House, but 
they believed that had the AFL backed them more fully then that number could have been 
bigger.
The psychological effect of labours entry into politics, even in such a limited way, was still 
considerable; it became a new consideration for politicians to placate. It was not, however, 
an approach without shortcomings, in that workers’ voting habits, like many other people's, 
are frequently not based on a rational analysis of candidates’ actions in Congress. Also, as 
labour’s vote was traditionally split between the major parties, it remained doubtful whether
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Gompers could deliver the labour vote to any one party, something most politicians knew only 
too well. Labour’s relative legislative isolation, in that labour had almost no firm allies among 
non-labour organisations, obviously reduced the chances of Gompers’ new approach being 
fully successful, as did the strong anti-labour sentiments of most businessmen and many 
politicians.
Not all workers endorsed this new approach or even gave it a chance to work. The Structural 
Iron Workers Union led by the McNamara brothers embarked upon a bombing campaign to 
secure their ends. This campaign culminated in the Los Angeles Times explosion of 1 October 
1910. The actions of the McNamaras and their subsequent trial and conviction cast all labour 
organisations in a poor light and so boded ill for the AFL. In the long run, however, the 
McNamara case had its positive side in that is caused many people to question a system that 
caused some workers to tum to violence. E.R. A.Seligman blamed the explosion upon ‘ ‘a type 
of mind that has begun in this country to despair of equality and economic opportunity, and 
is being driven into violence because of the conviction that no other kind of action is 
possible ” (34). Slowly a sea change of sorts began to develop in the public’s attitude to labour 
in spite of the best efforts of NAM and the stupidity of people like the McNamaras. This was 
helped in no small way by the exposures of journalistic ‘ ‘Muckrakers’ ’ who did much to gain 
public sympathy for working people. As the Springfield Republican stated, “ capital must 
make up its mind to get along with labor. Such labor is here to stay, and the law is most likely 
to compel unionization of labor, rather than outlaw it’ ’(35). With growing public hostility to 
trusts and their activities labour enjoyed a kind of renaissance. Many progressives, however, 
feared the rise of socialism and worried about disorders from below more than Gompers ever 
realised. The ‘ ‘memory of the social upheavals of the eighties and nineties hung like a pall 
over the minds of the articulate public” (36). Gompers was to eventually find that these 
progressives’ attitude to unions was only slightly better than their attitudes to socialism, that 
they looked on labour as a poor cousin. By looking to these people for support rather than trying 
to act alone the AFL eventually discovered that it would only be treated with respect and given 
symbolic reforms when it accepted a subordinate role. Independent political action and labour 
radicalism were both viewed with horror by labour’s new friends, and ultimately the AFL 
would only prosper whilst it accepted a junior and filial position in the progressive coalition.
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0CHAPTER TWO
WH.SON - AN INTRODUCTION
Woodrow Wilson was one of the most educated men ever to govern from the White House. 
This chapter will look at his upbringing and early career as an academic; from this analysis a 
picture will emerge of a deeply flawed man. We shall see a man who could be coldly objective 
one moment and then highly prejudiced the next; a man who claimed he always fought for high 
principle, but who could break with close and trusted friends over minor points of honour. A 
curious character trait will emerge of a man who pushed hard for change, but who would dry 
up when the opposition hardened. This is important because the behaviour first seen at 
Princeton was reproduced later in Trenton and in the White House.
This chapter will close with Wilson's first tentative moves into practical politics, and in this 
section we will see how his wealthy backers advanced his candidacy as a conservative opponent 
to William Bryan's stranglehold on the Democratic party, but what they were soon frustated 
when the politically ambitious Wilson “ redefined” his conservative beliefs so as to be more 
attractive to progressive voters.
Wilson - Early Life And Opinions
Thomas Woodrow Wilson was bom on 28 December 1856 in Staunton, Virginia, the son of 
a Presbyterian minister. Wilson was extremely close to and strongly influenced, even 
dominated by his father, imbibing from him his deep and unquestioning religious faith, his 
admiration of the English literary classics and his dedication to intellectual and moral ideals. 
Wilson was fortunate in coming from a relatively comfortable and privileged background. He 
grew up knowing nothing of economic insecurity or poverty, he had almost no contact with 
the working class.
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Until he entered Davidson College in 1873 his education had been largely informal, supervised 
mainly by his father. He had trouble coping with his studies and when his health failed he 
returned home. In 1875 he went to study at Princeton. He did not shine as a student, but he 
did win a reputation as an effective debater, he read widely on the lives of British statesmen, 
and began his lifelong interest in government and public affairs. An enthusiastic Anglophile, 
he noted that a number of Englishmen had entered politics from university, and hoped he could 
do the same. He was so confident that his intellectual gifts would make an activepolitical career 
a real possibility that he had cards printed saying “ T.W.Wilson, Senator for Virginia” (l).
Wilson liked to think of himself as a southern gentleman, and so tried to be always in accord 
with southern, especially Presbyterian, orthodoxy. He claimed that “ a boy never gets over his 
boyhood, and can never change those subtle influences which have become a part of him” (3). 
His marked indifference to negroes was no doubt a product of his southern up-bringing. 
Although it is true he never shared the extreme anti-negro sentiments of many of his 
contemporaries there is no doubt that he was a southerner on the race issue. Both Wilson and 
his wife were against social relations between the races. He even prevented negroes enrolling 
at Princeton while he was principal. When selecting personnel for his first presidential 
administration Wilson included many Southerners, some of whom demanded segregation in 
government departments. Whilst it is true he stood against some of the cruder demands of these 
white supremacists, he and most of his cabinet were in favour of segregation, both official and 
social. He was actually surprised by the anger the controversy aroused and maintained 
throughout that it was done in the interests of the negroes themselves.
Wilson's views on other races went well beyond his antipathy towards negroes. In his History 
of the American People he made highly derogatory remarks about the recent wave of 
immigrants entering America from southern and eastern Europe. He wrote to Californian 
Senator J. D. Phelan that “ in the matter of Chinese and Japanese coolie immigration I stand 
for the national policy of exclusion... the whole question is one of assimilation of diverse races. 
We cannot make a homogenous population out of people who do not blend with the Caucasian 
race”  (4).
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He also had the contemporary disdain for career women, and always felt a woman’s place was 
in the home. He spoke of his disgust for ‘ ‘unsexed, masculine women, ’ ’ (5) and had few female 
friends, most of his intimates being male. He disliked his time teaching at Bryn Mawr and 
found the women students irksome. Wilson’s ideal woman was someone essentially feminine 
who was, as he told Ellen Axson ‘ ‘persuasive rather than coercive” (6). On the issue of female 
suffrage he told a reporter from the Royal Gazette, ‘ ‘women do not really want the franchise, 
and it would not be an unmixed blessing for the rest of the world if they had i t .... They are almost 
too much protected. Not that I would have it otherwise” (7).
After a period as a post-graduate at Johns Hopkins, and spells teaching at Bryn Mawr and 
Wesleyan Wilson joined the staff at Princeton as professor of jurisprudence in 1890. This was 
his most prolific period for writing and research. Between 1893 and 1902 he published nine 
volumes and thirty five articles and made a score of public addresses mostly on politics and 
history. His doctoral thesis Congressional Government analysed the functioning of the 
federal government. Wilson felt that the present system scattered responsibility and made it 
impossible for the electorate to keep their representatives accountable. He found the House 
wanting as a legislative body, and wrote off the president as a nonentity without effective 
power. Throughout the book one can detect Wilson ’ s bias against popular democracy in favour 
of government by intelligence and merit. He believed that the system as it stood was failing 
to produce real leaders, and so gave no scope for effective government. His remedy was a 
modified type of cabinet government where all cabinet members would be given seats in 
Congress, and so be made responsible for the passage of legislation. This solution is hardly 
surprising as Wilson was saturated with knowledge of English statesmen and politics; while 
his political roots were undoubtedly southern, his intellectual roots were English. At this time 
his model of political action was a somewhat romanticised version of British statecraft. 
However, in his lectures “ he gives no glimpse of the economic background of the English 
ruling classes. It was never hinted in his lectures that the gentry, bankers and businessmen 
enacted laws to protect their own class” (8). His doctoral thesis was hailed by his academic 
companions as a landmark in the analysis of American politics, though, his ideas were neither 
new nor profound. Many articles had already covered the same ground; it is almost 
inconceivable that he had not seen them, yet he did not acknowledge having done so.
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As an academic his writings were frequently marred by their shallow research, lack of 
originality, and deeply conservative attitude toward economic and social change. In The 
Making of the Nation he wrote of the “ crude and ignorant minds of the members of the 
Farmer’s Alliance” (9), and was savage in his criticism of Bryan and his “ Cross of Gold” 
campaign. During these early academic years he belonged to the Grover Cleveland “ sound 
money” wing of the Democratic party. He believed then and for long afterwards that trade 
unions were un American and were not in the best interests of the individual worker, in that they 
curtailed the worker’s right to sell his labour as he best saw fit. He long remained something 
of a Darwinian conservative. In The State he elaborated upon this gradualist theory of social 
change, “ in politics nothing radically novel may be safely attempted” (10).
In 1902 Wilson was made principal of Princeton. He took office with high hopes of making 
the university the intellectual heartland of American academic life. E. Gittings Reid believed 
that “ no university president ever had a stronger backing from his trustees than Wilson, and 
the majority of the faculty were his friends” (11). His early years as principal saw many 
successes. One of the innovations he suggested was the preceptorial system. Here instead of 
instructing students in a classroom-like manner through lectures and textbook reading, the 
university employed suitably qualified scholars to act as coaches and guides to the men's 
studies. When selecting personnel Wilson rather typically stated that “ their qualities as 
gentlemen must take precedence over their qualities as scholars should there be a clash’ ’(12).
A pre-requisite for the system was a thorough re-organisation of the university curriculum and 
departmental structure, which he undertook to carry out in 1903-1904. The adoption and 
inauguration of the preceptorial system and the re-organisation of the departmental structure 
and curriculum undoubtedly constitute Wilson’s greatest triumphs at Princeton.
In 1907 he prepared a paper attacking the university eating clubs, a student messing system 
based on election to various clubs. Not all the students could find a place in such a club. Wilson 
felt that the system operated to separate the social from the intellectual interests of the student, 
as loyalty to one’s club was often prized above loyalty to the university Wilson felt this was 
intolerable and wished to see the clubs replaced by a “ quadrangle’ ’ messing system. On this 
issue a maj ority of the faculty and a large body of the under-graduates supported him, however,
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a large bloc of the Eastern alumni were hostile, and their opposition led to the proposal being 
defeated, but not before much hard and bitter fighting. A plan to raise the intellectual life of 
Princeton at around $3,000,000 was asking too much! Numerous accounts have since been 
written which show Wilson battling the forces of reaction and snobbery over this and the 
graduate college issue. Most were written ex post facto, for Wilson made an assiduous effort 
to subordinate the social issues to the intellectual during these quarrels. It is clear though that 
he was not reluctant in 1912 to make political capital out of these clashes. He bore his defeat 
over the quads with bad grace, and broke with some of his oldest and closest friends. Foolishly 
he allowed the whole affair to degenerate into a personal quarrel. His intransigence and refusal 
to compromise, or even to treat tolerantly those who opposed him, not only helped to cause 
the defeat, but also undermined his earlier successes.
The quad issue had barely subsided when Wilson found himself at the centre of another 
acrimonious struggle. Here he clashed with the dean of the university, A.F.West, an equally 
powerful and opinionated man. They fought over the location and control of a proposed 
graduate college. While Wilson was occupied with curriculum reform and the preceptorial 
system he had wanted all the endowments from the alumni. West accepted this and supported 
him putting aside his own plans in the process. When Wilson put forward his quad proposal 
in 1907 West felt betrayed over yet another delay to his graduate college plan, and the two men 
broke as friends. As West and his friends took the lead in opposing the quad plan, Wilson hoped 
he could weaken West’s control over the graduate college and so get him to resign. The 
controversy was eventually resolved in May 1910 when I. C. Wyman died, leaving his entire 
estate valued at between $2,000,000 and $4,000,000 to the endowment of a graduate college 
along the West lines. This harmonised all differences of opinion and forced Wilson to admit 
total defeat. Wilson’s active participation in Princeton affairs ended in June 1910 when he 
accepted the Democratic nomination for the New Jersey governorship. Obviously the trustees 
did not know if he would be successful, but Wilson hoped they would wait for his resignation 
until after the result of the election. The anti-Wilson trustees, however, who now controlled 
the board, decided to force him out. A delegation was sent to him telling him to resign or face 
a vote of no confidence that he could only lose. The following morning he published a short 
note of resignation. M.T.Pyne wrote W.C.Proctor, “ according to the newspapers he forced 
his resignation on a reluctant board, although actually he was most reluctant to put it in and 
had to be told pretty positive that it had to be done’ ’ (13). Thus Wilson’s time at Princeton ended
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badly, his early triumphs soured by later defeats. These battles were unnecessary and were 
caused in large part by his inability to delegate responsibility or treat decently those who 
opposed him, a character trait that was to be displayed later when he began his political career.
Wilson - The Birth Of The Politician
In 1901 while writing a volume for A.B.Hart’s American Nation series Wilson first became 
acquainted with Colonel G.B.M.Harvey, a wealthy and influential newspaper owner. G.E.Mowry 
sees Harvey as a man more interested in protecting the position of the exceptional man in 
society than he ever was in bettering the lot of the masses. In own his book The Tolerance 
of Power Harvey concluded “ the majority of men still lead only automatic lives and 
contribute to progress only force, which serves no better than an idle engine unless directed” (14). 
Many other conservatives agreed, some even felt that in the highly differentiated America of 
the early 1900s the levelling process had already gone too far and had incorporated ‘ ‘ the theory 
of mediocrity which instinctively hates ability and invariably seeks undue advantage” (15). 
Harvey believed that Wilson shared his opinions and, after hearing his inaugural address at 
Princeton in 1902, he read all of his works. This led him to conclude that Wilson was potential 
presidential material; he was actually speaking to his assistant W.O.Inglis in such terms as early 
as 1902. He finally gave voice to these opinions at the Lotos Club dinner in honour of Wilson 
in February 1906. Here he made the startling proposal that Wilson should be nominated for 
president at a future date. Wilson was immensely flattered but no one, not even Wilson, seemed 
to take Harvey seriously. Undaunted Harvey pressed on and even set about enlisting support 
for Wilson from like-minded colleagues. On 10 March 1906 he ran an item on this very subject 
in his publication H arper’s Weekly.
As a Democrat of conservative inclination Harvey had long opposed W. J.Bryan. Unfortunately 
for Harvey no one in the party had more influence than Bryan, but as he had led the party to 
defeat on two occasions many Democrats no longer saw him as a winning candidate. If a new 
candidate emerged Harvey knew that he would have to be economically sound enough to 
satisfy the east and yet still be able to arouse the enthusiasm of Democratic activists. In his 
quest to mount a challenge to Bryan, Harvey and his associates deliberately went outside the
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ranks of professional politicians when lighting on Wilson. As a man of reputation, they knew 
he would be seen as an absolutely independent person. In a sense, the men to whom he would 
appeal for their vote would know nothing of him, on the other hand what they would know 
would be largely in his favour. He occupied a high and dignified position as a man of learning, 
a position which seemed to keep him above the sordidness of politics. Harvey was certain that 
‘ ‘around his (Wilson’s) banner would come all those forces which recognize that real progress 
comes from evolution, rather than revolution” (16). In his efforts to head off the progressives 
Harvey enlisted the support of a large group of political and economic conservatives, men like 
T.F.Ryan the utilities magnate and W.F.Laffan thepublisher. Wall Streetbankers, businessmen 
and conservative editors were all to be among Wilson’s early supporters. So much so that in 
1910 when Wilson was seeking to develop progressive credentials W.W.Bailey, the editor of 
the Johnstown Democrat, wrote “ in common with many others I associated you with the 
reactionary element of the party”  (17).
On Friday 15 March 1907 Harvey invited Wilson to a private dinner at Delmonico’s in New 
York. Here Wilson met Laffan and Ryan, and as W.O.Inglis says “ a self-constituted 
committee of investigation and selection, acting in behalf of a Conservative Democracy as 
against the Bryanized variety,”  met to look Wilson over “ to see if he came up to 
specifications” (18). At the request of his dinner companions Wilson put together a paper 
called “ Credo” . This document provides a succinct summary of his political and economic 
views in this period. In it Wilson said
The object of constitutional government is the liberty of the individual. There 
is no such thing as corporate liberty or corporate morality: only the individual 
can be moral and free. We need statutes not to regulate the business of the 
country, but to single out the individual amidst the intricacies of modem 
industrial organisation, and to fix upon men the responsibility for particular 
transactions. Great trusts are necessary because they are the most convenient 
and efficient instmmentalities of modem business .... Govemment should not 
undertake to regulate and supervise business.
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Wilson commented on labour thus
the constitution guarantees to every man the right to sell his labour to whom he 
pleases for such price as he is willing to accept. The men who abridge or abrogate 
this right have neither the ideas nor the sentiments needed for the maintenance 
or the enjoyment of liberty(19).
Wilson’s words must have satisfied his dinner companions for Ryan later contributed 
generously to his first campaign, and Laffan’s New York Sun supported Wilson up until 
Laffan died. Thus Wilson the avowed conservative Democrat was taken under the wing of the 
east coast capitalist section of the party, largely because it liked his pro-capital, anti-labour 
views. Here was a man they could identify with, and use.
From this time onwards Wilson was encouraged to speak out on political issues. In December 
1907 he addressed the Southern Society of New York, during which he emphasized the 
necessity for political idealism as a motivating force in American regeneration, and also said 
‘ ‘governments should supply an equilibrium not a disturbing force’ ’(20), showing that his deep 
rooted sense of historical conservatism was still predominant. He had never been impressed 
by the progressives and their demands, his conservatism tended to make him think that reform 
should always be geared towards maintaining the status quo. In 1896 Wilson had been openly 
contemptuous of Bryan and the Populists, however, once he began to contemplate the 
possibility of a political career he began to re-examine many of his own beliefs. By 1907 he 
was beginning to admit that much of Bryan’s diagnosis was essentially correct, but he still felt 
that Bryan was “ a man with a power of leadership but with no mental rudder” (21).
In November 1904 Laffan’s New York Sun quoted Wilson as saying “ the country needs and 
will tolerate no party of discontent or radical experiment, but it does need and will follow a 
party of conservative reform acting in the spirit of law and ancient institutions" (22). Three 
years later he was still saying ‘ ‘the problems that face contemporary America cannot be solved 
by radical action. Reform must come, but Americans must see to it that the process of reform 
is moderate and self-possessed by putting its prosecution in the hands of those who are free from 
the follies of establishing a panic and radical experiment” (23). This was the doctrine of an 
avowed conservative, one who would be at ease in the company of men like Harvey and Ryan.
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oHe denounced the regulatory passion of Roosevelt, he inveighed against regulation in business 
and industry by commission, he believed that a temperate and honest pursuit of private good 
was a public blessing. During the same speech he had gone on to say ‘ ‘the process of reform 
must be guided by those who understand the danger of drastic and radical change, who know 
the folly of rash experiments .... we do not speak exclusively of the capitalist classes. There 
is another as formidable an enemy to equality and freedom of opportunity, and that is the class 
formed by the labor organizations and leaders of the country - a class representing a small 
minority of the laboring men of the country, quite as monopolistic in spirit as the capitalists 
and quite as apt to corrupt and ruin other industries by their monopolies. If we are to restore 
the purity of our law and the freedom of our life we must see to it that no class whatever is given 
artificial privilege or opportunity” (23).
He went much further than this in June 1909 when giving his baccalaureate address to the 
graduating class at Princeton:
You know the usual standard of the employe is our day. It is to give as little as 
he may for his wages. Labor is standardized by the trade unions, and this is the 
standard to which it is made to conform. No one is suffered to do more than the 
average workman can do: in some trades and handicrafts no one is suffered to 
do more than the least skilful of his followers can do within the hours allotted 
to a day's labor, and no one may work out of hours at all or volunteer anything 
beyond the minimum. I need not point out how economically disastrous such 
a regulation of labor is. It is so unprofitable to the employer that in some trades 
it will presently not be worth his while to attempt anything at all. He had better 
stop altogether. America is rapidly becoming unprofitable under its present 
regulation (24).
The speech was reported in the New York Times,
Woodrow Wilson Hits Labor Unions. Says They Gave The Least Possible For Wages (25).
The speech and accompanying newspaper coverage provoked a storm of protest from unionists 
throughout the country who bombarded Wilson with letters. When attempting to explain his
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oposition he was forced to admit he had obtained all his information from ‘ ‘those who employ 
labor on a great scale” (26). He had little to say by way of reply to the many people who attacked 
him for his ignorance of working conditions and his unsympathetic attitudes.
Wilson - The Gubernatorial Campaign In New Jersey 1910
The impending defeat of the Republicans in New Jersey in 1910 was apparent to Harvey long 
before the actual date, and this made him think that the time was right for actively launching 
Wilson’s political career. Harvey was certain that the governorship would be a useful place 
V  for Wilson to cut his political teeth whilst also serving as a springboard for a presidential bid
in 1912. There is no evidence, in his speeches or letters, that Wilson ever concerned himself 
with New Jersey politics on any occasion before this date, not that this bothered Harvey.
The Republicans had been in control of the New Jersey legislature since 1893. Big business 
was securely in the saddle and held the ruins of Republican power. R.E.Noble alleged that 
“ probably no part of the Union offered more impregnable defenses to the onslaughts of 
progressivism than New Jersey’ ’(27). Practically all the great holding companies secured their 
charters under her laws, earning the state the dubious title ‘ ‘mother of trusts’ ’(28). Before the 
advent of Wilson progressivism in the state was a Republican endeavour, these ‘ ‘New Ideas’ ’ 
men as the Republican progressives were called prepared the way for many of the reforms 
Wilson was later praised for passing.
The Democratic party in New Jersey was controlled by three men. The most powerful figure 
was James Smith, who was president of the Federal Trust Company of Newark, head of several 
manufacturing companies and the owner of some morning and evening newspapers. He was 
a natural politician and as such was leader of Irish-American and Catholic affairs in much of 
the state. Smith was a longstanding friend of Harvey, whose career Harvey had helped on many 
occasions. Smith’s help on its own would not be enough, however, and so the assistance of 
the two other Democratic bosses would be needed. One was James Nugent, but as he was 
Smith ’ s nephew and one of his financial underlings, Harvey knew he could be trusted to follow
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the Smith line. As Nugent was chairman of the state Democratic Committee this greatly 
strengthened the Smith-Nugent stranglehold on New Jersey. The third party boss, Robert 
Davis, was the county collector of taxes and held the reins of power in the Jersey City area. 
He was a longstanding enemy of Smith, but his help would be essential if Harvey was to have 
Wilson elected governor. Harvey was confident he could pressurize all three into co-operating, 
and he was to be proved correct. While Harvey was arranging all of this, Wilson made it clear 
that he would do nothing to secure the nomination, but would accept it if  it came to him 
unsolicited. Harvey was so sure of his hold over the state bosses that he felt he could even 
arrange that. Davis certainly agreed for he was heard to say ‘ ‘How the hell do I know whether 
he will make a good governor. He will make a good candidate and that is the only thing that 
interests me” (29). Smith was also willing to accept Harvey’s plan, but only after Wilson 
promised that if he was elected governor he would co-operate with the party machine and not 
3  attempt to set up an organisation of his own.
By June 1910 Harvey had convinced Smith that Wilson was the ideal candidate for the 
Democratic presidential nomination in 1912. This prompted Smith to say “ we have the 
opportunity of electing the next president of the United States by nominating and electing 
Woodrow Wilson as governor of New Jersey” (30). On 15 July 1910 Wilson wrote to the 
Trenton True American and the Newark Evening News to announce his willingness to 
accept the gubernatorial nomination. Most of the Democratic and many of the Republican 
newspapers greeted this news with enthusiasm. Wilson struck many journalists as being a 
fascinating and unique character, which resulted in his getting local and national press coverage 
not given to other candidates.O
While the Democractic bosses closed ranks around Wilson, the machine found that many 
Democrats were not prepared to accept him. There was no tidal wave of popular support for 
Wilson entering politics. In fact many progressives took the attempts of the machine to foist 
him upon the party as a blow to their efforts against bossism. The fact that the bosses endorsed 
him was taken as “ a sign of your (Wilson’s) willingness to allow the use of your name as a 
club by men whom every good Democrat feels to have been the bane of the party and whose 
leadership has made the state hopelessly Republican” (31). Others agreed, the Hudson 
Observer asserted ‘ ‘that Dr. Wilson was induced to enter the race by a combination of the very 
elements which the progressives were fighting” . It went on to call him the “ catspaw of the
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bosses” (32). Ten days earlier W.R.Hearst’s Chicago Record-Herald had perceptively 
declared “ Woodrow Wilson will be the Democratic candidate for president in 1912 if a 
combination of Wall Street and political interests can make him so” (33).
Wilson’s opponents manoeuvred skilfully and had James Kemey of the Trenton Evening 
News lead the assault upon him. Following Harvey’s advice Wilson had refused to make any 
statements on his views. This was used as a powerful weapon against him as he wished to 
become the gubernatorial candidate only if a ‘ ‘decided majority of thoughtful Democrats”  (34) 
wanted him, yet he would not elaborate upon his beliefs! This led Kemey to say “ the 
thoughtful Democrats of the state are asked to pass upon the candidacy of a man who is 
unwilling to let them know his views. He has never taken an active part in New Jersey affairs, 
never had the slightest experience of public life and is an absolute stranger to the great body 
of voters.... In effect he says take me on the endorsement of Morgan, Harvey and Lindenbury 
whose corporate connections you know. He does not even refer to his earlier expressions on 
working men to earn their wages, or his decidedly undemocratic view that the people are 
incompetent to select their servants” (35).
Even with coverage like this Wilson still had many advantages over his opponents: the backing 
of all the New Jersey bosses, a basically friendly press, and the fact that the progressives were 
badly organised and split between rival candidates. Thus on 14 September 1910 at the state 
convention Wilson won the nomination on the first ballot. Interestingly, he was introduced 
to his audience as “ the candidate for the governorship, AND THE NEXT PRESIDENT OF 
THE UNITED STATES” (36). His acceptance speech was a great success and a revelation 
in that he asserted ‘ ‘I did not seek this nomination, it came to me completely unsolicited. With 
the consequence that I shall enter upon the duties of the office of governor if elected with 
absolutely no pledge of any kind to prevent me from serving the people” (37). Startling words 
coming from a man whose nomination and subsequent election were boss engineered and 
supported. To have any real chance of success Wilson knew he would still need the votes of 
many Republicans and independents. Their support was by no means certain as his Republican 
opponent, V.M.Lewis, occupied a similar position to himself, being a candidate of a boss 
controlled party who appeared to be more progressive than his party leaders.
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Wilson’s first speeches in the campaign were not a success, he did not mention any state issue, 
merely laying before his audiences a revamped edition of the speeches on national affairs he 
had been giving for five years. It soon became apparent that if he was to have any chance of 
success he would have to break with his conservative past and embrace progressivism - a break 
evidently caused as much by political expediency as any other factor. He did not strike out on 
this new course without the prompting and tutoring of people like H.E. Alexander, the editor 
of the Trenton True American, who was among many advising him, helping in the 
preparation of speeches and instructing him on which issues to raise. Throughout the first three 
weeks of October Wilson’s speeches developed a markedly more radical tone, so much so that 
by 11 October he was declaring with apparent sincerity “ I am and always have been an 
insurgent” (38).
His Republican opponents counter-attacked by publishing many pamphlets alleging that he 
was an enemy of organised labour. It was here that they achieved their greatest success. 
Wilson’s conservative pro-business, anti-union views were circulated widely and generated 
a reaction among workingmen that offered a serious threat to the Democrats. The backlash 
began in Trenton when the Central Labor Union adopted a resolution that the workingmen of 
the area were ‘ ‘unalterably opposed to the nomination of Woodrow Wilson for the Governorship 
of New Jersey” (39). Matters worsened when the State Federation of Labor at their Newark 
Convention overwhelmingly endorsed the following resolution:
Whereas, the financial interests of Wall Street, New York, are endeavouring to 
have Woodrow Wilson, President of Princeton University, nominated as a 
candidate for the Governor of the State of New Jersey, and whereas, in his 
baccalaureate address to the students of Princeton University in 1909 Woodrow 
Wilson again strongly expressed his antagonism to organized labor: therefore 
be it resolved, by the New Jersey State Federation of Labor in Convention 
assembled this 15 August 1910, that this Federation be placed on record as 
opposing the nomination of said Woodrow Wilson as a candidate for Governor, 
that it urges every trade unionist and wage earner that, should the Wall Street 
financial interests succeed in having Woodrow Wilson nominated to act as a tool 
or agent of said Wall Street interests if he should be elected, that every trade 
unionist and wage earner in the State of New Jersey do their best to defeat him
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and to teach the financial interests of Wall Street, New York, that the voters and 
trade unionists of the State of New Jersey are capable of selecting their own 
Governor. (40)
This threw the Wilson camp into disarray. He was urged by his advisors to effect a counter
move at the earliest opportunity. A chance presented itself when E.R. Williamson, the editor
of the American Labor Standard, wrote to Wilson asking him to clarify hisposition on views.
Wilson seized the chance and wrote him a public letter in which he said:
The gross misrepresentations of my views with regard to organized labor which 
some newspapers have printed have given me no concern.... I was distressed that 
the New Jersey Federation of Labor should have allowed itself to be imposed 
upon - not because its members are likely to remain deceived in this matter, but 
for the opposite reason .... I have always been a friend of organized labor. It is 
in my opinion, not only perfectly legitimate, but absolutely necessary that labor 
should organize if it is to secure justice from organized capital, and everything 
that it does to improve the condition of workingmen, to obtain legislation that 
will impose full legal responsibility upon the employer for his treatment of his 
employes and for their protection against accident, to secure just and adequate 
wages, and to put just limits upon the working day and upon all the exactions 
of those who employ labor, ought to have the hearty support of the fairminded 
and public spirited man. For there is a sense in which the condition of labor is 
the condition of the nation itself.... I have criticized some of the things organized 
labor has occasionally done, but I have criticized them as a friend and because 
I thought them harmful to the laborers themselves and harmful to the country.
I know of no other standard by which to judge these things.... The laboring men 
cannot benefit themselves by injuring the industries of the country. Many 
thoughtful laboring men are themselves critical. I am much more afraid that 
the great corporations, combinations and trusts will do the country harm than 
that the labor organizations will do harm (41).
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Here Wilson repudiated virtually everything he had ever said about unions. Many editors were 
willing to accept his argument that while he had attacked unions in the past it was only ever 
done in a spirit of friendship. The Perth Amboy Evening News declared, “ with his letter 
setting forth his position on organized labor Woodrow Wilson stands forth stronger than ever 
as a candidate (42). Many Republican journals agreed. Kemey in the Trenton Evening News 
remained unconvinced saying that to state that Wilson was “ shifting his position towards the 
unions was ludicrous to say the least”  (43). In the Jersey Journal Henry F.Hilfers, secretary 
of the State Federation of Labor asserted that Wilson’s rapid change of heart was linked solely 
to his desire to be governor.
Wilson’s letter to Williamson prompted many workingmen to write to him asking him to 
explain the differences between the things he had said to Williamson and his earlier addresses. 
Sam Gompers contacted him on 20 October asking for a copy of his 1909 baccalaureate address 
and additional comments on his labour planks. D.L.MacKay, a New Jersey union official and 
W.Blackbum, the secretary of the Machinist local 87 West Jersey Lodge wrote numerous 
letters during October asking Wilson to explain the contradictions between his various 
statements. This led Wilson to write to MacKay, ‘ ‘there is absolutely no contradiction between 
the two sets of remarks you have seen quoted from me regarding the organization of labor. I 
believe that the organization of labor is absolutely necessary in the face of organized capital, 
and that most of the legitimate advantages which the laboring man has won in recent years in 
the respect of wages and many other matters have been won through the instmmentality of 
labor organizations. They have been legitimate and useful. At the same time I have once and 
again criticized the use they have made of their organization” (44). His answers satisfied 
neither MacKay nor Blackburn.
His mounting problems with labour led Wilson to seek out audiences of workers and to return 
constantly to labour issues. In the closing weeks of October he spoke almost exclusively on 
labour topics before audiences at Philipsburg, Newton, Camden, Salem, New Brunswick, 
Elizabeth, Bayonne and in both Bergen and Mercer counties. Although each speech was subtly 
different in every case he endeavoured to make clear that he felt his previous words on unions 
had been deliberately misrepresented by his opponents in order to deceive, and that he had only 
ever voiced them in the first place out of a solicitude on his part for the interests of workers 
themselves. Wilson’s efforts to win the votes of workers by asserting that he had not really
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meant what he had said previously may well have mollified many individual labourers; the 
officers of the State Federation of Labor, however, remained unconvinced and refused to 
withdraw their resolution condemning him.
While labour as an organisation remained antagonistic Wilson was successful in winning the 
support of enough Democrats, Republicans and independents to win the election. He won by 
a plurality of49,056 and carried into office alongside him a Democratic assembly. Wilson had 
a total of233,933 votes, Lewis only managed 185,573. This was agratifying victory for Wilson 
as Taft had carried the state for the Republicans in 1908 with a majority of 80,000. But the 
night of 8 November 1910 was a good one for the Democrats nationally. The House of 
Representative became Democrat controlled for the first time since 1892, and Democratic 
governors were elected in the previously Republican states of New York, Massachusetts, 
Connecticut, Ohio, Indiana, North Dakota and Colorado. Thus Wilson’s boss engineered 
victory in New Jersey was helped in no small way by the resurgence in the Democrats' fortunes 
nationally.
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CHAPTER THREE
GOVERNOR OF NEW JERSEY.
Wilson was praised by his contemporaries as a great progressive governor, and success in New 
Jersey considerably helped in his fight for the presidency. This chapter, however, will attempt 
to show a different side to his goverorship. We will see that the achievements of the New Jersey 
legislature were in actual fact quite commonplace, and merely brought the state into line with 
developments elsewhere. We shall see how Wilson curtailed the advances his legislators could 
have made by limiting his official programme to four main measures, and that these bills when 
passed into law owed as much to the legislators’ efforts themselves as they did to Wilson. But 
the State Federation of Labor fared well under Wilson and got much needed help with the 
passing of the state’s Employer’s Liability - Workingmen’s Compensation Act, and as a result 
their previously poor impression of him was amended. Whilst the 1911 session was hailed as 
a great success we shall see that the 1912 session was not. This was because Wilson simply 
spent too much time chasing the Democratic presidential nomination, and when he was in 
Trenton he was unwilling and unable to work with the Republican assemblymen who then 
controlled the legislature.
The Legislative Session 1911
Wilson was sworn in as the forty third governor of New Jersey on 17 January 1911. When he 
was elected both he and his friends knew that he had been put into training for the presidency. 
The nomination lay two years away, so he had only that amount of time in which to make a 
reputation for himself and to develop a national machine. Money, favour and habit had bought 
Wilson his nomination and victory. Thus the new governor entered office pledged to serve two 
masters: the bosses who had secured his victory and now expected some say in the new 
administration, and the progressives among the electorate who expected him to redeem the 
party pledges. His plight was eased in that he could draw support from a basically friendly 
legislature. There was a Democratic majority in a joint session; although the Democrats had 
an overwhelming majority in the assembly, the Republicans had a slight majority in the senate. 
The legislature of 1911 was not unlike most of the other state legislatures of the period as far 
as the quality of its members was concerned. The average assemblyman, irrespective of party,
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could boast little real political ability. Most were rather mediocre transients on their road to 
other govemment offices. Wilson spoke of them thus, “ they are not at all to my taste. I cannot 
help feeling a bit vulgar after them.... they do not leave me pleased with myself. I feel debased 
to the level of the men who I feel obliged to snub” (l).
During and immediately after the election Wilson gave little thought to his relationship with 
the Smith machine. The state committees, the county committees, the ward organisations in 
the cities, all the organs of the New Jersey party were controlled by Smith and his associates. 
Prior to his nomination Wilson had agreed not to attack or undermine the party machine (2). 
Shortly after the election, however. Smith informed Wilson that he had decided to ignore a 
recent vote which endorsed J. E. Martine as the Democrats’ choice as the next state senator, 
and was hoping to return to the Senate himself. Wilson was anxious to dissuade him as such 
an action would make him look like a tool of Smith. He was keen to avoid a break with Smith, 
but he could not persuade him to withdraw or accept a compromise candidate. Kemey noted 
that ‘ ‘to our suggestion that the Democrats had already definitely decided on Martine he gave 
little weight” (3). While Wilson was anxious to quietly resolve things without any great 
upheaval, all the state’s leading progressive papers backed Martine. ‘If Martine should be 
robbed of his rights by the Democratic machine, the people will realize that they have been 
betrayed” (4).
Judge J.W.Westcott was among many progressives who wrote to Wilson asserting that, ‘ ‘if 
Smith is chosen, these results are certain; 1 His election will prove a bargain and sale, the office 
going to the highest bidder. 2 Dr. Wilson is controlled by the same interests and methods that 
control Smith. 3 Dr. Wilson, so far as his usefulness in American regeneration is concerned, 
would be a negative quality. 4 The Democratic party in New Jersey would be out of power 
at the next election’ ’(5). Such criticism prompted Wilson to act. He wrote to Colonel Harvey 
hoping he would make Smith withdraw, but he could not do so. Thus Wilson came to realise 
that his hopes of seizing the leadership of the progressive forces nationally could be destroyed 
if he failed to support the progressives in New Jersey on this issue. Also as the progressives 
held the balance of power in the legislature their support was essential to the implementation 
of his state programme. He knew that if he did not lead the anti-Smith forces now he would 
never receive their support later. On 25 January 1911 Wilson succeeded in having Martine 
elected as the Senator for New Jersey by 47 votes to 3. It was fortunate for Wilson that this
41
oo
controversy occurred at the beginning of his political career, for it threw him out to the foremost 
waves of progressivism in the country. The defeat of Smith also made the average state 
assemblyman more willing to accept and follow the new governor. Without victory in this early 
clash it is arguable that Wilson would have experienced tremendous problems in enacting any 
part of his programme in 1911. His victory over Smith had its adverse side, however, in that 
it caused his original backer Harvey to have doubts about the wisdom of his scheme to advance 
Wilson as a conservative Democratic candidate for the presidency. His trouncing of Smith also 
made many veteran Democratic bosses loath to endorse him as a candidate.
Wilson was also fortunate that the Martine battle occurred early in his governorship for it left 
him free in the last weeks of December 1910 and early January 1911 to draw up a programme 
for the new assembly. It also meant that when the assembly convened on 10 January 1911 he 
soon became the most powerful figure there. To help in the drafting of a programme Wilson 
called a conference at his Princeton home. This group included academics from his teaching 
days, representatives from both parties and George Record, the state’s leading progressive 
Republican. He arrived at Wilson’s door armed with a wealth of material. To him Wilson 
assigned the task of writing direct primary and corrupt practices bills. Wilson asked other 
members present to prepare the remaining measures, these the Trenton Evening News 
reported “ embody platform pledges favoring the enactment of public utilities, corrupt 
practices and employer’s liability laws, as well as an election law’ ’(6). On the subject of further 
legislation Wilson declared “ I am not saying whether they have my support or opposition until 
they reach my hands ”  (6). He was astute enough to realise that the maj ority of laws, both public 
and private, enacted by a state legislature in any single session were of little real interest to the 
public. He knew that his own assemblymen would also demand their share of petty legislation, 
and so he and his advisors resolved from the outset to insist upon only four leading reform 
measures.
The state Democratic party had pledged Wilson as governor to "The enactment of an 
employer’s liability act which will satisfy the just demands of labor and secure safety and 
efficient sanitation in all manufacturing processes and employment," and "The enactment of 
a law establishing eight hours as the limit of the working day in all public works’ ’(7). Wilson 
was careful to endorse these pledges in the many speeches he made to audiences of
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workingmen. In his inaugural address on 17 January 1911 Wilson outlined the scope of his 
programme as far as labour matters were concerned:
No wise man will say that he sees the whole problem of reform lying plain before 
him or knows how to frame the entire body of law that will be necessary to square 
with the general interest.... in the first place, it is plain that our laws with regard 
to the relations of employer and employe are in many respects wholly antiquated 
and impossible. The employer is now generally a corporation or huge company, 
the employe is one of hundreds or of thousands brought together, not by 
individual masters whom they know and with whom they have personal 
relations, but by agents of one sort or another .... New rules must be devised with 
(%) regard to their obligations to their employers and their responsibilities to one
another. New rules must be devised for their protection, for their compensation 
when injured, for their support when disabled.... We must have a workingman’s 
compensation act, which will give him rights without suit, directly, and without 
conflict, by automatic operation of law. This is the first adjustment needed, 
because it affects the rights, the happiness, the lives and fortunes of the largest 
number, and because it is the adjustment for which justice cries loudest (8).
O
He thus placed an employer’s liability - workingman’s compensation bill at the front of his 
legislative programme. In closing his speech he conceded “ this is a big program, but it is a 
perfectly consistent program, and it is a perfectly feasible programe, and upon whose details 
it ought to be perfectly possible to agree even within the limits of a single legislative 
session” (8). Wilson threw his cap into the ring in the fight to enact the programme, pitting 
his reputation - to rise or to fall - upon it. As it was the programme the progressive of both parties 
had been trying to enact for over ten years its passage now, when many of them were actually 
sitting in the assembly, was surely not asking for too much?
On 4 February 1911a steering committee was formed which included J.P.Tumulty - Wilson’s 
private secretary, J. J.Treacey, Record and assemblymen Fielder, Silzer, Osborne and Gebhardt. 
Meeting at Wilson’s home they decided who would sponsor which bills. Wilson had 
assemblyman Geran take control of the primary and election reform measure. It was
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introduced into the lower house on 6 February 1911. It passed both houses and their respective 
committees by a majority of 34 to 25 on 6 March 1911. Whilst its passage was a victory for 
the forces of liberalism, the bill was so shabbily constructed, and so full of minor errors, that 
it was “ an absolutely unworkable document” (9). Record drafted the corrupt practices bill 
borrowing heavily from U’Ren’s Oregon reforms, and by 20 April 1911 this bill had also 
passed into law. It was speedily followed by a bill designed to effectively regulate the rates 
and activities of public utilities. The bill encountered few real obstacles in either house. 
Passing into law on the final day of the session it was one of the most through going public 
utilities statutes in the country at that time.
The last of the four major measures was the workingman’s compensation bill. Wilson outlined 
O  his reasons for backing it thus.
New Jersey is belated beyond most all of the states in establishing a just 
relationship of liability between the employer and the employe. We have 
permitted to exist in this state until the present day common law defenses against 
liability which belong to an absolutely different state of society. These common 
law defenses... ought to have gone with chain armor. Not in order to leave the 
employer defenseless, but in order to leave an equitable arrangement, by which 
there should be set an automatic insurance of workingmen against risk, an 
insurance that must be borne by the employer. What insurance company will 
now for reasonable rates insure an employer against the absolutely incalculable 
risks of a suit of law? You have to go before a jury. The sympathy of the jury 
may give excessive damages if the case is pitiable. No one can calculate the 
result of a suit. You cannot establish a rate against which there is no basis of 
calculation, but if you will establish a definite schedule of liabilities and have 
that schedule extend to the insurance company, than you can reinsure yourself 
in the insurance company at a definite, fixed calculable rate, and you are not 
going to pay, for the whole community is going to pay for it (10).
O
In spite of the continued agitation of the New Ideas reformers as late as 1908 New Jersey was 
still “ shamed by having the most ancient and unjust of any employer’s liability laws in the 
country”  (11). Employer - employee relations in New Jersey were still regulated solely on the
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principles of the common law, and an injured employee often found it near impossible to get 
damages because of the operation of the rules of “ assumption of risk,”  “ contributory 
negligence’ ’ and “ fellow servant negligence.”  The burden in industrial accidents, therefore, 
fell almost entirely upon the injured employee, his family, or private charity. The AFL was 
in favour of compensation, but their preferred solution was to improve the worker’s chance 
of success through the courts. While wanting greater employer liability in the case of injury, 
the AFL did not want to see laws passed which set specific rates for specific injuries; however, 
by 1907,26 states had just such a law. The AFL was not happy with this development for they 
believed that attacking compensation settlements through the courts could result in greater 
labour gains, whereas compensation laws merely pensioned off injured workers on a fixed 
income.
In 1909 agitation by New Jersey progressives and the State Federation of Labor had forced 
the Republican party, then controlling the legislature, to modify the operation of the common 
law principles. The new statute was so badly drawn that it satisfied the demands of no one. 
The struggle continued and in 1910 the Republican leaders were forced to concede the 
appointment of a commission of inquiry under Senator Edge to investigate the problem for 
Governor Fort. Shortly after his inauguration Wilson conferred with Edge on the question of 
an employer’s liability law that would meet the demands of organised labour. Although his 
commission was mainly Republican Edge assured Wilson that his members would be 
cooperative. On 16 January 1911 Edge introduced an employer’s liability bill into the upper 
house. When it was sent to the assembly, however, it encountered the opposition of 
assemblyman Ford,who was the president of the State Federation of Labor and chairman of 
the committee on labor and industries. Ford was recognized as the leading spokesman for 
organised labour in New Jersey. Both parties had agreed to support the principle of 
workingmen’s compensation during the 1910 election, so the controversy over the 1911 
legislation was a straight fight over the nature and extent of any such measure. Edge’s bill had 
grown directly out of his commission on liability. Wilson gave Edge the go-ahead on his bill 
shortly after refusing to introduce a similar bill submitted to him by Record. Edge’s bill made 
its provisions elective in an effort to prevent it being declared unconstitutional at a later date. 
It also contained a clause saying that if the parties concerned did not contract out of its operation 
within a given period then its conditions would take effect automatically. The bill approved 
specific sums for specific injuries, this ran contrary to the wishes of organised labour and so 
became a point of contention when it entered the assembly. When the bill first came to the vote
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in the Senate on 14 March 1911, Senator Gebhardt speaking for Wilson opposed the single 
measure that specified set sums for particular injuries as it was known that the State Federation 
objected to this.
Assemblyman Ford countered Edge by introducing two similar bills on 16 January 1911 into 
the lower houses, one on employer’s liability, the other on workingmen’s compensation. 
Assemblyman A. B. Walsh of Mercer County also proposed ameasure of his own, which called 
for a definite schedule of compensation for specific injuries. Ford insisted that his measures 
should take precedence over Edge’s bill, largely because they provided for greater 
compensation. By forcefully advancing his own bills and using his powers in the assembly he 
succeeded in keeping Edge’s bill bottled up in committee for two weeks when it came down 
from the Senate in March 1911, without actually reporting it to the lower house. In a bid to 
end this embarrassing situation Wilson had to take decisive action. Thus in late March he 
decided to openly support Edge over Ford, reasoning that Edge’s more cautious bill had the 
greater chance of passing the legislature successfully before the session ended in April. He was 
fearful that the current disagreement between the two houses would result in no liability 
legislation passing at all. Wilson was certain that Ford’s bill, being broader in scope and more 
expensive, would not pass the more conservative. Republican - dominated Senate. He called 
Ford in, hoping that he could persuade him to accept the Edge measure. ‘ ‘Don’t you think it 
would be the part of wisdom to accept the Edge bill and make sure of getting something? ” (12) 
Wilson asked of Ford. Clearly Wilson impressed Ford as, after discussions with the State 
Federation, he backed the Edge bill as a compromise measure. On 3 April 1911 the assembly 
unanimously approved the state’s first workingmen’s compensation act. The following day 
Wilson added his signature. He praised Ford for cooperating, ‘ ‘it is said about Mr Ford that 
his interests are too much specialized and centred, that he does not really think of any legislation 
except that which is in the interest of the laboring man. He is interested in more things. I cannot 
say I criticize him for being interested in the matter .... Ford and his associates in the great 
laboring organizations of the State had independent preferences with regard to the provisions 
of the Employer’s Liability and Workingman’s Compensation Act, they cooperated in the 
passage of the act.... They were not working, so far as I discovered, for any private or partisan 
advantage” (13).
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The Edge bill was in three parts like the 1909 act it superseded. Section one specifically 
abolished the two remaining grounds which exempted employers from liability: assumption 
of risk and fellow servant negligence. Once an employer and his employees had agreed to be 
bound by the act the employer was compelled to pay compensation whether there was 
negligence or not. It was assumed that the parties concerned had agreed to this unless they 
specifically stated that they would not be bound by its provisions. One exception was if the 
injury was clearly self-inflicted due to intoxication. Section two caused more controversy, 
dealing as it did with the method of compensation. It laid down a definite schedule of payments 
to be made in the case of injury or death, and provided that during the first two weeks after injury 
the employer should furnish reasonable medical care to the injured worker. In the case of death 
there was a sliding scale of payments linked to such things as the deceased worker’s dependents 
and job description. Workers had to agree to surrender their right to seek compensation 
elsewhere, such as from a jury trial. They could go to court only if the amount of compensation 
was disputed. The final section defined wilful negligence on the part of the employee, in which 
case the act need not apply, and also set forth the general provisions of the law. While approving 
this act, the legislature simultaneously approved two more Edge bills. One expanded the 
coverage of the new law to people employed before the act came into force. The other 
established an employer’s liability commission to investigate and report on injuries.
In 1910 the New York state legislature had passed a workingman’s compensation act similar 
to the Edge bill. On 24 March 1911 the State Court of Appeal declared the New Y ork measure 
unconstitutional on the grounds that its compulsory features violated both state and federal 
provisions. The Newark District Telegraph Company set about testing the New Jersey 
legislation in October 1911 declaring that this measure was also unconstitutional. On 26 
February 1913 the State Supreme Court upheld the act, denying the company’s claim that it 
violated the Fourteen Amendment. This was by no means the only problem with the act as 
Wilson pointed out that ‘ ‘a great many indemnity companies which have sought to discharge 
the whole business by raising their rates from 40% to 100%, when the employers try to do what 
they must do - insure themselves against the risk - 1 amnotby any means sure thatmy judgement 
goes to the length of a State system of insurance, but these gentlemen can oblige us to establish 
one’ ’(14). All the parties concerned reached a compromise settlement thus making state action 
unnecessary.
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The State Federation of Labor understood perfectly the limitations inherent in the governor’s 
office and powers, and so were pleased with what had been accomplished. The new act went 
as far as mainstream AFL members wished government intervention in their affairs to go. The 
fixed rate of compensation for specific injuries was not to their taste, nor was the fact that the 
worker was obliged to surrender his right to a jury trial. Most still agreed, however, that the 
concessions granted were satisfactory as the act improved upon the existing situation and in 
the circumstances was the best they could expect.
The progressive leaders in the state legislature had a reform programme of their own, that in 
many respects went far beyond the bounds of Wilson’s four - cornered package, and so they 
worked hard for its passage. During the 1912 presidential campaign Wilson received the credit 
for all the measures enacted during his term, those he had actually worked for, and those passed 
with nothing more than his passive support. Certainly his bruising of the Smith machine made 
things a lot easier for these progressive legislators, and even passive support is better than 
nothing; but he was in no real sense the driving force behind most of the measures adopted 
during the 1911 session. A number of less spectacular laws completed the general reform 
programme and included laws that required stringent factory inspection, and a regulation 
governing the hours and type of labour that women and children could undertake. Clearly this 
was necessary for the Trenton True American declared, “ a law of this kind is of more 
importance than laws regulating corporations since they directly affect 98% of the people - the 
working people, while the other laws regulating corporations only effect 2% of the 
capitalists” (15). Wilson supported the bill, but only passively, his energies at this time being 
directed towards the fight for the Democratic presidential nomination.
In a letter to Mrs M. A.Hulbert, Wilson summed up the achievements of the 1911 session, ‘ ‘the 
legislature adjourned yesterday morning at three o’clock with its work done. 1 got absolutely 
everything 1 strove for - and more besides: all four of the great acts that 1 had set my heart on 
(the primaries and election law, the corrupt practices act, as stringent as the English, the 
workingman’s compensation act, and the act giving a public commission control over the 
railroads, the trolley lines, the water companies, and the gas and electric light and power 
companies), and besides them 1 got certain fundamental school reforms and an act enabling 
any city in the State to adopt the commission form of government, which simplifies the 
electoral process and concentrates responsibility. Everyone, the papers included, are saying
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that none of it could have been done, if it had not been for my influence and tact and hold upon 
the people .... I wrote the platform, I had the measures formulated in my mind, I kept the 
pressure of opinion constantly on the legislature, and the programme was carried out to the last 
detail’’(16). Whilst it was perfectly reasonable for Wilson to feel proud of the legislature’s 
achievements, it was grossly unfair of him to seize the lion’s share of the credit. Men had been 
battling in New Jersey for over ten years for these self-same measures; and it was these men 
who had helped in writing the bills, it was they who had introduced them into their respective 
chambers, and who had helped in the marshalling of forces when it came to voting. This is 
not to steal Wilson’s thunder, but merely to put his own role into its proper perspective. He 
redressed the balance marginally when he told Hulbert, ‘ T came to office in the fullness of time, 
when opinion was ripe in all these matters, when both parties were committed to these reforms, 
and by merely standing fast, and by never losing sight of the business for an hour, but keeping 
up all sorts of (legitimate) pressure all the time, kept the mighty forces from being diverted 
or blocked at any point” (16). Even this limited qualification is hardly enough to give others 
the proper thanks due to them. To further his own presidential ambitions Wilson rather 
shamelessly seized the credit for New Jersey’s reforms; in so doing, he took the spotlight from 
men of both parties who had spent so long preparing the ground. He also neglected to praise 
men like Tumulty and Kemey who had to attend to all the manipulations that he considered 
to be beneath his dignity. His occasional assertions that he had been fortunate, and well served 
by his subordinates, are few.
Wilson was not the only person pleased with the legislature’s achievements, the local and 
national press also sang their praise. Some were astute enough to realise that while the reforms 
were praiseworthy, Wilson was not a pioneer of reform. The measures enacted were 
commonplace, they merely put New Jersey into line with other states. It was really more of 
a case of New Jersey catching upwith the situation elsewhere, than of her storming ahead alone. 
The reforms enacted are very similar in scope and outline to acts passed by Hoke Smith in 
Georgia, LaFollette in Wisconsin, Hiram Johnson in California and Hughes in New York. It 
was these men who had paved the way for what followed in New Jersey under Wilson rather 
than the other way around.
Wilson was fortunate to appear on the scene when he did, to be governor of New Jersey when 
it had a Democrat controlled assembly prepared to push through progressive measures. Yet
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he succeeded where the New Ideas Republicans and progressive Democrats had failed. He 
succeeded because he was able to marshal into a coherent unit the state’s progressive forces, 
now in the ascendent, and have these men enact the legislation that had been previously 
trumpeted. He helped in the preparation of the legislation, he helped argue the case for reform 
before the legislature, he endeavoured to whip recalcitrant assemblymen into line by using the 
threat of the party caucus to determine policy. He was in a sense a prime minister, almost the 
kind of leader he had written about in his doctoral thesis.
The Legislative Session 1912
From the beginning Wilson had been fortunate in that the Republican minority had decided 
to follow his lead in legislative matters. During the 1911 off-year elections that situation 
changed. Wilson campaigned for the renomination of all the men who had stood by him during 
the previous session. This was carried to such a length that the campaign almost became a 
referendum on his programme. The election results were such that his attempt to win an 
expression of public support can only be judged a failure. The Republicans won 37 of the 
assembly’s 60 seats, and 5 of the Senate’s 8 seats which were up for re-election. A Democratic 
majority of 24 in 1911 became a Republican majority of 14 in 1912. Even though they had lost 
a seat in the Senate, the Republicans still controlled it by 11 to 10. What the voters obviously 
wanted was an assurance that the reform programme would be continued. Wilson could not 
give this, and in any event New Jersey had served its purpose for him - it had won him national 
recognition and a set of progressive credentials. His efforts were now devoted to seeking the 
presidency. Clearly, the New Jersey electorate saw through the campaign rhetoric and realised 
that he had gone as far as he intended. What was lacking, above all else in his speeches, was 
a definite commitment to reform legislation. His perpetual denunciations of machine 
politicians and his Republican opponents were simply too negative, and so the electorate turned 
away from him. Not only did he fail to beat the Republicans, but the Smith machine in Essex 
county remained intact.
In spite of a promise to cooperate with the legislature in 1912 Wilson did not provide effective 
leadership for the Republican majority. At no time during the session did he give any sign that
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let the routine business of the state plod on without him as he began his campaign for the 
Democratic presidential nomination. Not once did he meet with the Democratic assemblymen 
in caucus session, nor did he try to determine party policy or coerce the legislature into passing 
more reform legislation. There were reasons for this above and beyond his single minded quest 
for the presidency. The new assembly was dominated by Republicans who were for the most 
part conservative organisation men. Not only were they loth to help a man they saw as a 
dangerous radical, they were also anxious to give no further boost to his presidential campaign 
by passing legislation that might enhance his reputation. Yet even when taking these factors 
into account one must still conclude that Wilson neglected his duties as governor and party 
leader. In only one sense did Wilson use this time as governor to good effect, in that he used 
his power of appointment to greatly strengthen his power among Democratic assemblymen and 
so laid the foundations of a strong “  Wilson for president”  coalition in New Jersey.
His relations with the Republican controlled legislature were extremely strained. He vetoed 
57 bills during this session alone, including most of the important ones. His behaviour was 
such that the Republicans of both houses issued aj oint statement that was one of the most severe 
rebukes ever given a governor by the opposition members of a state legislature. It was a sad 
end to his career as governor, and in many ways mirrors his leave taking from Princeton. As 
a mark of their disgust the assemblymen piled 150 bills on his desk on the final day of the 
session, making it impossible for him to study any properly. The final days of the session ended 
with the Republicans passing bills wholesale over his veto. Wilson summed up his feelings, 
‘ ‘this has been a petty and barren legislature. It has done nothing worth mentioning except try 
to amend and mar the wonderful things we did last year’ ’(17). Hardly a fair comment when 
one considers the amount of time he spent away from Trenton during the session and how he 
refused to lead the legislature on the few occasions he was present. The legislative barrenness 
of 1912 was accentuated by Wilson’s neglect and personal limitations. His too frequent 
absences deprived the legislature of the vital personal leadership that had been so useful in 
1911. Once again he displayed his temperamental inability to work with men who were 
unwilling to follow his lead. He continued the Princeton habit of turning opponents into 
enemies. Once again he pushed hard for change in the early days and then dried up when the 
opposition stiffened. The 1912 session saw Wilson’s career as governor closing on a low, both 
as regards his effectiveness as party leader and his popularity with the electorate.
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Despite his limitations as a governor Wilson the politician had been a real success in 
strengthening his ties with his "new constituancy", with regard to organised labour Wilson said, 
‘ ‘my record as governor of New Jersey is entirely fair to labor .... I do not say it, nor do I like 
to have it said that I am the laboring man’s special friend. I am his friend in the sense that he 
is part of the country, and I am the country’s friend. I do not like to draw class lines .... Ask 
the New Jersey State Federation of Labor as proof that the educator has been fair”  (18). Clearly 
with regard to labour he was something of a success. The employer’s liability - workingmen’s 
compensation act was by no means perfect, but it was a significant improvement on the 
previous situation. Coming as it had alongside other broadly pro-labour measures it was 
acceptable to the majority of working people. In 1910 the State Federation had not only 
condemned Wilson’s gubernatorial nomination, but had actually campaigned against him. In 
1912 they endorsed his campaign to win the Democratic nomination for the presidency, clearly 
they did feel the educator was something of a success.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE PRESroENTIAL ELECTION 1912
The 1912 presidential election is remembered as the watershed of progressivism, of the fight 
for the heart of the movement by Wilson and his main opponent Theodore Roosevelt. In this 
chapter we will see how labour played a central role in the election campaign, for it was here 
on the tender subjects of labour and immigration control that Wilson was traditionally at his 
weakest, and where his opponents could attack him with the best hope of success.
Winning The Democratic Nomination
The congressional and gubernatorial elections of November 1910 had seen the Democrats 
profit from the divisions within Republican ranks. They resulted in a virtual Democratic 
landslide in all areas except the Pacific coast. The House became Democrat controlled for the 
first time since 1892, and with the support of insurgent Republicans the Democrats in the 
Senate had a working majority at long last. In addition, 1910 had seen many Democratic 
governors elected in traditionally Republican states, among them Wilson in New Jersey. 
Practically every Democratic newspaper in the country believed that with the nomination of 
a new candidate the party could also capture the presidency in 1912.
The schism in the Republican party deepened throughout 1911 as party insurgents clashed with 
Taft over policy. Few old line Democratic politicians had committed themselves to any 
candidate by the end of 1911, but Wilson’s legislative triumphs in New Jersey made him an 
early favourite. Conditions for him could not have been better with newspapers throughout the 
country praising the achievements of the legislature. Thus, in spite of the antipathy of many 
of the party bosses and conservatives who viewed his actions, utterances and early attack on 
Smith with serious misgivings, he was rapidly becoming a serious presidential possibility. 
“ 1 do not feel that 1 shall ever come to undertake an active campaign for the presidential 
nomination. 1 should feel that a nomination obtained in that way was hardly worth having, ’ ’ (1) 
wrote Wilson in June 1911. Yet within eight months of those words he made a nine thousand
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mile transcontinental tour, and campaigned in Georgia, North and South Carolina, Virginia, 
Pennsylvannia, Wisconsin, Texas and New York state.
0
Since 1907 Wilson had been groomed for the presidency by George Harvey and his business 
associates. However, from 1909 onwards, as he became aware of a rising radical feeling 
gripping the nation, Wilson was obliged to re-defrne some of his earlier beliefs. This could 
not be done without comment: TheNew York Sun asked ‘Ts Wilson Bryanizing?” (2) Using 
a series of rhetorical questions it alleged that Wilson’s political ambition was running away 
with him, and that he would do anything to win office. This changeability worried many, as 
W .McCombs, his campaign manager pointed out: ‘ T spent last night with Mr Louis Wiley, 
business manager of the New York Times .... (1 asked him) ‘What do you think of Wilson?’ 
The answer was, ‘He is a radical and his views are subject to change for political reasons’ ’(3). 
This belief that he was departing from moderate, mainstream Democracy began to worry his 
early backers. Between December 1911 and May 1912 many of his original supporters began 
to have doubts about their advocacy of his candidacy, and some even began to conspire against 
him. Among the plotters were Harvey, Watterson and Hemphill, men who had played a 
leading part in creating the Wilson candidacy. Once they were no longer certain of their ability 
to control him they orchestrated a campaign to ruin him.
This campaign was helped by attacks made on Wilson by the newspapers of W. R. Hearst, 
which were supporting Champ Clark. They attacked Wilson on his weakest fronts: his early 
views on unions and immigrants. This was so telling it was later used by his rivals in the actual 
campaign itself, and it is there that we will look at it. The Harvey campaign of vilification came 
to nothing when Wilson was able to show how honourably he had handled the rupture with 
the now disgruntled colonel. The break with Harvey actually helped Wilson further enhance 
his progressive standing. Harvey’s support had always laid him open to suspicion among 
Bryan Democrats. ‘ ‘The best thing that could happen to Wilson at this time would be his open 
repudiation by those publications (Harvey’s H arper’s Weekly) that are now speaking kindly 
of him” , (4) Bryan wrote in 1911 shortly before the break. With the departure of Harvey the 
Wilson campaign was run by enthusiastic amateurs.
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As the Democratic convention drew closer a number of clear candidates emerged. The 
strongest was Champ Clark, the Speaker of the House. He was a man of the Bryan type, who 
had accumulated a consistent progressive record over the years, though he had never originated 
any legislation or taken the lead in any important movement. His critics saw him as a rather 
narrow and provincial politician of undistinguished intellect; Wilson wrote him off as “ a sort 
of elephantine, smart Aleck’ ’(5). He had, however, inherited most of Bryan’s following in the 
Middle and Far West, and had also acquired the not inconsiderable support of Hearst. Many 
time-serving Democratic politicians and state organisations gave Clark their support as they 
distrusted Wilson, especially after the attack on Smith. For a while Judson Harmon, the 
conservative governor of Ohio, looked like an opponent, but his star died as it became obvious 
that only a progressive could be elected, or at least someone who could pass for one.
Clark arrived in Baltimore with 436 delegates, while Wilson could count on only 248 at the 
very most. The emergence of Wilson as a national Democratic figure at first seemed to threaten 
the developing Democrat-AFL alliance. He was still renowned for his early distaste for labour 
and its principles. Thus in 1912 the AFL was in the anti-Wilson camp, preferring Clark. In 
the early balloting Clark established a strong lead. On the tenth ballot Tammany Hall moved 
to back him, which looked like the signal for landslide, as Clark already had 556 votes, well 
over a majority. Under the rules of the convention, however, a candidate who obtained a 
majority had to go on to win two-thirds backing. The landslide did not materialise as the Wilson 
and Underwood delegations were held in check. A gruelling campaign then began to wear 
down Clark’s support. Only by Machiavellian diplomacy could Wilson’s managers win the 
backing they needed, and on the forty sixth ballot Wilson finally won the majority he needed. 
Clark offered his support, but was clearly bitter: “ they (Clark’s supporters) made the fight, 
gave me a 200,000 majority in the States where Governor Wilson and I competed in the 
primaries and caused me to lead on thirty ballots in the convention, in nine of which I had a 
clear majority. Nevertheless, the nomination was bestowed upon Governor Wilson” (6).
Wilson’s victory represented the triumph of eastern Democracy over Bryanism, leaving the 
agarians with little real power within the party. Wilson effected a reconciliation with Bryan 
for appearances’ sake. In reality he could barely tolerate the man’s style and manners. In his 
acceptance speech Wilson promised to reduce the tariff, restrict trusts, reform the currency and
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banking systems, prevent financial confederacies and pass laws to help the workingman. How 
all this was to be done was left intentionally vague.
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The Republican Party Divides - The Birth Of The Progressive Party
In the 1910 elections there had been what amounted to a mass repudiation of Taft’s leadership. 
Republican insurgents made it plain soon afterwards that they would not tolerate his 
renomination in 1912. These progressives now constituted a majority of the party in the Mid 
and Far West. They had a fairly coherent programme of tariff and trust reform, all they lacked 
was a dynamic leader of national standing to be their standard bearer. Taft’s problems were 
worsened by the alienation of many of the party’s key business supporters because of his anti­
trust programme. In January 1911 the insurgent Republicans came together to oppose Taft’s 
renomination and formed the National Progressive Republican League, which included in its 
membership many senators, governors and congressmen. The League supported Senator 
R.M.LaFollette of Wisconsin and tried to obtain public backing from Roosevelt. The ex­
president dealt carefully with them. On 10 February 1912 Roosevelt surprised many people 
when he announced his own candidacy. The pre-convention campaign that followed was 
undoubtedly the bitterest in the history of the party. In the thirteen states where voters could 
express a preference Roosevelt won 278 delegates, Taft 48 and LaFollette 35 (7). Tafi however 
used the patronage steam roller to obtain control of southern delegations, he also had the 
support of most boss-controlled states. With the help of the National Committee the outcome 
of the convention in Chicago was a foregone conclusion. Taft gave himself 235 of the 254 
contested seats, and then proceeded to nominate himself using the self-same tactics Roosevelt 
perfected in 1908. Roosevelt walked out calling cheat and set about forming a third party.
On 6 August 1912 the Progressive party was bom in Chicago. It made Roosevelt its presidential 
candidate and Hiram Johnson his mnning mate. The party platform was significant in that 
national social justice groups and other advanced progressives found approval for their 
objectives by a major, if somewhat ephemeral party. Thus measures like a minimum wage for 
women, prohibition of child labour, workingmen’s compensation and social insurance were 
all in the party platform. But the bulk of the party’s membership was more linked to Roosevelt
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othe man than it was to any political programme. Amos Pinchot later said of the party ‘ ‘though 
we did not realise it, the Progressive party came into being, a house divided against itself and 
already heavily mortgaged’ ’(8).
The Socialist Party of America in 1912
While the two main candidates were obliged to appear radical while remaining essentially 
conservative, this was not a problem faced by the SPA. Their steady electoral rise worried 
many: Herbert Croly actually saw progressivism as being ‘ ‘designed to serve as a counterpoise 
to the threat of working class revolution” (9). He was not alone, Louis Brandeis was talking 
of the need for “ a bulwark against the great wave of socialism” (10). Roosevelt felt that the 
‘ ‘great growth of socialism in this country (is) far more ominous than any populist movement 
in times past”  (11).
The SPA vote had grown larger with each year of the new century. In 1900 Eugene Debs had 
polled almost 100,000 votes in the presidential election with no real political organisation, this 
was three times larger than any other American socialist had ever polled. With each year the 
SPA membership rolls and influence grew even larger. Between 1904 and 1908 SPA 
membership rose from 20,763 to 41,751 members, and by 1912 it had further increased to 
117,984. Never before had America seen a party grow so quickly. In the 1908 elections Debs 
polled 420,713 votes. His personal success was more than matched elsewhere, socialists were 
elected to many municipal, state and federal positions. 33 towns had socialist administrations 
and there were 79 socialist majors in 24 states. The SPA now had 1200 local offices in over 
340 cities. While it is an oversimplification to say that socialism caused progressivism, by 1912 
the three main parties were pushing reformist measures, in part at least, to slow the SPA growth.
58
3The Presidential Campaign - Wilson And Roosevelt As Candidates
By the middle of August 1912 it was obvious that T aft was simply not in the running. As early 
as 12 July he wrote his wife, “ I think I might as well give up so far as being a candidate is 
concerned. There are so many people in the country who do not like me” (12). Except for his 
speech accepting the Republican nomination the President refused to join in any further 
speechmaking at all. Wilson and Roosevelt carried the burden of the campaign, and it was the 
battle between them which was to decide who would be president. Ideologically, the 
progressive movement culminated and diverged in the philosophies and programmes they set 
forth. W.A.White was not alone when he lampooned their programmes as “ that fantastic 
imaginary gulf that has always existed between Tweedle-Dum and Tweedle-Dee” (13).
As the campaign progressed Wilson was forced to fabricate a programme in order to win over 
sufficient independents and insurgent Republicans. The series of speeches that grew out of this 
need were given the name ‘ ‘The New Freedom” . Most of this programme was supplied by 
Louis Brandeis. In the early stages of the campaign, certainly up to August, Wilson was clearly 
undecided on how best to proceed. He was having trouble finding a great issue with which to 
carry the people. On 28 August he met Brandeis, one of the leading progressive lawyers in 
the country, an outstanding authority on monopoly control, railway regulation, and the chief 
spokesman of the philosophy of regulated competition, unhampered enterprise and economic 
freedom. This meeting transformed Wilson’s emphasis on many questions,but especially on 
trusts. On 28 September Brandeis sent Wilson a draft of a magazine article he was preparing 
for Collier’s Weekly. This paper summarised all of the lawyer's many proposals with regard 
to trust control. From this article Wilson drew all the ideas he expounded during the remainder 
of the campaign. His analysis became much more perceptive after seeing Brandeis. He moved 
away from his earlier simplistic and unworkable position on trusts to the more realistic, if  still 
reassuringly vague set of points passed to him by Brandeis. The lawyer reinforced Wilson in 
his belief that most businessmen were men of good will, and that there was no contradiction 
between the concentration of wealth and political democracy.
While much of Wilson’s programme came courtesy of Brandeis, Roosevelt had Herbert Croly 
to thank for his new insightfulness. Croly ’ s Promise of American Life summarised advanced 
progressive thought and it was only after reading it that Roosevelt could define his “ New
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Nationalism” at Osawatamie in August 1910 with any real clarity. The journalist’s argument 
for the need to use Hamiltonian intervention to help achieve Jeffersonian ends fired Roosevelt’s 
imagination. Roosevelt’s advocacy of national government recognizing the inevitability of the 
concentration of wealth and industry, bringing corporations under federal control, and 
protecting workingmen all owe much to Croly.
The Presidential Campaign - The Labour Dimension
Politics in 1912 was determined by two questions, the relationship of government to industry, 
and the rise of socialism; and each had its own labour dimension. It was in the areas of labour 
and immigration that Wilson was traditionally at his weakest. It was here that his opponents 
could attack him with greatest ease and with the best chance of success. He had been savaged 
here in 1910 when campaigning for the govemership of New Jersey, and also while 
campaigning for the Democratic presidential nomination in 1912. Thus it was here again that 
his rivals launched their attacks during the campaign itself. His early writing clearly shows 
an enmity towards workingmen and a prejudice against certain types of the newer immigrant. 
In an effort to offset the criticism of many Polish, Italian, Jewish and other immigrant groups 
he publically wrote to the publishers of his History of the American People asking them to 
delete the offending passages from volume five until he could find time to rewrite them. He 
also claimed, as he always did in similar situations, that his critics were misquoting him and 
misrepresenting his views. The fact that many immigrant groups later backed him during the 
campaign is proof that his disclaimers were believed, although he never did actually rewrite 
the offending passages.
Wilson’s labour strategy worked along similar lines, he would renounce his earlier words, 
claim he was misunderstood and then go on to promise a new beginning. On 12 August one 
of his advisors, J.W.Kem wrote to him enclosing the draft of a letter he was planning to send 
to Sam Gompers, which read,
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I write to remind you (Gompers) of the action of the Democratic National 
Convention, at Baltimore in adopting aplatform which insofar as its declarations 
on the labor question are concerned was written by yourself and adopted by the 
Committee on Resolutions without the dotting of an ‘i’ or the crossing of a ‘t ’. 
I also remind you of the action of the Democratic House of Representatives in 
Washington in redeeming the pledges of the Denver Platform (1908). In view 
of the above facts, is it not in fairness due to the Democratic party from your 
federation, that its executive council which meets in Atlantic City next week 
should by resolution, or otherwise show its appreciations (14).
The need for the Democratic party to secure the votes of organised labour meant that Wilson 
3  had no other choice but to approach the AFL in this way. Equally Sam Gompers had no real
option but to accept the overtures even though he had initially preferred Champ Clark and still 
had doubts about Wilson. Gompers and the AFL refused to openly endorse any candidate, 
this was partly due to the AFL constitution which did not allow partisan political action, and 
also because many AFL officers were active Republicans. Y et as the campaign progressed it 
became clear that the AFL supported Wilson much as they had Bryan in 1908. In the October 
1912 edition of The American Federationist Gompers condemned Taft and the Republican 
platform and praised the Wilson labour plank, which is hardly surprising as he had written it 
himself! He also stated that while the Progressive party’s platform commitments to labour 
were gratifying, labour had found it impossible to obtain legislative protection when Roosevelt 
was president and so he could not now be trusted. In November shortly before the election 
O  Gompers formally endorsed Wilson and the AFL national office in Washington served as a
Democratic clearing house for the labour.
Gompers and the AFL were pressing hard for an elaborate programme that included federal 
aid for industrial education, a measure to loosen the labour contracts of seamen in American 
ports, the restriction of immigration, but most important of all was their desire to win immunity 
from prosecution from acts which the Supreme Court said violated the Sherman Act. The AFL 
wanted an amendment that would give unions specific immunity from existing prohibitions. 
Bryan had promised them this when he incorporated Gompers paper into the Democratic 
platform in 1908. Gompers took the 1912 platform, which included the 1908 pledge, and the 
Kem-Wilson letter to mean that Wilson supported the measures advocated. Shortly before the
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3election Taft vetoed the Sundry Civil Appropriations bill because of its rider (the Hughes- 
Hamill amendment) that prevented the Department of Justice from spending any of its funds 
on the prosecution of unions. Gompers made it clear that if  the bill and its rider were not 
endorsed by Wilson it would seem that he was insincere. Gompers had staked a great deal of 
his personal authority within the AFL on this approach.
Wilson was also under pressure to endorse the Seamen’s bill which called for severe safety 
standards on all ships entering America, which wanted to establish standards to regulate hours 
worked, hoped to improve the living conditions of American sailors and to abolish imprisonment 
for seamen who violated their contracts while in American ports. Wilson agreed to these 
conditions to Gompers’ satisfaction.
The final item on the AFL programme was the restriction of immigration. The AFL claimed 
that unrestricted immigration depressed wages, created an unskilled labour surplus and 
multiplied the difficulties of unions trying to organise the basic industries. There is much truth 
in labour’s claims on unrestricted immigration depressing the labour market, but the fact that 
many AFL unions operated a colour bar or would not even attempt to organise immigrants 
weakens their case. The AFL were not the only group advocating restriction, many other 
groups desired the same goal. While the AFL tried to paint their demands in economic terms 
many of these other groups were more openly racist. Wilson would not support the AFL on 
this issue. His supporters argue he took this stand as calls for restriction were unAmerican and 
morally wrong, startling words when one considers what he wrote in his History of the 
American People or to Senator Phelan in May 1912. His critics point to his political 
malleability and to his need to secure large quantities of the votes of recent immigrants, and 
claim this alone accounts for his aversion to restriction. A more likely explanation is that 
Wilson felt he could win support from both labour and immigrant groups by endorsing large 
chunks of the labour programme whilst simultaneously putting a block on immigration control. 
His electoral success in 1912 seems to suggest he was correct.
Securing the late endorsement of the AFL was not in itself enough for Wilson and his campaign 
managers as the AFL represented only a small percentage of all workingmen. Thus more had 
to be done to allay the remaining suspicions of other workers. Throughout 1912 Wilson was
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scheduled to speak before workingmen and to endorse labour issues. These speeches fall into 
two periods, one series was made as he sought the Democratic nomination in January to March 
1912, the second series was delivered mainly in September to October 1912 when he was in 
the grip of his battle with Roosevelt. In his first speech of 1912 he had endorsed labour’s right 
to strike against exploitative management, going on to say, “ the high cost of production is, 
almost in every instance, due not to high wages, but to the loss and waste in respect of bad 
management.... You need more intelligent workers and you cannot get them except at a higher 
price” (15). While in Boston speaking to a convention of real estate brokers he said, “ you 
cannot get the best work out of your workmen unless you make them by honest operations 
believe that you regard them, not as your tools, but as your partners’ ’(16), and also argued that 
employers should not overwork their employees but should pay them adequately for work 
done. A variation on the same theme was delivered at both Richmond on 1 February and in 
Philadelphia the next day. Wilson then turned away firom labour issues making his speeches 
broader and more national in scope as he challenged for the Democratic nomination. It was 
not until Labor Day in September that he again spoke exclusively on labour matters. Speaking 
in Buffalo he sought to identify himself with the nation’s wage earners saying that they 
constituted the country. He ridiculed Roosevelt’s call for a minimum wage for women saying 
that “ if a minimum wage is established by law, the temptation for every employer will be to 
bring his wages down to that minimum” (17). He castigated large corporations for excluding 
unions from their plants, but insisted it was not the government’s place to interfere for “ the 
minute you are taken care of by government you are wards and not independent men” (17), 
something that Gompers and the AFL had always believed. On 14 September he addressed 
a workingman’s dinner in New Y ork and claimed that the Aldrich tariff did not, as was claimed 
by the Republicans, protect American workers, but in actual fact depressed their wages for pay 
was higher in unprotected industries than in protected. Speaking in South Dakota on 18 
September and in Detroit the next day he repeated his words on the tariff and again attacked 
large corporations for excluding unions. In Hartford on 25 September and Cleveland on 11 
October he actually spoke glowingly of the actions of the Lawrence textile workers for striking 
against the oppression they suffered, to have him endorse an IWW strike must have been 
startling! At Scranton on 23 September he again attacked the tariff and large corporations for 
hurting both unions and the workingmen. At Fall River on 26 September he again praised the 
Lawrence strikers, attacked US Steel by name, called for higher wages and said he would 
recognize labour’s right to organise, which was not yet guaranteed by the constitution. He 
repeated parts of the same speech at Peru on 4 October and T opeka on 8 October when he again 
attacked US Steel for excluding unions from their plants. In Madison Square Garden on 31
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October he spoke of the need to protect women, children and the poor. All of these were 
supplemented with interviews and articles, all designed to allay the suspicion that he was anti­
union or anti-workingman.
Another issue that both main candidates had to address themselves to was the question of 
socialism. Both Wilson and Roosevelt confronted the issue partly to attract radical voters 
themselves, and partly to weaken the SPA. Wilson centred his attack around a few key themes, 
chief among them being that the Socialists were “ revelling in utopian dreams and that their 
theories are impossible, but that he could not help but admire the spirit that was behind it’ ’(18). 
Throughout the campaign Wilson would periodically return to the idea that socialism was 
impractical, utopian, and that the voters should beware of men claiming to have answers to all 
questions. These themes were most often expounded when talking to working class audiences. 
Another theme he found to be useful was to dismiss the rise in the SPA vote as a protest vote. 
A story he would often repeat was of his being approached by a socialist mayor -B E  Mouck, 
mayor of Wymore City, Nebraska. Mouck is supposed to have analysed his electoral success 
thus, ‘ ‘it was about 20% socialist and 80% protest’ ’(19). Wilson would then say that the protest 
had been noted and that his party would no longer neglect the working people.
On 14 October 1912 Roosevelt was shot and injured by an insane anti-third party fanatic while 
in Milwaukee, this effectively finished what remained of the two horse race. Wilson was 
prevailed upon to refrain from further active campaigning as it would appear unsporting. It 
mattered little by then anyway as it was becoming increasingly obvious that Wilson was going 
to win. On 5 November 1912 Wilson polled 6,293,019 votes, Roosevelt 4,119,507, Taft 
3,484,956 and Debs 901,873(20). Largely because of the multiple division of the vote, 
Wilson’s victory in the electoral college was of landslide proportions. Taft, carrying only 
Vermont and Utah, received 8 electoral votes. Roosevelt won 11 of California’s votes and all 
of Michigan, Minnesota, Pennsylvannia, South Dakota and Washington for a total of 88 votes. 
Wilson received the 435 that remained. Wilson did not poll as many popular votes as Bryan 
in 1908. Nor did he succeed in establishing the Democrats as the majority party in Congress, 
they had only a tenuous two year control of the House. Outside of the old confederate states 
and Kentucky he polled a majority of the popular vote only in Arizona. Neither Roosevelt nor 
Taft was responsible for the decrease in the Democratic vote for their combined vote in 1912 
is still lower than Taft’s vote in 1908. Thus it would appear that roughly half a million voters
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refused to back either Wilson or Roosevelt and voted instead for Debs. By capturing six percent 
of the popular vote he secured the best ever vote for the SPA. As with the other parties, the 
SPA vote was not uniformly spread, they polled well in Western states - in Washington, Idaho, 
Montana, Nevada, California and Arizona.
Clearly the division in the Republican ranks helped above all else in securing the presidency 
for the Democrats. For the second time in Amercan history the party in the majority lost the 
presidency through internecine strife. The overall election results show how important the 
labour vote was becoming to the Democrats. Taft and the Republicans, the only party offering 
labour nothing, got less than twenty five percent of the popular vote. AFL assistance obviously 
did not harm Wilson’s candidancy as some had feared it would. Roosevelt waged amagnificent 
campaign, but the election results show that he failed to draw progressive Democrats in any 
real number away from Wilson, and that alone heralded defeat. More important for the future 
of American politics, Roosevelt failed to establish the Progressive party on a firm and lasting 
basis. Roosevelt’s vote was too personal, linked too closely to him as a man and not to his 
programme. Many people simply refused to believe in his sincerity; although he offered labour 
more by way of legislation than Wilson, Gompers and the AFL remembered him as an 
unfriendly president. Anne Howard Shaw when writing to Jane Addams voiced the suspicions 
of many, “ I wish I could believe he (Roosevelt) intended to do a single honest thing or that 
he would carry out a single plank in the platform if elected.... I cannot” (21).
In time labour among many others would voice similar doubts about Wilson when he began 
to draw away from his own platform pledges, to such an extent that many historians doubt that 
he was ever a genuine progressive at all. As we shall see in the next chapter between 1913 and 
1916 Wilson either obstructed or refused to encourage the fulfilment of a large part of the 
progressive programme he had agreed to in 1912, and this was most marked where pro-labour 
legislation is concerned.
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3CHAPTER FIVE
THE Fm ST ADMINISTRATION
This chapter will open with the Democratic party struggling to cobble together a definite 
programme of government from the beguiling jargon of the New Freedom. We shall examine 
how Wilson handled this problem, and also those other problems bequeathed him by Taft such 
as the Colorado miner’s strike and the Commission on Industrial Relations.
We shall then concentrate upon the reforms enacted prior to the 1914 mid-term elections and 
the struggles surrounding the Clayton Act, the Seamen’s Act and immigration control. It will 
be shown that Wilson reneged upon the promises he made to the AFL during the New Freedom 
campaign. This chapter will show that it was only the poor Democratic showing in the 1914 
elections that turned Wilson into an active progressive after 1914.
After an analysis of his intervention during the threatened rail stoppage of 1916 this chapter 
will show how he hoped to rein in the IWW but that his officials could find no legal precedent 
to justify hostile action against them. By the close of the chapter we will see how the AFL had 
become a firm, if peripheral, part of the Democratic party.
The New Democratic Administration
Wilson arrived in Washington as an unknown quantity in national politics and with his 
reputation as party leader still to be made. Remembering his conservative upbringing and 
utterances, many people still felt that his New Jersey governorship, whilst promising much, 
was not sufficient proof in itself of his progressive transformation. People acknowledged that 
he was a consummate orator, but while endlessly eloquent, he remained disturbingly vague. 
Charles Merriam recalled his “ outstanding gift of statement which enabled him to attract 
support to a general spirit rather than a specific program, to avoid unpleasant commitments in 
dubious cases’ ’(1). Thus no-one was really sure what Wilson actually planned to do. It was 
from Brandeis that he had received a more specific vocabulary during the New Freedom
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3campaign, but even here he fought shy of the welfare legislation advanced by Roosevelt. 
Wilson’s commitment to pro-worker legislation was modest, having been written by Sam 
Gompers in 1908. Not only had Wilson no clear or detailed labour policy when he took office, 
but his fundamental attitude towards the problem had been too recently defined to be 
completely his own. He had as yet merely adopted the opinions of others. All he had decided 
was that his party needed to advocate “ something” about labour, his language allowing the 
inference that he had decided that the “ something” should not be “ aimless and baseless." 
Whether he ever did in fact work out this problem is doubtful. Take advice and delegate he 
certainly did, but it is open to debate whether he ever acted in a more coherent manner.
The four months between the election and inauguration afforded scant time to accomplish the 
large task that lay ahead of him and his advisors. They had to map out plans for a legislative 
programme and to organise a government almost from the ground up. The party was rusty 
when it came to the mechanisms of national management, having been out of office for so long. 
Labour’s request for remedial legislation thus came low on Wilson’s list ofpolicy requirements. 
He felt his most immediate objectives were reducing the tariff, reforming the currency and 
banking systems, and a modification of the Sherman Act to prevent monopolisation - although 
obviously labour was hoping that some of that modification would involve a re-examination 
of the injunction issue.
The fact that the Democrats had been out of office for seventeen years gave the president a 
potentially strong hand in forcing the party to his will. The Republican rupture meant that the 
Democrats could look forward to a majority of 73 in the House during the first two years of 
the administration. Moreover, many of the Democrats were new and inexperienced - 114 of 
the 290 had been returned for the first time. In addition, the old time party leaders Adamson, 
Clayton and Underwood all realised that the fate of their party depended largely upon their 
performance. It is significant that the first Wilson administration closed with major pieces of 
legislation bearing each of these men’s names.
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The Department of Labor
The idea behind a separate Department of Labor had been put forward originally by 
W.H.Sylvisin 1867. It was forty six years before the idea came to fruition. A Bureau of Labor 
had existed since the mid-1880s when one was created in the Department of the Interior. Four 
years after its creation it became independent, but still without executive rank. So as the first 
ever Secretary of Labor William Wilson’s was the task of organising a new department. He 
was ably assisted by his deputy Louis Post, a distinguished single taxer and union supporter. 
The names of Brandeis, Gardner and Redfield all came up before the position of first Secretary 
of Labor went to William Wilson. Ralph Easley of the NCF had hoped to see John Mitchell 
of the UMW gain the honour, but Sam Gompers objected to one of his vice-presidents’ names 
going forward, so the post went to Wilson, himself an ex-UMW official. Labour was delighted 
with William Wilson’s selection and hoped it was an indication that the new administration 
would support other labour measures. Gompers rather predictably hailed it as a justification 
of his non-partisan policies, and thought it was wonderful “ to have someone as its directing 
head who can carry the viewpoint of labour into the councils of the President” (2).
Others did not agree - more attention was paid to William Wilson ’ s appointment than any other, 
with the exception of Bryan. The New York Times claimed he was ‘ ‘appointed virtually at 
the instigation of Samuel Gompers” (3), while the New York Herald believed he would make 
his new post a “ department of union labor”  (4). The NAM, which had helped ensure that he 
was not re-elected as congressman for Pennsylvannia in 1912, was very critical of his selection.
2 ) Their criticism was well placed as William Wilson did see himself as being a partisan of
unionism, and whenever possible he chose unionists or those sympathetic to labour when 
selecting personnel. His department collaborated closely with the AFL from the very 
beginning. The Railroad Brotherhoods, being distrustful of the AFL, kept themselves aloof. 
As it was considered to be irresponsible the IWW was not encouraged to approach the 
department, and Wilson would not open his facilities to them.
The new department had four divisions - Labor Statistics, the Childrens’ Bureau, Naturalization 
and Immigration. The Bureau of Immigration absorbed 70% of department appropriations 
and 90% of personnel. Of the 2,000 employees in the new department, all but 200 were in 
immigration. Post lampooned this function as “ a government agency for keeping aliens
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out” (5). Above and beyond these duties, the department was to consider all questions on 
wages, hours and conditions in all government workshops, as well as the smooth functioning 
of the administration’s labour policies.
The Commission on Industrial Relations fCIRJ
On entering office Wilson inherited problems passed to him by his predecessor, one of which 
was overseeing the creation and investigative endeavours of the CIR. As a result of the Los 
Angeles Times- McNamara case the federal government had set up the commission. It was 
a tripartite group which was empowered to examine the reasons behind the growth of violent 
industrial unrest and to recommend solutions. Taft’s original group of nine had been vetoed 
by Congress, Wilson now had the task of selecting a new panel. The situation demanded some 
urgency J. J.McNamara had been a high union official, a conservative pro-AFL unionist, and 
according to Victor Berger a member of the Militia of Christ. If such a man deemed it necessary 
to dynamite buildings and kill then capital-labour relations were in a serious condition.
Brandeis described the prevailing industrial atmosphere thus, ‘ ‘there is unrest everywhere. 
Never before have conditions been so miserably bad. Capital and labour are not satisfied, and 
we are having clash after clash. The situation looks worse and the future gloomy. It has been 
said that we are now experiencing such times as preceded the French Revolution” (6). By 1912 
growing conservative opposition to progressivism, coupled with the increasing appeal of 
radical doctrines, was accentuating class tensions. Violence in labour disputes became almost 
a daily occurrence between 1913-1916, with causes célèbres like Joseph Hillstrom, Tom 
Mooney and the Everett Massacre only adding to the tension. After the Los Angeles Times 
explosion many people were keen to halt this slide into violence. The AFL were only too 
willing to help, and in the process to present themselves as the face of moderate, safe and 
legitimate labour. Many influential men, Wilson among them, were prepared to help them, 
especially if it meant they could head off the more hot-headed elements like the IWW. Thus 
Wilson excluded radicals and the IWW from the CIR, eight of whose nine members came from 
the NCF. The three labour representatives were described by Easley as being ‘ ‘anti-socialist 
to the core”  (7). Garretson was a Railroad Brotherhood chief, while Connell and Lennon were 
senior AFL officials and activists in the Militia of Christ, a catholic organisation pledged to
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keeping radicalism and socialism out of union affairs. Hoping to cool the ardour of some of 
the more extreme labour elements Brandeis wrote Wilson on 13,26and27May 1913 (8) asking 
him to select an IWW member as one of the labour representatives. Wilson felt himself unable 
to do so because of the IWW’s violent reputation. Erring on the side of caution he accepted 
the Taft labour slate which had been put forward by Easley and Gompers. The president also 
asked William Wilson to canvas labour on the subj ect of their representation, but as he confined 
himself to asking only pro-AFL/NCF elements it is hardly surprising they endorsed the 
conservative selection. Wilson also obliterated NAM representation, fearing them to be an 
employers’ IWW. Thus moderates dominated, radicals and arch-conservatives were 
disappointed. It is perhaps ironic that those who tended to turn to violence first in industrial 
disputes, on both the capital and labour sides, should have been excluded from participation 
in the CIR, and thus from being given an opportunity to become involved in the democractic 
2) process. Brandeis refused the offer of the chairmanship, but suggested Frank Walsh, a lawyer
and pro-Wilson Democrat from the Mid-West.
Sitting from 1913 until 1915 the CIR was the largest ever study of American industry. Its 
operation was divided into two parts, one was a series of open sessions where the commission 
members took testimony and questioned prominent witnesses. The other part was analytical 
research carried out by a band of trained academics who specialised in labour matters. The CIR 
gathered evidence in the industrial heartlands of America. Some of its most vocal critics, 
however, were actually Democrats. Coming mainly from south of the Mason-Dixon line, they 
insisted that Wilson keep the CIR out of their states. They were especially anxious to avoid 
2 )  the study of child labour. Wilson bowed to their pressure, as he was later to do with legislation
on the same subj ect. Thus apart from its investigations in Texas the CIR stayed out of the area.
When the commission reported in 1915 its contribution to advancing capital-labour relations 
was undermined by splits over its findings, although it had already been seriously weakened 
by the Congress elected in 1914 which would not continue its funding. In the final reports the 
labour representatives backed Walsh. As a result the employers submitted a report of their own, 
as did commission members Commons and Harriman. Obviously such splits played into the 
hand of those in office who were hostile to it. Congress treated all the reports with rough hands, 
apart from applauding its courage and endeavours they sat on its many recommendations.
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0In one of the most radical documents ever published by the federal government Walsh put 
capitalism in the dock. Not only were workers being denied basic human rights he claimed, 
but they were also being denied the right to organise. To redress the balance in workers’ favour 
he called for independent unions to be made a central objective of federal policy, and for the 
Department of Labor to prosecute unfair labour practices. Many of his other recommendations 
were unsubstantiated by hard evidence, which was obviously a serious weakness. The two 
other reports were confined to attacking the Walsh line. The employers condemned 
irresponsible capital and labour, and hoped moderates on both sides would work together. 
Commons and Harriman stood in the middle arguing for impartial arbitration agencies. The 
combination of a radical majority report and a split commission meant that nothing substantive 
came from it. Conservatives in and out of congress damned its findings, while both Gompers 
and his radical bête noir Debs welcomed its many recommendations.
Wilson congratulated the members of the CIR and then largely forgot about it, mainly because 
there was never a concentrated call upon him from any really powerful source to act on it. He 
did reject calls to remove Walsh as chairman when he attacked J.D.Rockefeller, but apart from 
that he would go no further. Acting on a radical document before a hostile and antagonistic 
Congress was too politically dangerous for aman with Wilson’s political pedigree. Thus whilst 
the CIRhad an educational effect upon sections of the public about working conditions its many 
recommendations were not instituted in a scientific manner until the New Deal era.
The Colorado Mining Strike
One area where Wilson and the CIR directly overlapped was the mining strike in Colorado 
which began in 1913 and continued long into 1914. A letter from William Wilson to the 
president summarises the sticking point between the mine operators (led primarily by the 
Colorado Fuel and Iron Company - CFI - a Rockefeller subsidiary) and the UMW, it also 
outlines the early history of the dispute and says a great deal about how industrial concerns in 
America managed their industrial relations in times of conflict:
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The position taken by the operators defending their refusal to have business 
dealings with the UMW is based upon the assumption that the UMW is a lawless 
organization ... that its officers have encouraged intimidation, assaults, arson, 
murder, armed resistance to organized government. If this arraignment were 
true the operators would be justified in refusing to deal... (however) during the 
strike it has been the universal policy of the officers of the organization to use 
their influence to have the strikers conduct themselves in a peaceful manner .... 
The charge that the UMW is a lawless organization whose officers promote 
violence would have greater force if it came from men who hadbeen conservators 
of peace. They (the operators) have maintained for years armed guards who 
have been used to intimidate the workers... .On 23 September 1915 Frank Hayes 
(Vice President of the UMW) said a strike was imminent unless the operators 
^  would meet representatives of the workmen .... On 5 September 1913 I
appointed Ethelbert Stewart (chief clerk in the Bureau of Labor Statistics) to 
act as a conciliator.... The operators claim there were only 2,048 union members 
out o f23,000 miners employed. The vote was unanimous in favour of striking. 
It is difficult to imagine such a small union nucleus being able to accomplish 
such acts without real support.... Insurrection and anarchy have prevailed for 
some time in the coal regions of Colorado, but that the mine workers are solely 
responsible for that condition may well be questioned (9).
The mineowners were quick to dismiss the Department of Labor’s officials, their point of view 
^  and their offers of help. They attacked the department head claiming that as an ex-UMW
official himself he could hardly be impartial. They also claimed that his officers were overtly 
pro-union. It is certainly true that many employees in the department were former union 
officers, a high percentage of them actually coming from the UMW. This was one of the 
reasons that Congress was so opposed to the department and caused so much trouble each year 
over its appropriations. So telling was the criticism that Post was obliged to contact Wilson’s 
secretary J.P.Tumulty in an attempt to dispel any doubts that may have been forming in the 
president’s mind. He pointed out ‘ ‘Stewart’s reputation for wide and trustworthy knowledge 
of details surrounding industrial problems’ ’ and ‘ ‘ that he is not a leader in union circles’ ’ Post 
also noted that “ there is a Feudal system in the territory of the CFI,’’ and that Wilson and 
Stewart had every right to intervene as “ the Department of Labor is prescribed as ‘to foster, 
promote and develop the welfare of the wage earners of the United States to improve their
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working conditions and advance their opportunities for employment,’”  and because “ the 
Secretary of Labor is empowered to act as a mediator and to appoint commissions of 
conciliation in labor disputes whenever in his judgement the interests of industrial peace may 
require it” (10).
Whilst there were numerous points at issue, ranging from working conditions unique to the area 
to the threatening behaviour of the operators, ‘ ‘the only question of any real importance, is the 
demand of the UMW for recognition of their union and the abandonment of the open shop 
policy” ( ll ) ,  stated L.M.Bowers, a CFI manager in a letter to Wilson, and around this issue 
an impasse developed. The UMW were willing to accept arbitration, but as the operators 
refused to bend on the subject of union recognition the dispute continued long into 1914. The 
3  situation rapidly degenerated into open violence with deaths on both sides, as tended to be the
case during labour disputes in Western territories. Wilson stood by the efforts of his department 
officials, for as he told J.F. Welbom, a senior official at CFI, “ the Department of Labor is 
empowered by act of Congress to exercise its good offices in trade and labor disputes for the 
purpose, if possible, of bringing about a just and amicable settlement” . He also backed 
Stewart, saying he was “ a trusted representative of the department sent to attempt to bring 
about a conference between the operators and the miners, and that he was sad that ‘ ‘he met with 
complete failure,”  and that “ his efforts were not welcomed” (12).
Matters came to a head in April 1914 when E.L.Doyle, a UMW official, told Wilson that 
0  ‘ ‘ verified reports today show that 4 men were murdered and 6 women and 15 children cremated
when operators’ mine guards dressed as militiamen attacked Ludlow Colorado tent colony 
with 6 machine guns then burned i t .... Children ranging from several week old babes to boy 
11 who ran to get drink for mother who was ill in cellar. He was shot through head. Officials 
believe at least 20 more women and children have been murdered .... about 200 have been 
accounted for, 200 missing” (13). After the incident at Ludlow the situation deteriorated into 
open warfare, forcing Governor E.M.Ammons to wire Wilson, “ conditions in this state 
compel me to request of you that federal troops be sent immediately .... disorder beyond the 
ability of the local authorities to control” (14). Secretary of War Garrison informed Wilson 
that he was legally able to act, and was thus able to dispatch federal troops should he so wish, 
but that “ the domestic violence has arisen out of a clash the merits of which you are not 
concerned with’ ’(15). This forced Wilson to inform Ammons that ‘ ‘my duty, as I now see it,
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is to confine myself to maintaining a status of good order until the State can re-assert its 
authority” (16), he could interfere no further in Colorado affairs. He did, however, informally 
contact J.D.Rockefeller owner of CFI, to see if he would prevail upon the operators in Colorado 
to seek a peaceful solution. Rockefeller refused, saying “ I have never been in personal 
involved with the CFI company having retired from active business some 15 to 20 years 
ago” (17). Frank Walsh exposed this lie during CIR hearings in Colorado when he exposed 
correspondence which showed that Rockefeller was not only actively involved in CFI and 
Colorado affairs, but had also taken a leading role in the management’s combatitive stance. 
Wilson was bitter over Rockefeller’s refusal to help and his double dealing. Colonel House 
records him speaking ‘ ‘with contempt for mere money getters” (18).
^  In September President Wilson made another effort to break the deadlock, in a letter to J.F.
White the UMW president, he put forward a draft adjustment for a settlement that had been 
drawn up by H.Davies and W.R. Fairley, commissioners in the Department of Labor’s 
conciliation section. It included “ the enforcement of the mining and labor laws of the state 
during a three year truce period. All miners not guilty of a violation of the law were to be re­
employed. Intimidation was to be prohibited. Scales of pay and rules and regulations were 
to be clearly posted. Each mine was to appoint a grievance committee. During the truce terms 
for contractual relations were to be waived. Mine guards were not to be employed. Federal 
troops were to be removed. There was to be a prohibition on picketing or any other 
demonstration by labor organizations. There was to be no suspension of work, and a 
commission was to be set up with presidential appointees, who were to be the final arbitrators 
2 )  in all disputed matters’ ’(19).
Colonel House recorded the miners’ responses thus, ‘ ‘the miners are at the end of their tether 
financially and they desire the President to appoint the Mediation Committee in order that they 
may accept it and end the strike, thus saving their faces. They believe that public opinion will 
later force the operators to arbitrate.... This news is of the most confidential character because 
the miners do not wish it known that they are at the end of their resources.... Houston has been 
in touch with the Rockefellers and they are as eager for a settlement” (20). To help bring 
matters to a head President Wilson released a statement saying ‘ ‘My plan seems to me to be 
obviously fair and sensible. The striking miners promptly accepted it, but the operators rejected 
it. I do not feel I am at liberty to do nothing in the circumstances .... (I have) determined to
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0appoint the commission contemplated in the plan of temporary settlement, notwithstanding 
the rejection of the plan by the operators” (21). Seth Low the chairman of the NCF, was 
appointed to head the commission. The miners called off their strike on 10 December 1914 
and accepted the commission, the operators would not do so. By March 1915 Low had effected 
a solution acceptable to both sides. The miners secured improved conditions broadly in line 
with their original demands and with those put forward by Wilson ’ s conciliators. On the subject 
of recognition of the UMW no progress was made. In its place, CFI put forward a plan for a 
company union. To help further the state legislature passed a workingman’s compensation act 
that put Colorado “ in the front ranks of States having good legislation for diminishing 
accidents among workingmen’ ’(22), this promised much in a state where the legislature had 
so often been controlled by the operators.
Throughout the strike Wilson backed the Department of Labor wholeheartedly, often in the 
face of serious criticism from the operators. He also intervened on numerous occasions to put 
his personal offices at the behest of the conflicting parties. He could do little more in a crisis 
that was fundamentally a state issue. What the strike does show, however, is that on too many 
occasions labour could only have its interests and needs addressed when a crisis of national 
proportion occurred, it was only then that labor could force itself on to the White House agenda.
The Clavton Act
With the inauguration of Wilson various progressive groups hoped to see their special interests 
protected by legislation. Sam Gompers was quick to remind Wilson of his obligations towards 
labour, some of his letters exceeding 20 pages! On 21 December 1912 he told the AFL 
executive council how ‘ T have presented to Woodrow Wilson our legislation in regard to the 
bills having passed the House .... Clayton Bill to regulate and limit the issuance of injunctions 
.... Clayton Bill to provide a jury trial for indirect contempts .... Sulzer Bill for the creation 
of a Department of Labor. We urged him to do what he could in securing the passage of the 
bills in the Senate” (23).
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It soon became apparent that things were not going to go entirely Gompers’ way, in spite of 
his earlier belief that Wilson would honour his labour pledges. Thushe wrote Wilson that “ the 
newspaper press is undertaking to place you in a position before the public entirely at variance 
with the contentions of labor... (there is a danger of) your being placed in apparent opposition 
to labor’s contentions” (24).
Gompers’ unease had been prompted by one of the first pro-labour measures Wilson had been 
asked to decide upon, the rider Democratic congressmen had added to the Sundry Civil 
Appropriations Bill 1913. This rider prevented the Department of Justice from using funds 
appropriated in the prosecution of unions. Taft had vetoed the bill, calling the rider “ class 
legislation of the most vicious sort”  (25). When the same measure was reintroduced in April 
2) 1913, Gompers hoped to see it pass as Wilson had intimated to congressional leaders that he
would not oppose it. However, as news of his apparent approval leaked out he was deluged 
by a flood of letters from almost every spokesman of organised capital in the country. Under 
such pressure Wilson characteristically reacted in one of two ways: either to stubbornly dig 
in and to defend the measure against all odds or to back down. In this case he weakened and 
reversed his position, primarily because of the strength and importance of his critics. He was 
not prepared to go out on a limb to back a radical measure for a group of marginal importance 
like labour. He thus agreed to sign the bill on 23 June 1913, but at the same time he issued a 
statement explaining that the rider was merely an expression of congressional opinion and that 
he would find money in the general funds of the Department of Justice for the prosecution of 
any group that broke the law.
If he hoped that this explanation would solve his problems then he was wrong. Ex-President 
Taft commented, “ he attempts to retain the support of those who insist upon this special 
privilege by signing the bill, and at the same time to mitigate the indignation of those who have 
regarded this as a test of his political character by condemning the rider in a memorandum and 
excusing his signature’ ’ (26). On this first critical test Wilson had done much to worry Gompers 
and other labour leaders. Gompers now began to wonder just how vigorously Wilson would 
fight for labour and how far he would go in honouring his election pledges. Gompers was not 
the only person to be alarmed at just how quickly the early idealism of the New Freedom was
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)tempered by the harsh realities of power. Wilson quickly modified his programme to 
accommodate the demands of industry, much to the dismay of more perpherial groups like 
labour.
In the campaign to secure relief from the injunction threat this episode was merely the first 
volley. At least Gompers and his colleagues now knew how far they could rely on Wilson, that 
like most politicians he went whichever way the political wind was blowing, and that if  they 
were to get any help from him they would need to threaten and caj ole. It was becoming obvious 
to labour leaders that Wilson was only prepared to back their programmes when they were ripe 
for realisation. He was not prepared to attach his name to any goals which might require long 
and patient cultivation, obviously that method of action did not suit his temperament or 
leadership style. It appeared that Wilson was willing to throw his weight behind only those 
interests that shouted the loudest, or in the case of the Colorado miner’s strike looked like 
developing into a situation which could injure him if he remained inactive.
Thus the AFL began to deliberately turn up the pressure, and their action seemed to be paying 
off as the New York World announced that “ Wilson agreed with members of the House 
Judiciary Committee that the demands of the AFL, in part, should be incorporated in the 
administration’s anti-trust program” (27). Gompers was calling for an anti-trust programme 
which included the Bartlett-Bacon plan which would exempt farmer and labour organisations 
from the operation of the Sherman Act, in that they would be reclassified as non-profit making 
organisations, and so be free of its effects. Wilson was under such pressure from all sides that 
he soon ‘ ‘appeared hazy concerning the exact form in which the bills would be rewritten’ ’(27).
Wilson’s anti-trust programme, including the labour clauses, was eventually incorporated into 
three bills drawn up by Henry Clayton of the House Judiciary Committee, which were soon 
combined into one measure known as the Clayton Bill. The bill had critics in all comers. The 
most serious area of controversy, however, was when labour leaders and their allies in Congress 
found nothing in it which gave unions the kind of exemption they requested, and felt they had 
been promised. They were soon up in arms, threatening the Democrats with the loss of the 
labour vote unless their demands were met. Knowing that Gompers could not honour any 
pledge to swing the labour vote one way or the other, Wilson was not unduly worried by this
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3threat. Still the New York W orld headlined how the unions “ Threaten Wilson Unless He 
Agrees To Exempt Labor, ’ ’ and reported how ‘ ‘open warfare between the administration, led 
by President Wilson, and the AFL, led by Samuel Gompers and organized labor’s representatives 
in Congress is imminent.... The President has been threatened with this feud because he will 
not agree to an amendment to the anti-trust laws to exempt labor. The threat of open warfare 
was made today during a conference between the President and a delegation of organized 
labor’s spokesmen in Congress.” The delegation had declared that “ pending measures did 
not go far enough .... They demanded that labor be taken out entirely .... This demand was 
not granted, the President informed the representatives he would agree to nothing more than 
is already provided in the bills. He flatly rejected the demands .... He is of the opinion that 
organized labor wants the Administration to sanction legislation which would not stand the test 
of constitutionality” (28). He would concede nothing more than a compromise amendment 
providing for jury trials in cases of criminal contempt, thus circumscribing the issuance of 
injunctions in labour disputes, and declaring that unions should not be considered as illegal 
combinations in restraint of trade when they lawfully sought to obtain legitimate objectives. 
This did not satisfy labour, it went so far as to threaten to join the Republicans and wreck the 
whole anti-trust programme if its demand for complete immunity was not granted. Even 
though he had agreed to this in 1912 he would not budge now, knowing as he did that the forces 
opposed to labour’s requests were of greater strength and importance.
Wilson’s will prevailed, and so with the compromise labour provision included the House 
passed the Clayton Bill on 5 June 1914. Two sections of the bill addressed labour: the first 
section defined organisations working only for mutual aid, and outlined how the law could not 
be used against them. The second section prevented the federal courts from issuing injunctions 
to stop workers engaged in a variety of work related protest and activism. The whole section 
was peppered with qualifying “ lawfuls”  and in itself said nothing about the legality of the 
named conduct, it merely addressed the court’s power to issue injunctions. It was almost as 
if  Wilson lost interest in the measure once it left the House, for it was largely cut adrift in the 
Senate, and as a result was assaulted on many fronts. Many of the Senators debating the bill 
merely restated the slogans of Gompers or the AABA, without attempting to independently 
examine the issues raised. One senator denounced the act for being ‘ ‘unjust and pathetic’ ’ and 
spoke vigorously against “ special privilege” (29). This obliged labour to combine more 
closely with farmers’ organisations to try and claw back in the Senate the concessions Wilson 
and the House had denied them.
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3On 30 July 1914 Gompers and Frank Morrison the AFL Secretary-Treasurer, the legislative 
representatives of the Brotherhoods and various national farming interests, addressed an 
appeal to the Senate Judiciary Committee. The letter reviewed the labour provisions of the bill 
as it had passed the House, and then went on to specify the changes they felt were necessary 
to satisfy farmer-labour needs. The changes Gompers argued for would have given labour the 
total immunity they were seeking, as they would be declared non-profit making organisations 
and so be outside the scope of the bill. Gompers hoped by excluding labour from the category 
of “ articles of commerce” the act would immunise labour from proceedings under the 
Sherman Act by putting it beyond the commerce power of the federal government. The Senate 
stood firm against these demands, making only a few changes of note. Senator Albert Cummins 
of Iowa, who agreed with Gompers that unions differed from business organisations and should 
be treated differently, still rejected Gompers’ conclusion that the non-violent exercise of union 
power should never be subject to state regulation or legal liability, and tabled many 
amendments. His colleagues rejected most of his ideas, but accepted his amendment reading 
‘ ‘the labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce” (30).
This famous phrase was, however, no more than a pious expression of senatorial opinion, and 
in no real way changed labor’s standing before the law. That the labour provisions of the bill 
did not grant immunity from prosecution under the amended Sherman Act was the opinion of 
practically every contemporary observer. The AABA claimed that no federal court had ever 
declared the mere existence of a union to be an unlawful restraint of trade, they claimed that 
Gompers had misled the House Judiciary Committee on this point and charged him ‘ ‘with his 
^  usual inaccuracy’ ’ (31), and claimed that ‘ ‘without further investigation the Judiciary Committee
of both House and Senate took their law from Mr Gompers, and to quiet his apprehension 
framed this section’ ’(31). The AABA also pointed out that the new act only addressed itself 
to lawful and peaceful conduct and so in no real way altered the liability of unions under 
Sherman.
To hide his own embarrassment and disappointment Gompers was obliged to voice all manner 
of verbal contortions and even called the Clayton Act labour’s “ Magna Carta” . Daniel 
Davenport speaking for the AABA called this claim ‘ ‘nothing but a humbug and sham,”  and 
Taft supported Davenport’s claim in a letter to E.E.Witte when he claimed the new act made 
few changes of but “ slight practical importance” (32). In many ways Gompers had no real
80
oo
choice but to sing the new act’s praises. He had spent eight years campaigning for this 
legislation, ever since the AFL put forward its “ Bill of Grievances” . The watered down 
Clayton Act was all he had to show for it, a concession grudgingly granted that did not really 
meet even his most basic requirements. He realised, however, that to attack the act too harshly 
would have been folly for it would have played into the hands of those in the AFL who objected 
to his non-partisan policies. This could well have been fatal, for in 1913 socialists were yet 
again mounting a concerted effort to unseat him. Gompers and the AFL were thus left to 
gamble that the organisation could eventually win from the courts what it could not get from 
Congress. Given the political alignments of the day, and labour’s peripheral position, they had 
in theory little to lose and much to gain, in hoping to get the court to interpret the law in their 
favour. This was however, a long shot given previous judicial decisions in cases involving 
labour.
The Seamen’s Act
Another pro-labour measure which had Wilson’s seeming approval at the time of his 
inauguration was the Seamen’s bill. Its purpose was to free American seamen from the bondage 
of their contracts, whilst also strengthening maritime safety requirements. The leader of the 
Seamen’s Union, Andrew Furuseth, had been fighting a largely fruitless battle for presidential 
and congressional support over twenty years. With the inauguration of Wilson he was 
confident he would now see his legislative dreams come to fruition. William Wilson, then 
representative for Pennsyl vannia, and Senator Robert LaFollette had sponsored Furuseth ’ s bill 
in the sixty-second Congress. It had passed the House in 1912, and the Senate in 1913, only 
to receive a veto from Taft in the dying days of his presidency. But with Wilson now in the 
White House, and his namesake elevated to the Department of Labor, Furuseth felt Taft’s veto 
was only a temporary hitch.
Had the bill been merely a matter of domestic interest it would probably have been re-enacted 
in the sixty-third congress and signed by Wilson. Trouble arose, however, because the measure 
abrogated the contractual arrangements of non-Americans serving on foreign registered ships 
that docked in American ports, thus violating treaties that America had signed with all the 
leading maritime nations. To complicate matters further, America had agreed to send
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representatives to an international conference in London in November 1913 on safety at sea. 
It hardly seemed like good policy for the government that had taken the initiative in calling 
the conference to act unilaterally before it had ever met. Thus Wilson yet again found himself 
in a tricky situation. Before the international ramifications of the bill had been brought fully 
to his attention he had been willing to support the measure and had actually promised to sign 
it. Now that the envoys of several of the European powers were expressing objections to 
Secretary Bryan he pulled back. Furuseth was to find, just as Gompers had over the Clayton 
bill, that Wilson was really only keen to back those measures that were ripe for realisation, and 
that he had a strong aversion to controversy. Even though he now had profound misgivings 
about the implications of the bill he was too late to stop action in the Senate. Sponsored again 
by LaFollette the measure was passed on 16 October 1913. Wilson did ensure that the House 
was prevented from moving on it by skilfully blocking any further debate until after the London 
conference on safety at sea had reported.
After the London conference Wilson found himself in a dilemma: should the United States 
ratify the convention on safety at sea unconditionally - which would mean dropping Furuseth’s 
bill - or should he have it ratified with a rider leaving room for the passage of the bill? Being 
the man he was he decided to let the State and Commerce departments make the decision. As 
they called for the unconditional ratification of the conference findings he was obliged to 
reverse his position on Furuseth’s bill. This resulted in a bitter controversy between Wilson 
and the progressive leaders in Congress who accused him of acting in bad faith. The House 
passed a modified version of the bill on 29 August 1914, meanwhile the Senate ratified the 
convention with a sweeping majority. In March 1915 both houses ratified the conference 
report, thus it now looked like the bill was doomed.
In an attempt to break the impasse and salvage something Furuseth made a personal appeal to 
Wilson in which he said “ you granted the members of the Executive Council of the AFL (a 
meeting in which) you renewed your expressions of sympathy but expressed some apprehension 
with reference to some possible complications that might arise over one section of the bill.” 
Furuseth still believed that “ it is difficult for us seamen... to understand how any nation can 
justly make any complaint because the United States chooses to make a seaman free” (33). 
Wilson was obviously touched as the following day he replied giving Furuseth a frank account 
of his position, ‘ ‘what is troubling me just at this moment is that it demands of the government
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what seems a truly impossible thing, namely, the denunciation of some 22 commercial treaties 
... I am advised by the State Department that the denunciation of a particular clause of a treaty 
is not feasible, that to denounce any of it would be to denounce all of it” (34).
Following straight on the heels of the letter Furuseth, La Follette and Senator Owen visited 
Bryan. This prompted the Secretary of State to immediately wire Wilson on a possible 
compromise solution that would involve the proponents of the bill having to make the 
necessary amendments themselves to water down the bill's international dimension. If they 
could not do so then Wilson would be in a position to veto it whilst apparently acting in good 
faith. LaFollette added his voice to the debate when he reminded Wilson that he agreed to 
Bryan’s terms and that if  any difficulties occurred, “ you have twelve months thereafter in 
which to adjust differences with foreign nations .... Should you require additional time to adjust 
all differences with the nations concerned I will pledge myself to aid to the uttermost in passing 
a joint resolution’ ’ (35). Seeing how things were developing Wilson astutely realised how little 
was now required of him, and so he surrendered to the pressure signing the bill on 4 March 1914, 
but not before he alleged “ I debated the matter of signing the bill very earnestly indeed, 
weighing the arguments on both sides with a great deal of anxiety” (36).
Any analysis of Wilson’s behaviour, as regards the backing of pro-labour measures prior to 
the mid-term elections of 1914, almost invariably obliges one to conclude that any concessions 
he made to progressive concepts were made only under duress, and consequently were not the 
result of any genuine conviction on his part. That this suspicion is well founded was shown 
time and again by the way in which he either refused to back the fulfilment of a large part of 
the progressive platform or actually obstructed it. He manoeuvred very carefully on the 
question of the application of the Sherman Act to unions, and did likewise with the Seamen’s 
Act; this was replicated elsewhere. Those concerned with the injunction issue and seamen’s 
rights did get a measure of redress, but elsewhere Wilson successfully stood off the 
movements designed to swing the influence and financial support of the federal government 
behind unions in their struggle for advancement.
83
31
Labour Failures Up To 1914
In 1912 whilst campaigning for the presidency Wilson had promised the National Child Labor 
Committee that he would support measures to prevent the invidious use of minors under 
fourteen years, and to improve the working conditions and pay of those under eighteen years. 
Once a measure reached Congress, however, and Wilson heard the infuriated growls of 
southern Democrats who claimed that such legislation could destabilise the southern economy, 
he thought again. He skilfully gave the constitution a narrow reading to shelve the bill 
sponsored by Owen and Keating, insisting along with the bill’s other critics, that it represented 
unconstitutional invasion of the police powers of the states, and that consequently he was 
unable to back their bill calling for the ‘ ‘forbidding of the shipment in interstate commerce of 
goods manufactured in whole or in party by children under fourteen, of products of mines and 
quarries involving the labor of children under sixteen, and of any products manufactured by 
children under sixteen employed more than eight hours a day” (37). Whilst he was able to 
escape further hostile comment upon this measure before the 1914 mid-term elections, it did 
come back to haunt him before his first term was over, when he was called upon to question 
his reliance on his party’s conservative members, and had to contemplate a working 
arrangement with more liberal and progressive forces.
Wilson likewise drew criticism for his actions on the issue of immigration control. The device 
favoured by the restrictionists and exclusionists was the literacy test, embodied in the Burnett 
general immigration bill. The House approved the measure on 4 February 1914, the Senate 
on 2 January 1915. Wilson came under intense pressure from both sides - from labour/ 
progressive elements favouring restriction, and from employers of foreign labour and the 
spokesmen of immigrant groups calling for its rejection. Charles Eliot was typical of the latter, 
writing “ I hope very much that you will veto the Burnett bill. The literacy test in the bill is 
a restrictive measure, it affords no real test.... The supreme selfishness of the attitude of the 
labor leaders on immigration ought to put them out of court altogether. Many of them are recent 
immigrants themselves” (38). It did indeed stick in many people’s throats that Gompers and 
many of his officers were foreign bom.
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On 22 January 1915 Wilson called a meeting in the East Room of the White House to help 
decide how best to proceed. The meeting lasted two and a half hours, and was evenly divided 
between both sides. Frank Morrison, AFL Secretary-Treasurer, led those favouring the bill. 
On the very morning of the meeting Wilson replied to Eliot “ (I) must keep my mind open on 
both sides, but my present judgement is with yours’ ’(39). Thus before he even entered the East 
Room Wilson’s mind was made up. It came as no surprise to the better informed to hear Wilson 
return the bill to the House saying, ‘ Tt is with unaffected regret that I find myself constrained 
by clear conviction to return this bill without my signature ... the bill represents a radical 
departure from the traditional and long established policy of this country.... The literacy test 
and the tests which it constitutes are an even more radical policy” (40).
The supporters of the bill were obviously dismayed, but it was becoming apparent by then that 
the European War was choking off most of the immigration they feared. It is possible that 
Wilson had indeed undergone a complete volte-face and now genuinely repudiated his earlier 
words on certain immigrants. His reluctance to support progressive measures once in office 
would tend to support this. What is harder to explain is why after the mid-term elections when 
he became noticeably more radical in his actions he still would not endorse restriction. An 
explanation for this is multi-faceted. The drastic change the literacy test presented to long 
established American immigration policies would no doubt have deeply offended the 
traditionalist in Wilson. Here was not a man who wished to back any measure which was a 
‘ ‘radical departure from the traditional and long established policy of this country’ ’(40). Also 
Wilson was astute enough to realise that the acceptance of portions of the AFL’s labour 
platform requirements, combined with a block on immigration control, could secure the best 
of all worlds for him. Acting in this way he could hope to gain large quantities of both the labour 
and immigrant votes during his re-election campaign.
The End Of The Reform Period And The Mid-Term Elections
A severe world-wide depression began in 1913 with the tightening of credit after the Balkan 
Wars. Fear of further conflict in Europe kept the markets jittery. When fighting actually began 
in 1914 it occurred during a period of general economic disorganisation. Unease in the 
American business world was not diminished by having a Democratic administration
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advocating tariff, banking and anti-trust reforms. Their fears were ungrounded for “ once in 
office Wilson, like many successful candidates, began to modify his idealism when faced with 
the practicalities of responsibility’ ’ (41). As Urofsky perceptively declares, the business world 
soon discovered that “ despite the campaign oratory, Wilson and his supporters were not 
irrational idealists. They understood that there were practical limits on the application of the 
New Freedom, limits which Wilson the candidate could ignore, but Wilson the President could 
not” (42). Thus well before mid-1914 the idealistic rhetoric of the New Freedom had been 
sharply tempered by the realities of power. The Democrats soon modified their programmes 
to accommodate business needs. Clearly, the 1913 depression made it necessary for Wilson 
to attempt a reconciliation with business.
Whereas A.S.Link believes political expediency alone made Wilson abandon the New 
Freedom, Urofsky in rejecting the single cause theory puts forward a more credible alternative. 
He argues that a variety of elements were at work - the need to soften the blow of the depression, 
political expediency and the dislocations caused by war in Europe (43). Thus in the spring of 
1914 Wilson embarked upon a campaign designed to win the friendship of bankers and 
businessmen, and to reduce any residual tensions that might exist between the business 
community and his administration. The accommodation of the anti-trust programme to the 
needs of business was the first step. His refusal to grant labour anything like the total immunity 
they sought calmed many business worries about his intentions.
Wilson’s courtship of business interests combined with his block on many labour orientated, 
progressive measures was not lost on the more liberal of voters. By 1914 many progressives 
had ample reason to doubt his political sincerity. For his own part, Wilson was convinced that 
he had honoured the platform commitments of the New Freedom in all major departments, 
including labour pledges. This complacency was soon undermined when the mid-term election 
results came in. The Republicans could not wage a particularly vigorous campaign, the 
continuing rupture in their ranks weakened them still. Roosevelt and the Progressive party 
made one last, unsuccessful, effort to break the mould and establish themselves on a major 
scale. Yet in spite of these electoral assets the Democrats still made a poor showing in both 
Senate and Congressional elections; so bad in fact that many believed their defeat in 1916
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looked certain. The Democratic majority in the House fell from 73 to 25, while the voting 
situation in the Senate remained largely unchanged. The Republicans also took back a number 
of states previously captured by the Democrats, including Wilson’s New Jersey.
The Progressive Reborn
The electoral setback troubled Wilson, not only did it throw the issue of his re-election into 
doubt, but it also contradicted his belief that his programme to carry out a maj or re-organisation 
of American economic life was complete and that the progressive movement had fulfilled its 
mission. Yet clearly the voters found the Democratic performance lacklustre. This initially 
2 )  nonplussed Wilson. He had not taken office promising to carry out a progressive programme
of federal social reform. He had merely promised to lower the tariff, re-organise the currency 
and banking systems, and strengthen the anti-trust law. He had actually done all of these things, 
and so was shocked by public ingratitude. Yet all of these reforms were achieved with the 
minimum of concession to advanced progressive concepts, and it was these people who were 
becoming reluctant to continue to support the Democrats. So just as Wilson hadbeen beginning 
to congratulate himself on a job well done he was faced with an election result that called his 
whole performance into question. Not only had he to begin again but he was also obliged to 
act in a more overtly progressive manner if he was to have any real hope of electoral success 
in 1916. If the election results of 1914 proved anything it was that his campaign to win over 
large sections of the business community had been unsuccessful, and that many previously 
2 )  loyal progressive voters were now also beginning to doubt him.
Commenting upon his problems, Frederick Howe suggested ‘ T feel that the Democratic party 
should fall heir to the group of socially minded membership of the Progressive party’ ’(44), and 
put forward a plan calling for the extension of social insurance to cover accidents, sickness, 
unemployment and old age; the development of insurance and pension systems for federal 
employees; the construction of ‘ ‘wandering artisan’ ’ homes; and the setting up of a nationwide 
system of employment agencies. By writing as he did Howe was hoping that Wilson would 
make a play for the heart of the progressive movement. Wilson was clearly interested as in 
his Jackson Day address he announced ‘ ‘only the Democratic party has carried out policies 
which the progressive people of this country have desired .... Don’t you think it would be a
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pretty good idea for the Democratic party to undertake a systematic method of helping the 
workingman of America? There is a very simple way in which they could help the 
workingman. If we were simply to establish a great federal employment bureau .... It was 
suggested in a cabinet meeting that the Department of Labor should have printed information 
about this in such a form that it can be pasted up in the post offices all over the United 
States’ ’(45). Following on from this speech William Wilson was allowed to move cautiously 
ahead on this plank of the Howe plan.
Henry Seager, another leading progressive, followed the Howe line when saying, ‘ ‘(I) venture 
to hope that you will include among the subjects touched upon in your message to Congress 
the need for a more adequate compensation law for federal employees. The defects in the 
present law are universally conceded .... federal employees are not able to have recourse to 
damage suits against their employer.... Last Winter the Kem-McGillicudy bill supported by 
this association (The American Association for Labor Legislation), was reported favorably to 
the Judiciary Committee of the House. Pressures from public business prevented it from 
coming to a vote .... The increasing pressure of public business which prevented legislation 
last Winter is the only serious obstacle in the way of definite action” (46). Ralph Meeker 
followed up claiming ‘ T feel that the compensation legislation in the United States is needlessly 
backward .... European countries are far in advance of us in respect to social insurance, and 
this is one of the reasons that their people are more united than our own. We should come out 
boldly and emphatically for a national insurance act similar to the Health Insurance Act of Great 
Britain” (47).
3
Progressive measures that had been previously rejected outright or discouraged now had the 
Wilson administration’s support. Having earlier refused to support the rural credits bill, a 
measure designed to aid the smaller debt ridden farmer, Wilson now reversed his position and 
helped the bill become law. The logy am that had seen too many progressive bills fhistrated 
was now broken. The Kem-McGillicuddy workingman’s compensation bill and the Keating- 
Owens child labor bill were both now given a new lease of life. Wilson’s keenness to support 
the child labour measure was no doubt linked to the prompting of people like Secretary Daniels: 
“ the Republicans warmly favor the child labor act but (claim) that the Democrats were 
opposing it. In view of the closeness of the vote in many states, and that women will vote in 
a large number of states I feel it would be a grave mistake if the Senate does not pass the child
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0labor bill .... I know many southern Senators oppose it but I believe that the failure to pass the 
bill will lose us more votes in the close states than our southern Senators appreciate” (48). 
Wilson had previously bowed to southern senatorial pressure, now he was forced to confront 
them. He was no doubt acting more out of fear that the Republicans would steal the credit for 
the bill than out of any real belief in the measure. On 18 July 1916 the president thus made 
an unannounced visit to the Capitol buildings, and there conferred with the Democratic 
majority leader Kem and other leading Democrats on the appropriate steering committees. He 
wished to fully rescue the 1912 Democratic party pledges, and so was obliged to press for the 
passage of the child labor measure and the bill calling for compensation payments to be made 
to injured federal employees. Under such pressure the senators wilted and agreed to back 
Wilson. On 25 July 1916 the Senate passed the bill on child labour.
One can only wonder how they would have reacted had Wilson had the courage to pressurize 
them in a similar way before the mid-term elections. Perhaps like Wilson they too were only 
galvanised into action by the possibility of a Democratic defeat in 1916. Following on its heels 
the AALL model workingmans’ compensation bill for federal employees was passed on 19 
August 1916. As with the earlier bill on child labour its resurrection owed much to Wilson’s 
new found desire to be seen as a progressive.
The reason for this astonishing metamorphosis in Democratic policies, coming as it did in the 
summer of 1916, was apparent to all observers. But regardless of the motivation behind 
2 )  Wilson ’ s new commitment to advanced doctrines, the fact is that the Democratic congressional
majority - with Wilson pushing hard - had by Autumn 1916 enacted almost every important 
plank of the Democratic and Progressive party platforms of 1912. Progressivism had come 
momentarily to fruition and had found acceptance by one of the maj or parties. Clearly Wilson 
saw no contradiction when he announced in 1916 that he had carried out not only his own 
election promises of 1912, but those of Roosevelt as well. He knew only too well that he had 
been elected by less than a majority in 1912 and that he would need the votes of as many 
progressives as possible in 1916 now that the Republicans had reunited. It is thus highly 
unlikely that anything more concrete than political expediency dictated Wilson’s shift, as 
Secretary Garrison said, ‘ T once heard a description which as nearly fits the case of President 
Wilson as any other I know, in describing someone it was said, ‘He was a man of high ideals, 
but no principles” ’(49).
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Trouble On The Railroads
The smooth run up to the 1916 presidential election was seriously affected by trouble on the 
railways requiring from Wilson a crucial piece of crisis management. A nationwide rail strike 
would seriously affect the preparedness programme, cause nationwide distress and paralyse 
industry.
Trouble on the railways had been long brewing. Matters came to a head on 9 March 1916 when 
the presidents of the four brotherhoods presented demands for an eight hour day, with no 
accompanying reduction in wages from the ten hours they normally worked, and time and a 
half pay for all overtime work. On 15 June the management rejected the demands, offering 
2 )  to submit them to arbitration. Wilson had been alerted to the situation by Senator Adamson
who felt that “ it looks like danger is brewing in the railroad situation. We are casting about 
to find some way to avert the universal strike which seems imminent.... We would like to have 
the benefit of any suggestions you might make” (50).
Wilson decided to invite both sides to a personal conference. This didnotplease W.C.Chambers 
of the Board of Mediation and Conciliation, who was forced to write, ‘ T observe that the 
representatives of the railroads are to have a conference with you either today or tomorrow.... 
you are to be asked to bring about an adjustment of the wage dispute... neither of the parties 
to the controversy has yet applied to the Board of Mediation and Conciliation for its services, 
3  as provided by the Act of Congress 13 July 1913. Neither has a condition yet been reached
in the controversy ‘in which an interruption of traffic is imminent and fraught with serious 
detriment to the public interest’ which would otherwise allow the Board to ‘proffer its services’ 
.... I deem it my duty to suggest that if you should be asked to intervene at this stage it would 
be well to refer the parties to the past efficiency of the law” (51). Already officials in the 
Department of Labor were worried that the president would decide to intervene personally, by­
passing their expert services, and so diminishing their ability to act in future disputes. They 
felt that any intervention he made at this stage would be taken by capitaland labour as meaning 
he had little faith in their abilities to act in time of crisis. While Chambers was urging caution 
and an adherence to the law, Wilson seemed to be preparing to act more decisively. On 31 July 
he sent William Wilson a letter he had received from H.A.Wheeler, president of the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce and asked for Secretary Wilson’s comments. Wheeler had alleged that
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“ conviction is deepened that an amicable settlement is remote .... On 18 August the Joint 
Conference will convene again, the men will announce the result of their strike vote. The Board 
of Mediation and Conciliation may come into the matter then, but without effect, in my 
judgement, in bringing these contending factions together”  (52).
William Wilson did not agree with Wheeler for he advised “ I still believe there is a lot of 
hysteria about the situation growing out of the fact that a strike vote has to be taken before the 
railroad companies and the Mediation Board will recognize that a labor dispute exists .... A 
strike vote taken under such circumstances does not reflect the attitude of the workmen towards 
a strike but represents the desire to press their claims to the front when the Mediation Board 
^  is called in. Neither does the stand taken by either side at the beginning of the negotiations
always represent what they will be willing to accept at the end .... In my judgement it would 
not be wise to provide any special machinery for the adjustment of this dispute.... Within three 
years we have created a new Mediation Board. It has done splendid work. There is no 
indication that it is not capable of handling this situation” (53).
Thus William Wilson backed Chambers and his other Department of Labor officials, and 
advised the president not to intervene personally, but to leave things to his officers and let the 
law smoothly run its course. Unfortunately when it was called in the Mediation Board was 
unable to bring about a settlement, and 94% of the 400,000 Brotherhood members approved 
2 )  strike action. Thus Wilson stepped in and on the morning of 13 August conferred with over
30 rail union officers at the White House. Brotherhood President Garretson made it abundantly 
clear that the eight hour claim was non-negotiable, and was seemingly unmoved by Wilson’s 
words that a strike would have catastrophic consequences for the country. Wilson met the 
owners during the afternoon. They were equally unbending, and claimed that the union 
demands would cost them an extra $100,000,000 a year.
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The following morning both sides again presented their cases to Wilson, while he again 
renewed his call for compromise. When both sides refused to back down he resolved to try 
and impose a settlement of his own. On 16 August he put forward a plan calling for the 
concession of the eight hour day, the postponement of the overtime demand and the setting up 
of a commission to observe and report on conditions in the industry (54).
On 18 August he met 31 rail union officers in the Green Room and pleaded with them to accept 
his plan, threatening that refusal could lead to nationalisation. The owners were called back 
in the next day, they highlighted how they felt his plan would destroy all the previous peaceful 
moves for labour adjustment in the industry. They were certain that federal intervention would 
destroy the existing arbitration system, which they hoped he would endorse. This caught 
Wilson in an embarrassing position: the owners welcomed mediation and arbitration - clearly 
hoping it would lead to a toning down of labour’s demands. The unions, however, were 
demanding pre-conditions before talks could begin, namely the granting of the eight hour day. 
Wilson now had to decide what to do in a situation that threatened the nation’s economic well­
being when one side was refusing arbitration. Wilson decided to browbeat the management. 
He did promise, however, to use his influence with Congress to increase rates so as to cover 
the extra costs the changes would involve. When it still remained clear that the owners would 
not move he declared, "if a strike comes, the public will know where the responsibility rests. 
It will not be upon me" (55). Clearly though he could not leave matters there, he again called 
in the owners, but his pleading was to no avail.
There were indications that some owners actually welcomed a strike, believing they could use 
it to crush the Brotherhoods. Ripley, the owner of the Santa Fe network, felt he could break 
the unions in thirty days. H.G.Otis the Los Angeles Times correspondent felt that “ organized 
railroad men would be the losers by tremendous majority, and the outcome would be the 
ultimate non-unionizing of the railroad service”  (56). Wilson’s bitterness towards the owners 
was such that he declared ‘ T pray God to forgive you, I never can ” (57), as he parted company 
with them. On 27 August the Brotherhoods let it be known that their strike would begin on 
4 September.
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3Wilson was in conference with the Senate Democratic leaders during the afternoon of 28 
August working on emergency legislation. Before a joint session of Congress the next day he 
outlined legislation designed to prevent the strike, and also to guarantee that such a catastrophe 
could never happen again. During a long speech in which he outlined the history of the dispute 
and his part in preventing it, he came up with the following peace proposals: “ 1) An eight 
hour day for railworkers engaged in interstate commerce (which in the absence of positive 
overtime meant ten hours’pay for eight hours work). 2) Compulsory suspension of rail strikes 
pending investigation by a federal commission. 3) That the Interstate Commerce Commission 
study the costs of the eight hour day, with a view to allowing the rail owners to increase rates. 
4) That the president be authorised to compel rail workers and officials to operate trains for 
military purposes” (58).
His endorsement of the eight hour day, long a union demand, was of vital importance in rallying 
labour to him during the Autumn campaign. The next few days were busy, for it appeared at 
first that Congress might refuse to act. With the help of W.C. Adamson, Chairman of the House 
Interstate Commerce Committee, and Majority Leader Kitchin, Wilson pushed his opponents 
into line. Kitchin and Adamson drafted a bill imposing the eight hour day, which would take 
effect on 1 January 1917, and also providing for a commission to study rail problems. Wilson 
and other congressional leaders were first shown the bill on 31 August. The following day it 
was introduced into the House and approved by 239 votes to 56. After a day of acrimonious 
debate, and much browbeating, the Senate accepted the bill on 2 September, Wilson signing 
it the same day. Passage of the Adamson Act forestalled the strike set to begin on 4 September.
2 )  The owners refused to accept the bill, and immediately began proceedings to challenge its
constitutionality. They refused to recognize its legality when it came into effect on 1 January 
1917, so the Brotherhoods again renewed their strike call for 15 March 1917. Under pressure 
from Wilson the strike was lifted for forty eight hours on 17 March, during which time U boats 
sank American shipping. As war seemed imminent the owners conceded their case and 
accepted the new act. On 19 March the Supreme Court voting 5 to 4 declared the act valid.
Wilson’s intervention, primarily on the side of labour, won him many plaudits from union 
activists and was of great value to him during his re-election campaign. The browbeating of 
Congress and the enactment of the Adamson Act did, however, help the Republicans somewhat 
during the same campaign. The averting of the threatened rail strike was Wilson’s second
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3major piece of crisis management during a labour dispute. The breakdown in industrial 
relations in the rail industry did have a truly federal dimension, something which the Colorado 
miners’ strike never had, and so allowed Wilson the chance to step decisively in when he wished 
and to enact emergency legislation.
ThelW W
The activities of the IWW were causing unease to the governments of the Western territories. 
In October 1915 Secretary Lane received a telegram from the governors of California, Utah, 
Washington and Oregon saying they were experiencing ‘ ‘abnormal disorder’ ’and asking him 
to launch a federal investigation on the grounds of an “ indication of an interstate conspiracy 
and misuse of mails” (59). This was not the first such request he had received, so Lane and 
Secretary Gregory thought it best to discuss the matter with Wilson, and it was he who gave 
permission for the inquiry to go ahead. Gregory contacted Wilson in February 1916 with its 
findings: ‘ ‘the investigations have shown that the membership of the Industrial Workers of the 
World is made up for the greater part of agitators, men without homes, mostly foreigners, the 
discontented and unemployed who are not anxious to work, and men of a very lower order of 
intelligence and morals .... The membership numbers about 2,000 in each of the states of 
California and Washington. The movement in Utah and Oregan is receding. The leaders of 
the Industrial Workers of the World preach ‘direct action’ and ‘sabotage’ .... It (the enquiry) 
failed to develop any evidence of violations of the federal statutes except in the mailing of 
certain publications and the writing of obscene and incendiary letters” (60).
Federal officials were keen to move against radicalism but simply lacked the tools to do so 
before the war. Whether the IWW deserved its reputation is beside the point, for the federal 
government saw internal security, and all threats to it, largely in terms of that organisation. The 
western appeal for aid in 1915 was simply one of many coming from those territories between 
1912 and 1915, all of which failed to provide any real concrete evidence of offences against 
federal laws. In 1912 a scrupulously thorough examination by Justice officials in California 
had failed to produce any evidence to indict IWW leaders for conspiracy, but although no 
persecution was possible it did not stop the flood of state demands to Washington for help. As 
William Preston notes, “ until World War One Washington was embarrassed by the lack of
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laws suitable for the prosecution of dissident members of the community”  (61). Lacking the 
tools and emergency conditions that could justify federal action, the government could only 
sit back and wait. While the calls for help did not change, the circumstances certainly did; 
American entry into the war, revolutionary disorder in Europe and unrest in America all created 
a justification for war-time repression.
Official worries over the IWW were redoubled in 1915 when the organisation began a new 
period of rejuvenation. In that year the Agricultural Workers Organization (AWO) was put 
together and given a charter. The AWO was firmly anchored in the mid-western wheat belt, 
and was the foundation for other significant membership gains made in 1917 in the western 
metal producing areas. With the formation of the AWO, the IWW began to show signs of 
concentration on more stable unionism for the first time in its short life. By August 1916 the 
IWW had issued 116 charters, and had sufficient money for the first time ever to pay salaries 
to its officers. By 1917 the IWW had 100,000 members, compared to 18,000 during the 
Lawrence strike and 40,000 in 1916. These developments have led Philip Taft to conclude that 
the IWW “ was functioning regularly as a labor organization ... able to sink roots in some of 
the industries employing a large complement of unskilled labor” (62). Consequently, as 
Robert Goldstein wrote, ‘ ‘had not the government smashed the IWW during and after the war 
there is good reason to believe that it might have become a powerful economic organization 
of unskilled and semi-skilled labor” (63).
Evidence of IWW activities and revival worried Wilson, especially so when American entry 
into the war in Europe was becoming increasingly likely. The president was also receiving 
reports on the activities of foreign agents working in America for the countries engaged in the 
European War and was worried in case the IWW might be drawn into these intrigues. In 
September 1915 Secretary Lansing sent Wilson a confidential intercept of a communication 
between the Austrian ambassador and his Foreign Minister in Vienna. The intercept concerned 
itself ‘ ‘ with regard for arrangements for a strike in the steel and munitions factory at Bethehlem 
(Schwabs) and in the middle West’ ’ (64). Ambassador Dumba was already actively organising 
German language newspapers, organising unions of Austro-Hungarian workmen and forming 
separate labour bureaux for his own countrymen. Wilson insisted that the Central Powers recall 
Dumba and his co-conspirators Boy-Ed and Van Papen, the German military and naval 
attaches.
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Wilson had the IWW proscribed during his second term and had emergency war time 
legislation passed which allowed federal agents for the first time to arrest its officers and 
members.
The 1916 Presidential Campaign and Election
Wilson was inundated with suggestions for the Democratic platform for the coming election. 
By June the following labour programme had been bolted together, “  1) A living wage for all 
employees. 2) A working day not to exceed eight hours, with one day of rest in seven. 3) The 
adoption of safety appliances and the establishment of thoroughly sanitary conditions of labor.
4) Adequate compensation for industrial accidents. 5) The standards of the ‘Uniform Child 
Labor Law’ whenever minors are employed. 6) Such provisions for decency, comfort and 
health in the employment of women as should be accorded the mothers of the race. 7) Adequate 
provision for aged employees entitled to retirement by long and faithful service. We believe 
also that the adoption of similar principles SHOULD BE URGED AND APPLIED in the 
legislation of the states with regard to labor within their borders” (65).
Wilson hoped that this platform would win him not only the votes of workingmen, but also 
those of the progressives who were without a party now that the Republicans had reunited. 
Charles Crane told him how ‘ ‘the Progressives are in a resentful mood and will probably drift 
in large numbers towards us without propaganda, (but) any sympathetic moves at St. Lewis 
would be most effective” (66). Norman Hapgood felt “ several hundred thousand - perhaps 
a million - Progressives who are displeased with the failure of the Colonel to run, and who think 
Hughes too conservative” (67) would vote for Wilson. However, in a letter to Hapgood 
W. A.White noted a view prevailing among many, ‘ ‘the truth is that I see no very great reason 
why he (Wilson) should be defeated; and - woe is me - no considerable preponderance of 
evidence in favor of his election... perhaps 35% of the Progressives who had remained loyal 
to their party through the election of 1914 would vote for Woodrow Wilson in 1916” (68).
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DIn an under-heated campaign things seemed to be going Wilson’s way. His Republican 
opponent C.E.Hughes, who was the leader of the progressive wing of his own party, fought 
a lacklustre campaign. He had difficulty finding an issue with which to attack Wilson and to 
energise his own supporters. He had his greatest success though when attacking Wilson on his 
handling of the rail strike and on the issue of the eight hour day. So telling was his criticism, 
and so vital had labour become to Wilson’s success,that his advisors urged him to concentrate 
on this issue. Colonel House wrote him urging him to point out that “ 1) The labor leaders 
did not hold up the President and Congress in order to get legislation which the President 
proposed for they preferred to accomplish their purposes through strike. 2) Hughes had no 
suggestion or criticism to make at the time. 3) If Hughes had disagreed with the President’s 
action, what would he have done in the circumstances? 4) Many of the railroad managers 
favored accepting the President's proposal because they thought the strike would be successful.
5) If the people will sustain the President he will urge upon Congress legislation that will take 
the menace of the strike from us ” (69).
Others also wrote Wilson urging him to speak out on the eight hour day. Not only did he do 
so, but characteristically he followed the House line. It was important he address the issue, for 
as House noted “ I told him that while the logic of the situation was with us, the vote would 
certainly not be unless the drift (which) had set in against us because of the eight hour law was 
stopped” (70). Another old friend, Charles Eliot - no lover of labour - took a different line, 
“ the reason I hear given by reasonable people for abandoning you in favor of Hughes is that 
you cannot be trusted to deal justly and courageously with the industrial warfare which will 
probably become fierce within the next four years; that you do not see how selfish and greedy 
the unions are, or how ruthless they can be in enforcing their demands for more pay, and that 
you are afraid to use the powers of the government to prevent strikes in public utilities .... They 
are dissatisfied with what you did about the threats of the railroad brotherhoods and believe 
(without evidence) that Hughes would have done better .... I believe that there is no clear choice 
between the Democratic and Republican parties in regard to timidity before the labor 
organizations” (71). Wilson ignored Eliot’s advice and adhered to the House line, for as the 
Colonel said, “ it is true we have organized wealth against us, and in such an aggregate as never 
before. On the other hand, we are pitting organized labor against it, and the fight is not an unfair 
one” (72).
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)He was rewarded for his post-1914 championing of labour causes with the clear unequivocal 
support of the AFL hierarchy. Sam Gompers called out the troops for him and the movement 
abandoned the sham of neutrality they had employed in earlier elections. The left wing of the 
progressive movement, including many socialists, seemed never to doubt for one moment that 
they had no real alternative but to back Wilson. Virtually the entire leadership of the advanced 
progressives moved en masse into the Wilson camp. The Wilsonian strategy of building up 
a new coalition of progressives and unionists worked magnificently. The Brotherhoods, the 
AFL and other small groups of labour all supported him. Even such IWW stalwarts as Mother 
Jones went on the stump for Wilson, although the IWW as a movement did not support him. 
So vigorous was labour’s support that Hughes was obliged to drop the eight hour issue. Sam 
Gompers issued a ringing declaration of support, ‘ ‘Never at any time in the last fifty years have 
the workers had more at stake in any political campaign .... During the present administration 
the organized labor movement has been able to secure recognition for the rights of human 
beings and opportunity for all to participate in the affairs of the nation in a degree that has never 
before been accomplished .... This recognition has taken the form of legislation necessary to 
protect the interests of wage earners. During the last four years there has been enacted by 
Congress and signed by President Wilson humanitarian protective legislation unprecedented 
in amount and scope” (73). Gompers was indeed quite right to say that Wilson had been at the 
helm when legislative changes were made, but ignored the fact that much of this legislation 
was of poor quality, was only grudgingly conceded, was not really what labour desired, or was 
done solely to curry favour. Wilson’s task was made easier by the fact that the leaders of the 
AFL desired so very little from the government, and were so anxious for recognition and 
respectability that they would praise almost any change.
It is clear that the campaign witnessed an almost perfect alignment of progressives and 
conservatives into opposing camps. The factor which won Wilson his second term was the 
fusion of the peace cause, caught so perfectly by the slogan ‘ ‘He Kept Us Out of the War,” 
with the pledge of a move towards greater progressive democracy - a programme Hughes could 
not match. The labour measures of his first term proved to be an essential part of his election 
campaign strategy and in the formation of his electoral base and coalition. His promise to keep 
America out of the war was not in itself enough to cement this new progressive-labour 
coalition, that was only achieved by his promise of progressive democracy. The bombastic, 
pro-war utterances of Roosevelt clearly hurt Hughes, but never as much as his own inability 
to seize the political initiative.
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To many people’s surprise the early returns on 7 November seemed to give Hughes an almost 
clean sweep of the Eastern states. For a time it looked as if Wilson had fluffed things and 
actually lost the election. As the night progressed, however, and one after another of the 
Western states fell in behind the Democrats, it became clear he had done enough to hold onto 
office. Gompers publically campaigned for the Democrats; in the Western states particularly 
this proved to be of vital importance. By November 1916 the AFL were becoming a core 
constituent of the Democrats, who as a minority party nationally needed all the friends they 
could get. The contest was so close though that in some states a handful of votes would have 
been enough to have elected Hughes. With a total of277 electoral votes Wilson had a majority 
of 23 in the Electoral College. In all he received 9,129,606 votes as against 8,538,221 for 
Hughes, a gain for Wilson of almost three million votes over 1912-many of them obviously 
being ex-Roosevelt progressives and socialists. It was the best evidence yet that Wilson’s 
2) progressive - peace campaign had succeeded in drawing together a new alliance, although still
not a majority of the popular vote, something he could not achieve in either of his two election 
victories. Socialists deserted the SPA to back Wilson, their vote dropping to 585,113 in 1916 
from a high of 901,873 in 1912.
All contemporary observers agreed that the key factor behind Wilson’s success was his promise 
of continued peace, prosperity and progressive democracy. These were the issues that won 
over a large maj ority of women voters, a large minority of socialists, and a large enough number 
of progressives to win the day. W.E.Dodd confided to Colonel House that “ it is the South and 
West united; the farmers, small businessmen and perhaps a large sprinkling of Union labor 
against the large industrial transportation and commercial interests” (74). Wilson actually 
succeeded in winning most of the agricultural states - something Bryan had narrowly failed 
to do in 1896. To that he added two Eastern States and a large portion of the social justice vote, 
who had previously supported Roosevelt. The labour vote, although not yet fully organised, 
to a large extent heeded Gomper’s advice and went to Wilson. It was a crucial factor in his 
success in New Hampshire, Ohio, Washington and California.
The Senate and Congressional contests were equally close. The Democratic majority in the 
Senate was reduced to 8, while control of the House lay in the hands of a few progressives and 
independents, the new Congress consisting of 217 Republicans, 213 Democrats, 2 Progressives, 
1 Socialist, 1 Prohibitionist and 1 Independent.
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The Close Of The First Administration
The sixty-third Congress was the longest ever sitting up to that time, and from it the Democrats 
secured a useful package of measures, many of them of a pro-labour nature. It must be pointed 
out, however, that many of the measures progressed to fhiition with almost no help or positive 
guidance from the president. Some measure he actually tried to frustrate or stop altogether. 
The pro-labour clauses in the Clayton Act were only conceded grudgingly and with much 
backsliding on Wilson’s part. The final package was so watered down as to be meaningless. 
Even before it was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in the early 1920s, all 
contemporary observers were pointing out that it in no way changed labour’s standing before 
the law, irrespective of Gompers' claims to the contrary. Gompers, of course, had no real option 
but to sing its praises, he knew it was all Wilson would grant him, and praising it might keep 
his radical enemies at bay. Being a trained, if unsuccessful, lawyer and a professor of 
jurisprudence, one wonders how Wilson could have escaped noticing its glaring faults, that is 
of course assuming he was ever concerned enough to study it. The Seamen’s Act was also 
passed reluctantly. It was, however, an excellent piece of work, but as Wilson played no part 
in the drafting of it, and actually did much to frustrate it once he became aware of its 
international dimension, he cannot claim much credit for it. Its passage owes everything to 
the bravery and persistence of Andrew Furuseth and Robert LaFollette. It was unfortunate that 
the war wiped out many of the improvements Furuseth was working for.
The passage of other pro-labour measures, such as the Child Labor Law and the Workingman’s 
Compensation Act for Federal employees, owes much to the fact that after the 1914 mid-term 
elections, with the Republicans reuniting, the Progressives fragmenting and many businessmen 
remaining aloof from his overtures, Wilson needed to cobble together a progressive alliance 
if he was to have any real hope of being re-elected in 1916. Prior to the off-year elections he 
had rejected these bills, but now with necessity staring him in the face he thought again. An 
editorial in the New Republic described him thus, “ Wilson is being motivated by political 
expediency. From the day of his first nomination, his absorbing preoccupation has been the 
resurrection of the Democratic party as a capable organ of government. In the pursuit of this 
objective Wilson has been a thoroughgoing opportunist. Every statesman has to a large extent 
to be an opportunist, but Wilson’s brand of opportunism has not been convincing. His 
management has been unscrupulously adroit, his opinions have been suspiciously fluid; the 
reversals and expansions of his policy have been too numerous and too considerable’ '(75).
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It is unfortunate that labour could only get on to the White House agenda when Wilson needed 
their support or when a crisis of national proportions developed. During periods of emergency 
labour could force Wilson to activate a programme of crisis management, as he did over 
conditions in Colorado and during the threatened rail strike. It is during these crises that we 
see the magic of the man. A man capable of acting decisively when the need arose, a man able 
to get his way with Congress and force through emergency legislation, as he did with the 
Adamson Act. It is a pity that this kind of action could only be brought forth infrequently. It 
is almost as if when people pressed their demands peacefully he could feel free to ignore them 
if he so wished.
Clearly at the close of the first administration Wilson was well informed on the broad sub­
divisions within the labour movement. He had come into contact with, spoken to and 
corresponded with many AFL officials. No doubt he found them pleasing acquaintances. 
Their desire to be accorded a measure of recognition and respectability would have appealed 
to his ordered mind and personality. Legislatively they asked for very little, which both pleased 
him and played into his manipulative hands. The fact that Wilson spoke at the dedication of 
the new AFL offices in Washington showed the growing significance of this section of the 
labour movement. This act demonstrated how politicians had now to address themselves to 
labour whether they really wanted to or not. In many ways the actual words spoken that day 
by Wilson were meaningless. They were, in fact, simply more vague promises of friendship 
and support. What was really important was the actual appearance itself- a clear recognition 
of how far labour, especially in its AFL guise, had come.
The IWW were, however, another matter completely. Here were malcontents attempting to 
overthrow the social, economic and political systems that had shaped and moulded Wilson. 
Here were men who Wilson felt were quite prepared to use violence and sabotage. The reports 
he had reviewed of their activities in the Western territories, when combined with their 
resurgence in 1915 in areas vital to the economy, all greatly troubled him. This was especially 
so when he witnessed the European powers’ willingness to intervene in American affairs, for 
he was concerned that the IWW might be drawn into such schemes. Officials within the 
Department of Justice had already shown that they had no legal justification as yet for moving 
against the organisation. An opportunity came during the second administration under the 
emergency conditions engardened by American entry into the European war. As we shall see
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in the next chapter the IWW and domestic radicalism were then effectively crushed.
Wilson’s first term closed with him returned to office as the head of anew progressive-labour 
coalition, who had voted for him as he promised to keep America out of the war, and as he had 
given them the hope of greater progressive democracy at home. Wilson effectively reneged 
on both promises during his second term and it is that which we will examine in the closing 
chapter.
O
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oCHAPTER SIX
THE SECOND ADMINISTRATION
This chapter will concern itself with how American entry into the European War affected the 
developing relationship between the federal government and labour. The declaration of war 
gave the administration the excuse they needed to move against the IWW and SPA. The 
emergency also made it imperative for the government to more fully involve the AFL in the 
everyday functioning of the administration. We will see, however, that this new relationship 
was created for purely short-term reasons, and that in the postwar period the administration 
speedily withdrew its support from the AFL and aided employers in their drive against labour. 
By the chapter's close we will see the AFL pushed back to their pre-war bastions and in a 
structurally weaker position than in 1916, and with none of their “ Bill of Grievances”  fully 
rectified.
The American Entry Into The European W ar
Wilson’s electoral success in 1916 owed a great deal to his attaching his name to rising 
progressive sentiment. His decision to take the country into the European War had electoral 
implications. American progressivism was concentrated largely on economic and social 
justice at home, almost to the point where it became provincialism. Thus the vast majority of 
progressives, especially in the Mid-West, wanted to keep America out of the war, and so were 
in the anti-war, anti-preparedness ranks. There was also almost unanimous opposition from 
labour and farmer organisations to preparedness and the war, the one notable exception being 
Sam Gompers.
In 1914 the AFL spoke out against the war, feeling it was a capitalist war which could only 
weaken labour. Gompers, seeing how European labour was enfeebled by its members’ rush 
to don uniform, decided his own movement must not suffer if a similar situation was ever to 
occur in America. Seeing how the European movements had acted, he decided that if  he were 
ever placed in a similar situation he would cooperate with the war effort and so not lose his 
power to influence events in labour’s favour. As he said himself, ‘ ‘the present war has proved
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0that one of the strongest emotions in a man is patriotism. It is stronger than the fundamental 
tenet of socialism, stronger than the ideals of international peace, stronger than religion, 
stronger than love of life and family” (1). He was realistic enough to see that American 
intervention in the war was inevitable, and that in such a situation it would be best to offer one’s 
services freely rather than be coerced into action. By cooperating labour would not only have 
an opportunity to get their point of view over, but they could also stop employers who might 
wish to use the war as a pretext for rolling back labour gains. Gompers perceived that American 
entry into the war would probably force the government to take over the levers of industrial 
control. Thus as government intervention was unavoidable, it was better he protect AFL 
interests and so try and turn the emergency to his own advantage.
The AFL made public their new found commitment to the national service by publishing 
American Labor’s Position in Peace or in War, which pledged their support in the fight against 
Germany. It was not an unconditional pledge. Gompers especially was determined to 
safeguard his recent advances. He was hoping to make the AFL the medium through which 
the government would attempt to win the cooperation of all workers, whether unionised or not. 
Thus he dropped his almost life-long commitment to pacifism and deserted the American peace 
movement once it became clear it was impractical to remain a pacifist. This ability to desert 
his principles was what made him such a useful tool to the Wilson administration, and why 
during the war they rewarded him and other like-minded AFL officers with positions on 
government boards.
This volte-face was made in the face of strong opposition. Whilst Gompers was being 
pressurised by his NCF associates, who worked on his narcissism and anti-socialist biases, to 
preach the rightness of the allied cause, he was under equal pressure from the German-Irish 
bloc in the AFL to support their countrymen. Clearly the administration was hoping to use 
Gompers to win these elements for the war, or at worst neutralise them. The Irish were 
increasingly anti-British after the Easter Rising and gladly joined with their German brethren, 
thus Gompers was in some danger of splitting the AFL, or at the very least alienating large and 
powerful sections. He knew that many AFL officers had no wish to ally themselves with the 
British and French governments, but ffomhis own analysis of events in those countries he knew 
that if he wished to have any say in national affairs he would have to back the war effort.
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unemployment and economic depressions that had hindered the AFL for long periods during 
the early twentieth century were soon things of the past as war orders flooded in and stimulated 
the economy. Unemployment had almost disappeared before American intervention in 
Europe. A labour shortage was made almost acute by the cutting off of European immigration. 
Good business conditions, rising prices and a buoyant market brought with them calls for 
higher wages, shorter hours, and improved overtime pay, and opportunities for unionisation. 
These conditions gave the AFL a potentially strong hand, but one that could be easily lost if 
war came to America and the government resorted to emergency legislation to compel 
obedience. The boom certainly gave millions of workers the confidence they needed to quit 
their jobs or strike for better conditions. Thus the government mobilised for war in the midst 
of one of the most extensive and long-lasting strike waves in the country’s history. The 
influence of anti-war agitation and unprecedented strike activity prompted the administration 
to devote special attention to labour.
The Suppression Of The IWW And Other Radicals
American entry into the war gave the Wilson administration two major problems: organising 
the nation’s industrial capacity and winning the support of workers, farmers and dissidents. To 
accomplish these goals the administration openly conciliated pro-war AFL officers and 
businessmen, and when this failed with others used the power of the federal government to 
coerce and crush. Support for the war was decidedly patchy, especially among workers and 
farmers. This meant that the administration had reason to offer bribes. Anti-war activity was 
particularly strong in rural areas with many farmers believing that Wilson had betrayed them. 
Socialism was rife in the Mid-West with the SPA being the only nationally organised group 
against the war. This gave the party an opportunity to rally anti-war elements to its banners. 
The Wilson administration met this problem head on by trying to destroy the SPA and the 
IWW. The situation looked dire as George Creel,the head of the Committee on Public 
Information (CPI), reported: ‘ ‘You will find in Georgia and parts of South Carolina, you will 
find in Arkansas; you will find in many parts of the West, an indifference that is turned into 
a very active irritation that borders on disloyalty .... We must take the whole country” (2).
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In 1917 the radical movement in America was made up chiefly of the SPA, the IWW and the 
Non-Partison League, a mainly rural based progressive group. The IWW was generating a 
strong appeal to native-born unskilled workers previously ignored by the AFL. The SPA was 
showing a strength not seen by earlier socialist parties like the SLP, or even the Populists. 
Given the strength of radicalism in America at that time it is not surprising that opposition to 
American entry into the war was huge. Organisations which identified themselves as anti-war 
made big gains in 1917 despite the opening of a vicious anti-radical campaign against them. 
The IWW recruited over 30,000 new members between April and September 1917. The SPA 
also made great gains which were linked to its anti-war stand, growth so impressive that Daniel 
Bell spoke of them as reaching “ new and spectacular heights” (3). This growing anti-war 
sentiment did not threaten revolution or violence, but it did pose a serious threat of disaffection 
which if  left unchecked could have undermined the nation’s morale.
Whilst the SPA remained pacifist in large part, the IWW sought an equivocation that might 
spare it from government attack. The IWW leadership decided to allow the membership to act 
upon their own consciences on registration for the draft and conscription. Incredibly 
registration ran as high as 95% in many areas(4), but then membership of the IWW did not 
automatically mean disloyalty to America - something the administration never quite realised. 
The IWW’s concentration on industrial action and its toning down of its anti-militaristic, anti- 
government background did not win it a last minute reprieve. As William Preston said ‘ ‘The 
effort proved fruitless and irrelevant for the IWW was convicted in large part for what it had 
been in the past” (5). Identified by its past actions and utterances the IWW could not divest 
itself of those connotations. Also by emphasizing the concept of a capitalist master class and 
refusing to abandon the right to strike the IWW retained the very concepts that ensured its 
suppression.
Wilson was certainly in no mood to brook opposition, from 1915 onwards he had helped foster 
a national defence mentality which increased fears about the radicalism of labour, so the 
IWW’s being lukewarm over preparedness soon called its patriotism into doubt. In his State 
of the Union Address to Congress as early as December 1915 he was saying that “ the gravest 
threats against our national peace and safety have been uttered within our borders. There are 
citizens of the United States, I blush to admit, bom under other flags, but welcomed by our 
generous naturalisation laws.... who have poured the poison of disloyalty into the very arteries 
of our national life’ ’(6). By speaking as he did he called into question the loyalty of any person
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who expressed a dissenting opinion. On 14 June 1916 he actually said that “ disloyalty must 
be absolutely crushed” (7) and in September attacked “ certain groups and combinations of 
men amongst us who were bom under foreign flags”  and suggested that such men had 
‘ ‘injected the poison of disloyalty into our most critical affairs, (and) laid violent hands upon 
many of our industries’ ’(8). On 2 April 1917 he suggested that ‘ ‘if there should be disloyalty 
it will be dealt with with a firm hand of stem repression” (8). In June 1917 he wamed that 
Germany was using ‘ ‘liberals, socialists, the leaders of labor to carry out their designs”  (9), and 
said that ‘ ‘may God have mercy on them, for they need expect none from an outraged people 
and an avenging govemment’ ’(10).
The calling up of the National Guard for federal service in 1917 deprived most states of their 
most effective anti-radical forces. Under the constitution federal troops could only be used to 
suppress local disturbances if federal laws were broken. They could only move even then if 
the govemor certified that the state was unable to cope, and the president had issued a 
proclamation ordering the insurrectionists to disperse by a certain time. All of these mles were 
flouted when the administration moved against the IWW. The use of federal troops in local 
strikes was unusual and unconstitutional, but the war emergency gave the move a certain bogus 
legality. At the moment that IWW led workers looked like achieving breakthroughs in strikes 
in the lumber and copper industries in the North-West the federal govemment broke the strikes 
by their use of federal troops as strikebreakers.
As William Preston perceptively declares, ‘ ‘ a strike could now be labelled not only a legitimate 
labor stmggle, but also a seditious interference with the war effort depending upon need "(11). 
The administration disliked strikes that interfered with war production, but handled them in 
different ways. It tolerated strikes by AFL unions and dealt with the issues raised by mediation 
and conciliation; but there was no such sympathetic flexibility for the IWW. The IWW revival 
from 1915 onwards in the lumber, mining and agricultural areas of the mid-West, established 
them as a menace to numerous communities vital to the war effort. Prosecuting attomeys in 
Washington and Montana and federal agents in the Bureau of Investigation all certified to the 
peaceful nature of the 19171 WW-led lumber strike, but lumber operators and the administration 
were fearful of IWW job control over the industry. Thus govemment action was not based on 
the realities that its own agents reported or on the world as it was; instead it was based on the 
anxieties of an important section of the public - the employer class. When the IWW leadership
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issued a regional general strike call on 20 August 1917 to protest against government sponsored 
repression the military moved in and occupied large areas of Arizona and Montana until 1921. 
As Preston says “ surveillance, occupation and suppression marked the wartime participation 
of federal troops in the drive against subversive labor elements” (12).
Not only was the Army employed against radicals but the strength and scope of various 
“ internal security”  agencies were also increased. Military intelligence agents engaged in a 
wide range of dubious activities not only against the IWW, but also against the SPA and civil 
liberties and pacifist groups. The most novel force used by the administration, however, was 
the American Protective League (APL) a privately funded volunteer force operating under the 
Department of Justice. The relationship of the APL to Justice, and whether or not its agents 
could make arrests, was deliberately left vague. Its members infiltrated radical groups, broke 
into buildings, wiretapped, bugged and opened mail. The head of the APL urged his lieutenants 
to obtain financial support from businessmen “ who usually are the ones who benefit in a 
property sense by the protection offered by our organization” (15). John Roche calls the APL 
‘ ‘a govemment sponsored lynchmob’ ’(14). What the Army, Justice and the APL could do best 
was to provide the overt control of radicalism and sense of action hysterical citizens were 
demanding from their govemment. This gave other govemment departments the time they 
needed to search for a longer lasting legal precedent to move against the IWW.
At first the Department of Justice could find no federal law it could use against the IWW. This 
problem could only be resolved by the passage of emergency legislation. The administration 
was thus instmmental in pushing through Congress the Espionage Act 1917 and the Sedition 
Act 1918. The former could result in a twenty year sentence for those found guilty of 
deliberately hindering the war effort. Empowered by the act the Post Office could stop articles 
going through the mail, and in this way strangled the radical press. Wilson argued for harsher 
penalties but Congress would not allow the direct censorship of the press. The Sedition Act 
outlawed virtually all criticism of the war effort or govemment.
The administration also had an arsenal of other weapons. In Autumn 1917 Wilson issued new 
orders so that all German males over fourteen had to register with the govemment; they were 
debarred from entering many areas and were expelled from Washington D.C; they had to have
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)permission to travel, to change their residence and were barred from entering ports. In all this 
covered 600,000 German-Americans. On 17 April 1917 Wilson started a programme designed 
to debar from public service all people deemed to be “ inimical to the public welfare” (15). 
Under the Trading With The Enemy Act of 6 October 1917 all foreign language papers had 
to be submitted to the Post Office for approval. The Immigration Act of 1918 extended the 
concept of guilt by association and so made it easier to deport members of organisations 
deemed to be threatening - although to the administration’s chagrin many IWW and SPA 
members were native bom.
In large part the govemment, using its best legal brains, built its case against the IWW on 
expressions of opinion about capitalism, the class stmggle, sabotage, militarism, war and 
conscription, much of this material predated the war and the passage of the emergency 
legislation! Only in the IWW Sacramento trial could the govemment introduce to any great 
extent evidence of vandalism or the destmction of private property. As William Preston 
showed, the trials “ provided a sense of public reassurance, the product of clamor more than 
tmth” (16). By the end of the war virtually everyone who had played a prominent role in the 
IWW was in prison, not just the top leaders, but second and third string leaders as well, many 
of them being held for things they had said before the war.
The failure to protect the IWW’s civil liberties pointed the way to the eventual collapse of 
solidarity among liberal exponents of such matters. The IWW stood alone as no one dared 
speak up for them, such was the atmosphere the administration had created. The one man who 
could have called off these prosecutions was Woodrow Wilson. He chose not to because 
instinctively and philosophically he detested the IWW class war theories of society. To him 
the IWW were a ‘ ‘menace to organized society and the right conduct of industry’ ’(17). The 
IWW's equivocal stand on the war was bound to hurt a man of Wilson’s temperament; to call 
it a capitalist war was to sneer and mock him; and so no appeals for IWW civil liberties would 
impress him. His political and economic philosophy left him personally unmoved by the 
misfortunes of the IWW. As he told the attorney-general, “ the IW W ... are certainly worthy 
of being suppressed” (18).
113
)3
Clearly those who suffered most were those whose views on the war were derived from some 
objectionable economic or social doctrine, irrespective of their views on the Central Powers. 
Prominent newspapers and politicians in both the main parties criticised the govemment and 
the war effort yet they never suffered at the hands of the govemment. Clearly the bias was 
towards cmshing the IWW and SPA. Whilst the IWW was destroyed the SPA was only 
severely weakened. Gabriel Kolko has even argued that ‘ ‘the facts show that the party gained 
in strength and popularity as a result of its anti-war stand” (19). But at the moment when 
American socialism appeared to be on the verge of significant political and organisational 
success it was gravely weakened by a combination of federal and State repression. The party 
was probably naive in believing it would be treated fairly by the political authorities, and as 
a result its press was damaged, its leadership imprisoned and its ideological heart - the mral 
mid-West - was cut out.
The AFL showed only unconcem as these groups’ civil liberties were denied, but then it was 
the biggest beneficiary of the assault. Its role in the cmshing of the IWW was quite active. The 
path from Justice to the AFL building was two-way with both organisations freely trading 
information on known or perceived radicals. Steven Larson actually believes that the AFL and 
govemment worked so closely together that “ an alliance to cmsh radical labor groups such 
as the IWW” (20) was formed. Whilst keen to rid itself of the irritant that was the IWW, the 
AFL was also motivated by a real fear of repression itself if it did not back the govemment, 
and obviously hoped for govemment aid if it did. Gompers certainly played on the 
administration’s fear of radicalism, raising the possibility that if concessions were not granted 
he might be ousted. Gompers actually told Wilson that he must ‘ ‘deal with the representatives 
of the bona fide organized constmctive labor movement of the country or they will have the 
altemative of being forced to take the consequences of the so-called IWW with all that 
implies” (21). It is the new working relationship between the administration and the AFL that 
developed during the war we shall examine now.
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War brought prosperity, and as in the past, prosperity brought labour unrest. The now 
favourable labour market differed from earlier shortages of supply only in degree, certainly 
not in kind. War also brought another factor into play - military needs demanded full and 
uninterrupted production. To ensure labour peace the administration, in the words of David 
Brody, knew it would have to “ intervene massively in labor-management relations that had 
hitherto been completely private’ ’(22). American involvement in the war produced a need for 
a ‘ ‘large unit coordinated economy’ ’(23), aimed at producing large quantities of goods; it also 
required the control of the economy and society by a large and powerful govemment. The 
direction of the war was, however, a new experience for everyone, and so confusion abounded 
in official circles in Washington. Urofsky actually believes “ there was an almost criminal 
negligence in the Wilson administration in preparing the country’s defenses - especially its 
industrial resources - from 1914 to 1917"(24).
Clearly the administration realised that labour would need placating as their ability to make 
the economy malfunction was considerable. The Department of Labor should have been the 
agency to prevent industrial unrest and to coordinate the activities of the several govemment 
departments involved with labor. It was not, however, in a position to render such a service. 
Only two of its bureaus - Labor Statistics and the Childrens’ Bureau - were of real value in war 
labour work; the other bureaus lacked statutory authority for their actions, and Congress was 
unwilling to grant these powers to a department it distmsted. The department was not only 
hampered by congressional opposition, it was also bothered by a general lack of funds and the 
continued hostility of many employers. However,the blame for the Department of Labor not 
being allowed to manage labour relations does not rest solely with Congress. William Wilson 
was timid in pressing his case, even when he had the president’s support.
For almost nine months the administration tried to meet the war crisis by using peace-time 
methods and failed. Wilson had to acknowledge that the older methods or management were 
not working and that a new direction had to be found. Even before America actually entered 
the war Secretary Baker entered into an informal pact with Gompers, with President Wilson’s 
tacit approval, under which the first of a number of govemment boards were set up to deal with 
labour. On 29 August 1916 Congress gave its approval to the setting up of the Council for
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)National Defense (CND) with members including the secretaries for War, the Navy, 
Agriculture, Commerce and Labor. Gompers was co-opted on to the CND as one of its many 
vice-presidents, and was also made chairman of its Labor Committee. The job carried no 
salary, but it gave Gompers the opportunity he had long sought to have labour’s voice heard 
properly in govemment circles. It also gave him the official respectability he felt he deserved. 
He acquired prestige and recognition beyond his wildest dreams. There were few important 
officials to whom Gompers did not now have easy access, so much so that some of Wilson’s 
cabinet colleagues felt he was closer to the president than they were themselves.
The CND had two major functions: to coordinate all forms of transportation and to survey 
industrial resources. On 13 December 1917a CND interdepartmental conference came up with 
the following recommendations:
1 There is a need to set up a machinery for solving labor disputes.
2 Provisions have to be drawn up to provide for an adequate supply of labor.
3 Labor needs protection - both in the workplace and from unscmpulous 
employers.
4 Living conditions need safeguarding.
5 There is a need to develop an educational publicity agency which will win 
over labor-farmer organisations to American involvement in the war.
This was the role given to Sam Gompers. The AFL was deliberately brought into a partnership 
with the administration and capital. Many AFL officers sat on govemment boards. Gompers 
insisted that any labor members on a board had to come from organised labor. The 
administration, however, was not willing to allow the AFL to get too far above its natural 
station. They would not allow labour representation on any committee that handled the 
allocation of war contracts. Labor was only ever allowed to sit on boards that handled labor 
disputes. The administration certainly offended the AFL by refusing to give it full recognition 
and representation on non-labour committees. On the vast majority employers were 
represented but workers were not. Even though Gompers gave employers full representation 
on his labor committee, the chairmen on other committees, mostly businessmen, failed to give
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)labour equal recognition, even when the CND called “ as a matter of justice and democratic 
principle”  for “ representatives of employees as well as employers to determine national 
economic policies” (25).
There remained a large part of industry not covered by the CND or any other govemment 
agency. This shortcoming shows that there is a lot more to a successful war labour policy than 
the mere adjustment of wages and the prevention of strikes. The administration’s lack of an 
overall policy, and the decentralised method of handling war contracts, made it essential that 
other agencies had to be speedily set up and empowered. Much of this was done hastily and 
was ill-thought out. The speed with which these agencies grew and the personnel recmited 
made it impossible to give those functions the care they required. Thus the administration 
stmggled to cope as their war labor policy was being hampered by both the new realities of 
the socio-economic situation and the absence of a uniform central direction in administration 
policies. Robert Cuff clearly feels that bureaucratic infighting and the absence of an accepted 
central plan was tme right across the board and not just in the area of labour (26).
With labour tumover and strikes reaching unprecedented levels William Wilson, Secretary 
Baker and Gompers all urged President Wilson in August 1917 to appoint a special commission 
to investigate wartime upheavals and make recommendations. The result was the President’s 
Mediation Commission (PMC) with William Wilson in the chair and AFL representation. 
Clearly the setting up of the PMC was an admission of failure on the part of the Department 
of Labor as it was then constituted to deal with labour problems created by the war. The 
appointment of Wilson as chairman was merely to help him keep face. While the PMC did 
good work in regional disputes it also passed on recommendations to the president regarding 
labour policies overall. Acting upon these the president called upon all sides to meet in a War 
Labor Conference to devise a programme to govern labor-management relations. The board 
soon discovered that the existing method of dealing with labor problems was unsatisfactory, 
with each department acting on its own without regard to the needs of other departments. 
Obviously this led to duplication, lack of uniformity and conflict. Possibly the gravest failing 
was that no nationwide disputes board existed. For these reasons the president had to 
acknowledge that peace time methods were failing. The CND echoed that feeling when it
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argued for a system that would provide for an adequate and stable labour supply to war 
industries, and argued that this could only be ensured by a system of labour bureaus, by better 
training and by a priorities agencies to determine the needs of competing industries.
To help ease the mounting problems the President created the National War Labor Board 
(NWLB) and patterned its operating responsibilities on the conference’s and CND 
recommendations. The NWLB was set up to encourage the settling of disputes through 
conciliation and mediation. Gompers was co-opted on to the NWLB. He was one of five AFL 
officers to sit on it, they were of course counter-balanced by five representatives from industry. 
Ex-president Taft was co-chairman with Frank Walsh of CIR fame. Many labour men were 
concerned about Taft’s appointment, seeing him as a reactionary. He did, however, do much 
to redeem his good name before labour by his wartime actions. Labor certainly got more from 
Taft than employers did from Walsh.
The board was empowered to prevent strikes and lock-outs, to prevent undue interference with 
union organised shops, to extend collective bargaining, and to prevent unions or workers from 
extending into non-union areas by the use of coercive methods. During its short lifetime the 
NWLB developed a number of procedures to resolve disputes and to give power to its policies. 
It certainly did prevent the more extreme anti-union employer practices such as blacklisting, 
espionage, surveillance and yellow dog contracts. It also devised effective remedies to prevent 
discrimination because of legitimate union activity. Importantly though the board would not 
compel companies to bargain collectively with unions. Whilst firms could not compel 
membership of a company union, they did not have to accept the unionisation of their plants. 
As a sop to both proselytising unionists and to employers the NWLB did order the 
establishment of works committees in non-union shops as a compromise. Clearly whilst unions 
were often able to attain a controlling element on these committees the policy was not to AFL 
tastes. Many open shop employers seized on this loop hole, David Brody recorded 
J.D.Rockefeller advising Judge Gary to ‘ ‘be sure that the shop committee is of your best 
employees and not a committee appointed by outside agencies; an employee representation 
plan, if protected from union infiltration promises a safe defense from interference from 
Washington” (27). Whilst the principal function of the NWLB was “ to settle by mediation 
and conciliation controversies arising between employers and workers in fields of production 
necessary for the effective conduct of war’ ’(28), the code developed by it tended to favour labor
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more at the expense of employers in the majority of NWLB decisions, labour did still remain 
more at govemment mercy than were employers. William Wilson in answer to the many 
enquiries on the relation of the board to his department maintained that “ the board was an 
integral part of the department, but that its decisions were uncontrolled’ ’(29). Clearly 
employers would have been even more reluctant to submit to its powers had William Wilson 
dominated it.
By 1918 few areas of war production were without access to some specially devised adjustment 
agency. To better coordinate their activities yet another board was formed, the War Labor 
Policies Board (WLPB). This new board had representatives from each of the other major war 
)  agencies and departments involved with labour. By determining standards for wages, hours
and working conditions, then imposing these standards through federal agencies,it was hoped 
the WLPB would end instability in the labour market. Unfortunately the WLPB was unable 
to enforce a nationwide standardisation policy, and was criticised on all sides. One of the 
strongest criticisms was voiced by John Lombardi that “ it had a large and costly staff of 
experts, who saw small parts of the labor problem intensively, and saw nothing in large”  (30).
This semi self-regulatory method of industrial relations was ineffectual in many areas but 
especially so on the railways. Here the labour situation, even after the Adamson Act, looked 
menacing. The pressures of wartime working swept away many peacetime practices, including 
virtually everything conceded under Adamson. Wartime operating difficulties looked like 
they would worsen an already dangerously overheated situation. So much so that the federal 
govemment was finally obliged to step in and attempt to minimise these problems, but only 
after much prevaricating, and only when conditions were near acute. By the middle of 1917 
the labour situation was critical, with an acute shortage exacerbated by conscription. The sharp 
rise in the cost of living soon began to produce wild-cat strikes, which labour alleged were being 
made worse by managerial manipulation. Labour feared that the management might use a local 
rail dispute to push its case for mandatory arbitration, which was one of the issues behind the 
troubles in 1916. The rail management and the federal govemment remained inactive before 
this mounting crisis, to such an extent that Wilson’s system of traffic priorities was soon in 
shreds. This combined with labour calls for industrial action to improve their working 
conditions and rates of pay made the situation look bleak.
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The Brotherhood chiefs had assured Wilson that there would be no strikes during the war, but 
even before 1917 was over they began to see that they had been optimistic. As an initial 
response Wilson tried to get the management to accept labour’s demands by promising federal 
aid; this failed when the management tried to use the crisis to further their political ends by 
asking Congress to exclude the industry from anti-trust statutes. At this point Treasury 
Secretary MacAdoo stepped in to argue against increased federal aid, in its place he proposed 
outright federal control of the rail service. Wilson was instinctively against any form of state 
ownership believing it to be inherently socialistic in principle. He was also against it as he did 
not feel the federal govemment could command the loyalty of rail labour.
MacAdoo was remarkably successful in changing his father-in-law’s mind. Whilst he was won 
over he was still worried that MacAdoo ’ s reputation as a Wall street promoter would be enough 
to tum labour against him, but Tumulty and Brandeis convinced him otherwise. They also 
argued for the introduction of Taylorist techniques, forgetting that the manipulation of the 
industry in this way would dismpt the existing bargaining system. This notwithstanding, the 
administration took control of the rail network. In so doing it brought far reaching changes 
in the bargaining relations of rail politics. As K. Austin Kerr has highlighted, the political 
innovations behind federal control involved more than merely shifting power away from the 
old regulatory system to a management-dominated rail administration, for the transport needs 
of the war that had to be met by the proponents of federal control demanded capital-labour 
cooperation. The workforce had considerable control over labour relations, and MacAdoo 
came to sympathise with many labour aspirations. The govemment increased wages, 
standardised work practices and improved conditions all to help appease labour. MacAdoo 
also helped the Brotherhoods achieve one of their long sought goals: national standardisation 
of wages and mles on the rail networks.
The railways administration was in many ways a model; an example of what the Wilson 
administration could have achieved elsewhere in the economy had the president had the 
courage to intervene more forcefully, and allowed his govemment to provide a more dynamic 
role. He was though merely content to let labour and business co-exist as before, whilst being 
overseen by govemment agencies which would only intervene and attempt to regulate 
conditions when a clash of interests developed. It was only the imminent collapse of the rail 
network under the added burden of wartime pressures and the threat of a strike over wages that
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prompted Wilson to accept MacAdoo’s plans for anationalised system. Thus it is to MacAdoo, 
and not Wilson, that the praise must go for its working so well. Certainly wildcat strikes and 
threats of a national stoppage plagued MacAdoo, but he was able to meet most of these threats. 
With Wilson’s blessing he banned workers from indulging in political activity, always a 
dangerous thing in a democracy, even in time of war. Yet despite grumbles over this labour 
stayed friendly to him.
MacAdoo used private managers to run the various divisions of the rail administration, a device 
also used by Wilson. They relied heavily on theirpreferred organisation, corporate management, 
bringing into govemment service many managers from private industry. In 1913 Wilson had 
sought men for office who shared his philosophical standpoint; Daniels knew little of naval 
matters, MacAdoo of banking, Bryan of foreign affairs. But by 1917 ideology counted for 
little, experience and ability were all, thus many appointees were businessmen whose sole 
concem was with getting the job done. Organisations like the NCF were also heavily involved 
in the mnning of the wartime organisation, with many of its more prominent members winning 
places in the govemment, including Gompers. Private corporate management permeated the 
whole enlarged wartime administration, which is more than can be said for unionists, whose 
contribution to the public service was deliberately curtailed. In reality their sole preserve was 
in those areas directly affected by them, and no others.
During the war union membership rose from 3,014,000 in 1917 to 4,169,000 a year later. In 
the immediate post-war period it surged again as the conscripts came home to 5,110,000, the 
highest level in its history (31). Thus the AFL was jubilant at the war's end from the increase 
in their membership rolls, from the level of respectability and recognition afforded their 
leadership and from the concessions they had managed to claw from the administration and 
from management. Unions had expanded into firms that had previously excluded them, and 
even into some new industries, like meatpacking; some inroads were even made into steel. 
Many company unions, however, had also developed.
Many of the Administration’s agencies were hamstrung by Wilson’s insistence that they must 
use public opinion to compel obedience to their decisions rather than rely upon the power of 
legal enforcement. This was not always possible and then emergency action was necessary.
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oThe Western Union Telegraph Company refused to listen when Wilson personally asked them 
to reinstate workers sacked for joining a union, so he ordered the company to be taken over. 
The Commercial Telegraphers’ Union, despite its name a company and not a union, also came 
under government control when it discharged union members. This was a double edged sword, 
however, as workers in the telegraph industry in general found the Post Office Department a 
difficult employer, but then Postmaster-General Burleson was no lover of organised labour. 
While Wilson allowed the taking over of companies which unfairly discharged workers for 
union activities, he was equally keen to pressurize workers into going back to work in time of 
dispute and to trust in their officers to help them. Of the large corporations placed under 
government control the transfers were always more one of form than of substance, as most of 
the existing management stayed in place and usually continued to act as before. Without doubt 
criticisms can be raised against Wilson’s wartime practices; certainly there was a chronic lack 
of centralisation; there was an absence of regard or knowledge by government agencies of 
practices in other departments; different wage rates were being paid for the same job by 
different agencies; there was simply too much competition for workers, so the highest paying 
employer won. This instability simply fed the already excessively high labour turnover, and 
so delayed production, increased costs and caused tension. One of the most serious 
weaknesses, however, was that most of the war labour programme was voluntary, and so was 
subject to the vested interests of those who took part. Melvin Urofsky felt that the entire federal 
regulation of the economy was shaped along the lines the leaders of big industry wanted, that 
Wilson acquiesced in this policy because he felt high production could only be guaranteed if 
industry was left unhampered in this way, and so businessmen were left unsupervised to 
reshape the economy along lines acceptable to them. He even charges Wilson with ‘ ‘an almost 
criminal negligence” (32) in preparing the nation’s economy for war between 1914 to 1917.
It is certainly true that Wilson and his officers believed totally in free enterprise and the profit 
motive, and it is conceivable that these beliefs could be exploited by businessmen; especially 
when Wilson delegated power and responsibility so totally to his subordinates. Urofsky is thus 
quite correct to posit an alternative strategy that Wilson could have followed, one where he 
restricted big business, encouraged smaller concerns, had a more effective tax programme and 
insisted upon a more thorough protection of labour’s rights. Wilson’s pre-occupation with 
maximum industrial output meant that he never even seriously entertained an alternative plan 
of action and so labour was marginalised. The journalist Robert Bruere commented most 
wisely in February 1918 on the state of Wilsonian labour politics ‘‘at the very moment when
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othe nation was making a patriotic appeal to the workers to get out a maximum production ... 
The Department of Justice was arresting them, the PMC was telling them that they must 
organize into unions, and the Supreme Court was announcing that if they attempted to organize 
under certain conditions they would be guilty of contempt of court” (33).
Naturally there are different views on the AFL’s wartime practices: that the government 
bestowed numerous favours and advantages on labour, or that labour leaders bound their 
workers so tightly that they effectively got nothing of any lasting value out of the war. The 
daily functioning of the wartime administration, the peripheral nature of labour leaders’ 
contributions to the overall whole, the swift dismantling of the whole structure after the war, 
combined with growing grass-roots labour militancy and an employers-administration counter 
attack on labour all tend to reinforce the view that labour perhaps did not achieve all it could 
have done, but that the deck was loaded against a fair game. If labour leaders were 
unsuccessful, and they probably were, it was frequently because of circumstances beyond their 
immediate control. Devices for minimising friction only appeared gradually and often did not 
work properly even then. Solutions reached at the top were often unacceptable at local level. 
Also many government concessions only came piecemeal, and only when serious industrial 
difficulties arose, as on the railways. Government intervention worked best where strong, pro- 
AFL, unions already existed. In many steel and munitions plants the employers successfully 
stood off government boards and their decisions. Thus the workers who benefitted most were 
those already organised before the war began. Whenever unions had real strengths, or solid 
footholds before the war, huge gains were made. Wherever good organizers could spread the 
gospel gains were made. Only where unions were absent pre-war, or where they fought among 
themselves, did employers prevail; but the end of the war changed the whole picture.
Reconstruction And Reaction
The leadership of the AFL soon had reason to be disappointed with the government’s post war 
attitude. The war had exposed workers’ desires to participate in the running of the nation. Mere 
wage increases alone would no longer satisfy them, nor would they placidly accept a return 
to pre-war bargaining practices. In the immediate postwar period radical elements in the AFL 
renewed their calls for the movement to restructure along industrial lines feeling that the
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existing craft predominance served only to weaken labour. Despite membership gains and the 
movement’s successes during the war dissatisfaction with the leadership was growing, with 
many of the newer members being unwilling to accept the traditional, cautious AFL approach 
to business. Many of them were also impatient with government constraints and official 
attitudes in general. Wartime responsibilities had, however, had a sobering effect on the 
already cautious AFL leadership, enhancing their already pronounced tendency to compromise 
when pressurised from above. Thus the radicalizing of a growing number of AFL members 
was a matter of some concern. The AFL executive council were to some extent hampered by 
Gompers himself in their efforts to restructure to meet these challenges. As he got older he 
was becoming more set in his ways, and was manifesting a worrying tendency to be less than 
willing to work with perceived radicals.
In an effort to oppose the radicals in their ranks the executive council adopted a reconstruction 
programme in 1918 which called for government ownership, operation and regulation of 
public utilities; increased government control of corporations; government financing of low- 
cost housing, and general demands for more union say in the determination of public policies. 
What the executive council failed to understand was that their call for more industrial 
democracy and their move into new uncharted areas was not seen by employers as a bulwark 
against radicalism, but was instead perceived to be a challenge to the right to manage. As far 
as American management was concerned the end of the war heralded the end of their truce with 
labour. In the immediate post war period they pushed for the rapid dismantling of all 
government agencies, the deflation of prices and wages, and all moves to rationalisation. The 
armistice freed the hand of management, the public prohibition against union discrimination 
was no longer in force, nor was the need for continued full production.
The employers of America were aided in their stand against labour by the official attitude of 
the Wilson administration to the question of reconstruction Wilson was certainly sceptical 
about all reconstruction plans, especially those that were wide in scope. Two days before the 
armistice was signed Wilson forced the cancellation of plans to discuss reconstruction with the 
CND. Realistically, though, large reconstruction plans were probably always doomed to 
failure. The troops simply wanted to quit the service whether they had jobs or not, the public 
was war weary, business wanted an end to government restraint, and labour was suspicious of
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effort to revert to pre-war conditions as quickly as possible. Nearly all the wartime agencies 
were allowed to dissolve or were abandoned when their funding ceased. One of the first to lose 
its effectiveness was the NWLB.
While Wilson hoped to solve the problems of reconstruction by ignoring them and pretending 
they did not exist, his cabinet colleagues were free to take their cue from him. Clearly Wilson 
was hoping the country could return immediately to its pre-war status, and seemed to think it 
could be done without federal involvement. Unfortunately, reconstruction was not going to 
be that simple. Many federal agency officials felt the absence of a rational plan would only 
precipitate severe problems, and they were proved correct. Clearly they remembered the 
difficulties of gearing up the country for war, and hoped to avoid the same kind of problem 
converting the countr>' back to peacetime working. Wilson effectively ignored their pleading, 
and compounded these domestic difficulties - the problem of organising a smooth return to 
peacetime conditions, the need to minimise capital-labour unrest, and to make positive moves 
to offset the fragmentation of his electoral base - by simply ignoring all his problems in his 
headlong flight to Europe to win Allied approved for the League of Nations. He was now more 
concerned with foreign than domestic matters, and so he argued for the line to be held against 
wage increases. Wilson shared with Lloyd George a talent for delaying decisions when 
confronted by powerful union demands. Clearly he felt that to concede wage increases or 
power to unions now would only inhibit business’ ability to cope with the coming deflation.
Wilson’s postwar indifference to the AFL was also linked to electoral issues. The Republican 
triumphs in 1918, at least in part, were linked to disenchantment at his domestic policies, 
especially his alleged trucking with labour. Small wonder that during 1918-1919 he ingored 
all calls to help save the wartime agencies as they were closed down. Wilson’s repression of 
radicals during the war had done a great deal to fragment the coalition he had created in 1916, 
as George Creel noted, ‘ ‘all the radical and liberal friends of your anti-imperialist war policy 
were either silenced or intimidated. The Department of Justice and the Post Office were 
allowed to silence and intimidate them .... There was no voice to argue for your sort of 
peace” (34).
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With the breaking up of his electoral base went his chances of success with the League in 
America and re-election in 1920. Thus with both Houses of Congress in Republican hands and 
his electoral base in pieces Wilson had need to rebuild a new coalition. Advice about how was 
not long in coming. Tumulty argued that high wages were bad for consumers, and hence for 
Democrats. He felt that Wilson had already done enough to assure the Democrats of labour’s 
continued support and so he advised against the granting of further concessions to labour and 
felt that if  they did that ‘ ‘the country at large would think that we are making a special appeal 
to labour at this time. If there is any class in this country to which we have been over generous 
it has been labour .... I think that this class owes us more than they have been willing to 
give” (35). Wilson followed Tumulty’s advice, and so the AFL leadership were to find their 
access to the president lessening dangerously. With his unconcern with developments at home, 
his preoccupation with the League, his electoral problems, and growing physical incapacity, 
union leaders could no longer be sure of meeting the president at all.
The immediate post war period saw a rise in the number of strikes. More workers struck during 
1919 than were to strike for the next six years or for the entire 1923-1932 period, a record never 
since surpassed. In Seattle there was even a short attempt at a general strike called in support 
of striking metal workers. It lasted for almost five days and completely paralysed the city. 
Leading businessmen made no secret of the fact that they were very much against this new 
phenomenon in labour tactics, and as a result violence was widely used in its suppression. 
There was also widespread discontent among the various police forces in the country over their 
levels of pay and their working conditions, which culminated in a police strike in Boston with 
85% of the force not at work. This led to twenty four hours of some of the worst rioting and 
looting ever seen in an American city. Wilson called the policemen’s action ‘ ‘a crime against 
humanity’ ’(36). These strikes were local affairs, but both had national implications due to the 
issued they raised, and the change in strike tactics they showed. More significant strikes, 
however, were to be seen in the coal and steel industries.
A growing gap between the cost of living and wages was a major factor in the miners’ strike. 
Since October 1917 miners had been working under an agreement with operators and Fuel 
Administrator Garfield that was only intended to cover the period of the war, and that was 
scheduled for renewal or renegotiation on 31 March 1920. The increasing cost of living made 
the miners restive, they became even more so when the operators would not approve a pay rise.
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William Wilson hoped the president would intervene and prevent a walk out, but all he did was 
declare that any strike would be a breach in the agreement made with Garfield, going on to claim 
that “ such an action would create a disastrous fuel famine, paralyse industry, force many 
workers out of employment” , so that a strike “ under these circumstances was not only 
unjustifiable, it was unlawful” (39). With the public backing his stand he asked the mine 
leaders to rescind the strike call. William Wilson responded by working even harder on his 
cabinet colleagues as they wanted even more drastic measures, but was unsuccessful in his bid 
to stop Attorney-General Palmer getting an injunction against the miners.
Palmer secured from Judge Anderson a restraining order on the basis that the strike was a 
violation of the Lever Act. The general impression when the act was passed in August 1917 
^  was that it did not apply to labour. When the bill had gone before Congress the AFL had argued
for the inclusion of the Hollis amendment which stipulated that the act would not apply to 
labour. Attorney-General Gregory, Herbert Hoover and the president had all assured Gompers 
and Frank Morrison that the act did not limit strikes, and so Gompers had not pressed the 
issue.Thus the administration was now justifiably accused of acting in bad faith. After a 
fhiitless meeting with Palmer over the injunction Gompers, Morrison and Wall condemned the 
government’s stand. The New Republic believed the action had excited ‘ ‘in the workingmen 
of the country a resentment against the existing operation of law and contempt for the vaunted 
impartiality of the govemment” (38).
Z ) The injunction failed to open the mines, but it did stop the UMW leaders aiding their workers.
Thus the following week the cabinet, again over William Wilson’s objections, voted to invoke 
court action. On 8 November 1919 Palmer secured a court order compelling the UMW leaders 
to rescind the strike in three days. This action was unprecedented, in that it demanded the 
performance of a positive act, whereas injunctions were usually negative in that they restrained 
people from committing certain prescribed acts. The court order was obeyed, but the men 
stayed out. The cabinet again sided with Palmer and Garfield, over William Wilson’s 
objections, and decided to prosecute nine UMW leaders. The leaders were actually arrested 
and federal troops were ordered to move into the coal areas. Federal agents were allowed to 
tap telephones, and agents were sent to spy on the UMW, and non-Americans were threated 
with summary deportation. During the course of the strike over eighty UMW officers were 
cited for contempt. With the operators unbending and the administration so openly against
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them the strike collapsed in ruins on 10 December 1919 when the UMW accepted a government 
approved mediation plan giving them some of the things they struck for in the first instance. 
Some historians, John Lombardi amongst them, actually doubt that Wilson personally 
participated in the events leading up to the injunction of 1 November 1919. He had returned 
from Europe in September because of ill health and from then until December he attended no 
cabinet meetings. William Wilson certainly believed that Palmer, Garfield and Tumulty were 
directing affairs, and that they were not acting as the president would wish. Wherever the final 
blame may ultimately lie it is certainly true that by using an injunction to stop the strike the 
government fundamentally changed the attitudes of many working people to the Wilson 
administration and the president himself; undoing at a stroke all the good work many 
administration officials and the AFL executive council had laboured to perform since 1913.
By 1919 steel had replaced the railways as the single most important industry in America. Like 
most mass production industries US Steel employed huge numbers of unskilled and semi­
skilled labour. After the success of the wartime years many AFL organisers were determined 
to unionise this industry. On 29 August 1919 Gompers and the members of the steel organising 
committee met Wilson, their sole request was that he would arrange a meeting with the 
company chairman Judge Gary. Wilson promised to do his best and said that “ the time has 
passed when any man should refuse to meet representatives of his employees” (39). Gary 
would not accede to Wilson’s request; he did, however, attempt to lay his side of the story 
before the president in a four page letter. The entire tone of the letter was conciliatory, clearly 
whilst he was opposed to unions he left the impression he would not resist strong administration 
pressure to settle. Wilson did not reply to the letter. It was found years later by Ray Stannard 
Baker unopened in the president’s files. Had he seen it Wilson might have attempted a more 
direct approach, not seeing it Wilson remained inactive. He could have acted on this own 
initiative to force Gary to see the AFL representatives, but he simply did not want to get 
enmeshed and did not want to put his prestige on the line for a cause where success looked so 
doubtful. Gary, insulted by Wilson’s apparent rudeness, stood firm. On 22 September 1919 
the walkout began. It was only partial, but it still exceeded in scope and magnitude anything 
in the nation’s experience - a quarter of a million workers were on strike. After four years of 
continuous production and massive wartime profits the employers involved were in a good 
position to stand firm. Many AFL officers only too well aware of this fact urged caution, 
Gompers prominent among them, but the pressure to strike came from below.
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On 28 August 1919 Secretary Lane had asked Wilson to call a conference of labour, capital 
and the public to resolve the nation’s mounting industrial problems. Wilson agreed saying “ the 
object of all reform in this essential matter must be a genuine democratization of industry based 
upon the full recognition of the rights of those who work, in whatever rank, to participate in 
some organic way in every decision which directly affects their welfare or the part they play 
in industry” (40). This industrial conference gave the unions an arena for bringing public 
pressure on US Steel. A prominent speaker on industrial affairs, principal of Harvard 
University C.W.Eliot felt that their hopes of success and of the conference actually solving 
anything were doomed from the beginning, as its organisation into three groups merely 
increased existing tensions. Clearly capital and labour were too entrenched in the attitudes of 
the past to successfully embrace the future. On 9 October the labour group launched a frontal 
assault by calling on the conference to both intervene in the steel dispute and for a resolution 
endorsing collective bargaining and allowing workers to pick representatives of their own 
choice. Lane called this “ a bit of audacious labor politics, fine strategy from a labor 
standpoint” (41), but it crippled the conference because it forced it to consider the question of 
settling a specific strike before it had had time to consider the causes of all strikes. Gompers' 
brave gamble failed to get the necessary majority it needed and both plans were voted out. The 
labour delegation walked out in disgust, hamstringing the conference and bringing the steel 
strike no closer to a conclusion.
The huge volume of press coverage the strike generated certainly did not aid the workers. The 
New York Times said “ the leaders are radicals, social and industrial revolutionaries” (42). 
The New York Tribune felt the dispute was “ another experiment at Bolshevising American 
industry” (43). The Chicago Tribune said “ the decision means a choice between the 
American system and the Russian” (44). The management, ever keen to secure public support, 
hammered the point that many of the strikers were immigrants, and that their actions were both 
unAmerican and radically suspect. The strike leadership were also pilloried as dangerous 
radicals, especially William Foster whose ex-IWW background came back to haunt him. The 
radical issue squashed the strikers' main hope for a settlement, steel was under no public 
pressure to deal with radicals, and won some support for actually refusing to deal. As with the 
miners so too with the steelworkers, the administration refused to aid them. Key men in the 
administration, especially Tumulty and Palmer, opposed them. Tumulty was convinced he 
saw “ abundant evidence on every side that propaganda is afoot to advance the Soviet 
idea” (45). The president, effectively incapacitated after a stroke, applied no brake to those 
smaller men. Administrative indifference turned to active partnership when federal troops
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3went to Gary, Indiana. State and federal judges were also encouraged to develop more extreme 
rulings to further restrict picketing, and to return America to its anti-union normality. The 
strike, always only partial, finally cracked when the skilled workers, primarily American bom, 
began to return to work, and by January 1920 the end had come.
The strike was probably the single most important strike in America after the Pullman strike 
of 1894. It was of vital importance to the AFL for as Brody notes ‘ ‘if steel could be organized 
then so could the other mass production industries” (46). Dulles actually believes that “ the 
whole labor history of the 1920s would have followed a completely different course’ ’(47) had 
steel been organised, and he is quite correct to say so.
The culmination of post-war reaction came with the attacks on those of radical persuasion 
during the ‘ ‘Red Scare’ ’. Vigilantes, war veterans, businessmen, the press and the government 
all combined to “ save’ ’ the country by trying to suppress all sorts of radicalism. Such groups 
were proscribed by law, free speech and assembly were suspended, duly elected members of 
state and national legislatures were denied their seats and suspected alien radicals were 
deported. In the annual report of the Attorney-General in 1921 he noted that ten states had anti­
anarchy laws, seventeen had criminal syndicalism laws, twenty-four had laws against 
membership in ultra-radical groups, twenty-one against attendance at ultra-radical meetings, 
twenty-nine had anti-red flag laws and others had sedition and sabotage laws.
Clearly the actions against the IWW were only a prelude to the furore which accompanied 
suppression of radicalism in 1919. Attorney-General Palmer even tried for a peacetime federal 
sedition law, but he was refused, even though Wilson endorsed his request in his State of the 
Union address. William Preston believes that the “ antagonisms for readjustment and 
revolution played on emotions still keyed to the fanaticism of war” (48). With the post war 
cessation of prosecutions under the Espionage and Sedition acts. Justice no longer had its 
emergency tools for overthrowing radicalism. Pardons Attorney James Finch was typical of 
many federal officers when he claimed that the war was merely the opening phase in the 
revolution, and that the opposition of radicals to the war had ‘ ‘ only been incidental to their main 
purpose and object” (49).
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Overt pressure was applied to numerous radical groups to crush them, but government policy 
followed subtle paths as well. The administration was careful to only parole those IWW 
members who severed their connections with the movement and who adopted a more 
reasonable attitude to American institutions. Finch actually conceded ‘ ‘that in many instances 
there was no evidence whatsoever to show that the defendants had ever done anything to violate 
the Selective Service Act or the Espionage Act’ ’(50). Thus the government seemed to be less 
concerned with past objections to war than with past and present radical beliefs.
Justice, the Pardons Office and Wilson all shared in the formulation of postwar anti-radical 
policies. The Wilson administration set the tone followed by Republican administrations in 
the twenties. Gregory and Palmer both argued against any general amnesty, and Wilson 
^  abandoned his own predisposition to forgive because he was convinced of the IWW’s criminal
background. Regardless of the evidence upon which their convictions had been based the 
departments of Justice and Labor separated prisoners according to their attitude and tractability. 
The administration’s amnesty programme depended not on the fairness of the punishment but 
on the amount of social unrest, or the supposed imminence of revolution. Wilson not only 
refused to support workers’ aspirations after the war but as Melvin Urofsky said ‘ ‘the evidence 
shows that Wilson was guilty of allowing the public interest to be trampled on’ ’(51). The Red 
Scare was eventually called off, but not before it had served its purpose.
By the early 1920s the already near useless Clayton Act - whose operation had been suspended 
during the war - was finally killed off by the Supreme Court, as was the Child Labor Act. Thus 
2) federal anti-trust laws could again be used against unions. Picketing was further limited,
injunctions were once again used to hamstring labour. This combined with a severe depression 
in 1921-1922 rubbed further salt into AFL wounds and membership rolls began to fall. Before 
Wilson left office the AFL had been pushed back into their old bastions, their vaunted alliance 
with the Democrats in tatters, and worst of all - they had nowhere else to go. Gompers and his 
associates were in an unenviable position.
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Necessity had pushed the AFL into politics in 1906 and a working alliance with the Democrats 
soon developed, but what did labour get from the arrangement? A delegate at the 1920 AFL 
annual convention was plainly critical:
Sam Gompers cannot keep a straight and serious Countenance and allege that 
his ‘political’ policy has yet-fourteen years later - adjusted these grievances in 
labor’s favor. Y ou will find every one of these grievances repeated... in 1919.
The only one that has been adjusted is the seaman’s grievance ... but this was 
not due to Sam Gompers. It was due to the efforts of Andrew Furuseth, Victor 
Lander and Senator LaFollette. And even that problem still exists.... The pitiful 
climax of Sam Gompers’ political effort stands forth exposed to the world in the 
Wilson Administration. Never before has the leader of labor in the United States 
attained such influence with the government. Never again will Sam Gompers 
have so much prestige .... And what did it get the workers? Never before has 
a federal administration so ruthlessly and shamelessly trampled upon the rights 
of the worker. Never before had the misuse of the injunction to defeat the 
workers been so vicious. Never before have all the powers of government been 
so mobilised to defeat labour. And this has been done by the Wilson 
administration (52).
Melvin Dubofsky is equally dismissive and believes that “ the great labor reforms of the 
Woodrow Wilson era occurred in the midst of war and collapsed in the disillusionment of 
peace” (53). The pre-1916 labour reforms which were an integral part of his election strategy 
did indeed become a new, more rounded, labour policy during the war. What Gompers failed 
to realise was that the power given to him and his organisation during the war was purely of 
a short-term nature and was done for emergency purposes. Once the war ended and the 
emergency was gone then so too were the powers removed. The situation existing during the 
war in America was not the beginning of a new dawn for labour, it was merely an armed truce. 
With the war over the administration allowed the AFL to be pushed by employers along the 
lines it found to be acceptable, and that was to create a politically neutralised, pro-capitalist 
labour movement. Given that organised labour was a minority of all labour, that its legal status 
was still in some doubt and that its organisation was deficient this was perhaps bound to happen. 
With capital in a uniquely strong position, with the courts antagonistic, with the SPA an
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0untested political ally and with the Republicans offering nothing, mainstream organised labour 
had nowhere else to go but to the Democrats, who as a minority party nationally would at least 
offer them a sympathetic ear. But that was ultimately all that was offered; the Wilson 
administration provided few rewards for the AFL’s successful political mobilisation and 
finally smothered the adoption of a more politically active strategy by the movement in the post 
war years.
Jumping into bed with the Democrats was obviously a calculated risk, but perhaps one that 
Gompers' felt was worth taking. But then Gompers greatest strength was his opportunism, a 
character trait he shared with Wilson. Both men had no ultimate ends, being content to work 
for day to day improvements. This equipped Gompers to work with Wilson, a man equally 
keen never to define his beliefs or programme too clearly. Yet Gompers’ strength was also 
his greatest weakness, for it meant that Wilson could use him for ends other than those Gompers 
wished to serve. Wilson certainly used him to keep the wilder elements in the labour world 
in check. By working as he did Gompers ossified the AFL and so it entered the twenties with 
an out-moded craft monopolised organisation that could not attract the unskilled, meet its own 
members’ needs, or extract concessions from mass-production industries, like US Steel or the 
car industry, that still excluded unions. Marc Karson is quite correct to say that between 1906- 
1918 the AFL effectively gave its support solely to the Democrats, that they tolerated 
discrimination against negroes and racialist attacks on Asians, and were indifferent to the plight 
of the unskilled, but then so was Wilson. But by becoming an adjunct of the party they allowed 
themselves to become nothing more than a minor pressure group who were only listened to 
2) when it offended nobody else.
Working together in their muddled inefficient ways Gompers and Wilson held back labour. 
Due to their efforts the labour movement as a whole did not achieve real power until the late 
1930s. By preaching the doctrine of business-labour accommodation they relegated labour to 
a near permanent subordinate role. Obviously we can never know if the radicals in the IWW 
and SPA would ever have been successful with AFL help, but they were denied that aid, and 
when they looked like flourishing they were crushed by federal repression. When Gompers 
bowed out of public life he did so in the full knowledge that his calculated risk - of backing 
the Democrats - had brought his movement little of real tangible value.
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In the early twentieth century organised labour for the first time in American history 
represented a durable mass movement. As unions grew in size and industrial conflict spread 
federal policies and actions often proved to be the decisive factor in the success or failure of 
a venture. “ Under Wilson labor became a persistent, inescapable national issue” (54), 
Dubofsky notes. He also feels that “ at no point between 1913 and 1920 was there a clear, 
consistent federal policy towards workers and trades unions” (55) and it is here we must 
disagree. There was a line of consistency in Wilson’s dealings with labour. As the head of 
a minority party nationally the support of labour was vital to the Democrats, but the 
practicalities of office and the need to remain on a friendly footing with other more powerful 
interest groups, meant that labour’s voice never carried much weight. Even when bearing in 
mind the privileges that were granted to pro-war unionists between 1917 and 1918, and the 
pro-labour measures he put his signature to during this first term, it still remains quite clear that 
Wilson only ever saw labour as a minor pressure group. During the war Wilson and his 
colleagues showed themselves to be adept at appeasing, buying off and flattering the moderate 
AFL leadership so that they would conduct themselves along lines that were acceptable to the 
administration. They could understand, perhaps even empathise with the needs and aspirations 
of these workingmen. They wanted little and were polite in asking for it. This was certainly 
not the case with the IWW. The administration had little time for these radicals, afraid as they 
were of the changes those kind of people might bring to their comfortable world. The ideology 
of the IWW was threatening and hostile, these ‘ ‘ Wobblies’ ’ challenged the assumptions they 
lived by. Thus the unique conditions of wartime America provided the administration with 
the opportunity they had long sought to move against them. Using a traditional if  rather crude 
carrot and stick approach the AFL were bought off - recognizing union standards and practices, 
allowing large pay rises, taking over companies where the owners were uncooperative and 
giving AFL officers places on government boards - whilst the IWW were crushed - their 
members harassed, their leadership imprisoned and their organisation suppressed. Some of 
their officers stayed in prison well into the twenties, long after the need to hold them had gone. 
This shows a vindictiveness and a smallness of character which is perhaps unusual in the 
holders of elevated public office.
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3The standard approach to labour matters in the Wilson administration was that its needs would 
only be addressed when they were brought to the government’s attention, when its demands 
were “ reasonable” , when helping labour would not alienate other more powerful pressure 
groups, and when its lobbying activities were kept well within the parameters of proper 
pressure group activity. This arrangement worked to the best interests of the AFL, as they were 
the only movement to fully accept the tenets of capitalism. The price of this cooperation - the 
so-called Wilson reforms - were a poor reward, they were of no great or lasting significance. 
They were passed because their time had come, because others were prepared to push through 
the legislation, and because granting these changes was of no great importance. Symbolic 
reform is easy, meaningful advances need to be forced out of legislatures. Labour fared 
indifferently because Wilson was the champion of a dying age, an unseeing victim of his own 
preferred solutions. He satisfied the yearnings of the past rather than anticipating the needs 
of the future. Even in his own day he was something of a period piece, resisting instinctively 
the harshnesses of accelerating industrialisation. Thus in place of a definite labour programme 
he could only ultimately provide reaction and a beguiling jargon. His first term was more 
distinguished by its scope than its originality, his second was noted for its conservatism.
Wilson’s performance was also hampered by glaring personal and organisational limitations 
in his mode of work. Secretary Lane was one of many men to complain bitterly that Wilson 
consistently failed to use his cabinet properly as a deliberative body for serious discussion 
within a few months of starting his first administration. Only occasionally would Wilson have 
proper discussions with his cabinet, ironic for a man who preached the benefits of full cabinet 
government in his younger days. Wilson tended to ask for advice from individuals like Colonel 
House, and as House himself admitted, “ as far as I can gather, he confers with none of them 
(department heads) except in matters concerning their particular department” (56). This 
caused immense problems when Wilson became incapacitated after his final stroke, leaving 
the affairs of state in a lamentable condition. MacAdoo confessed to House that he believed 
his father-in-law was keen to dispense with cabinet meetings altogether! Lane, McReynolds, 
Lansing, Houston and Gregory were also to voice similar criticisms. Lane talked bitterly of 
how “ for some weeks we have spent our time at cabinet meetings largely telling stories’ ’(56). 
Once Wilson was ill the whole situation deteriorated into severe bureaucratic infighting as 
different department heads fought for supremacy. William Wilson and Baker favoured 
unionism, whereas the department heads in Commerce, Agriculture, Justice and the State 
Department did not. Clearly, Wilson’s inability to listen to advice, to respect and work with
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men with whom he might at times disagree determined his relations with his cabinet, and hence 
the operation of the administration as a whole. Subordinates dealing with problems which fell 
outside his preoccupations were often distressed at his unwillingness to provide guidance, as 
William Wilson was to frequently find. Housed in a new and minor department like Labor 
he received little direct presidential guidance except in moments of crisis. The president simply 
allowed his department heads to proceed with neither criticism nor guidance. He would 
frequently ignore them until a crisis forced an issue on to his agenda, having his officers 
struggle along unaided until then. No detail, however, was too small once he decided an issue 
was worth his attention. There were thus gradations in the intensity of his commitment. He 
was also frequently incapable of giving a flexible response and many situations require just 
that. He was certainly willing to collect pertinent facts from others, but was loath to genuinely 
solicit opinions, especially from those who by tradition in America were used to voicing one, 
and that meant that new pressure groups like labour fared most poorly of all. Even when he 
conferred with legislative leaders his enthusiasm would fall off, if  he anticipated a refusal. 
Thus conferences became merely devices for collecting information rather than for fully 
exploring other peoples’ viewpoints.
House felt “ his (Wilson’s) chief defect was temperamental” (57). As early as 1914 House 
confessed to MacAdoo that he was scared that because of Wilson’s limitations the administration 
was in danger of drifting aimlessly towards conservatism, which is in fact what happened. He 
also felt that Wilson dodged trouble, had unjust prejudices against people and would not confer 
with people he disliked. House alleged that ‘ ‘no one can see him to explain matters or get his 
advice .... The President lacks executive ability and does not get the best results from his cabinet 
or those around him” (58). House was convinced that Wilson never really knew what was 
happening in any government department at any time, but then Wilson deliberately constricted 
the contribution his subordinates could make to policy formulation. He knowingly cut off the 
channels through which guidance usually flows. House called his methods “ lonely and 
inefficient”  (59) and insisted that he was also ‘ ‘the most prejudiced man he had ever met”  (60). 
Wilson defended his methods by claiming that ‘ ‘tolerance is an admirable intellectual gift, but 
it is of little worth in politics. Politics is a war of causes, a joust of principles. Government is 
too serious a matter to admit to meaningless courtesies”  (61), and so in the application of such 
working methods he left behind him a ‘ ‘trail of broken friendships and a singularly impersonal 
public reputation” (62). Figures of such marginal importance as William Wilson or Samuel 
Gompers could thus never have said they knew him or felt they had his full confidence. They
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knew so little of him and his thought processes that they could never know how he might act, 
which consequently left them in an inherently weak position.
During his political career Wilson learnt how to mould his appeal to run along the lines of group 
and class self-interest, and to resolve class-political conflicts along the lines of existing 
economic power. In so doing ‘ ‘he ignored the great issue which is slowly coming to the front, 
the question of economic democracy, abolition of privilege, and securing to men the full fhxits 
of their labor or service .... The issue of political democracy has passed, the issue is now one 
of industrial or economic democracy” (63), so said George L.Record in March 1919 when 
commenting on the Wilson presidency, and this is damning criticism from the man credited 
with converting Wilson to progressivism.
Record urged Wilson to supplement his international programme with an accompanying social 
democratic programme in America, including in it a demand for the common ownership of 
public utilities and a limitation on large fortunes. Record’s words obliged Wilson to 
acknowledge that ‘ ‘the world is going to change radically, and I am satisfied that governments 
will have to do many things which are now left to individuals and corporations.... I am satisfied 
for instance that the governments will have to take over the great natural resources ... all the 
water power, all the coal mines, all the oil fields.... They will have to be government owned 
... if I should say that outside, people would call me a socialist, but I am not a socialist. And 
it is because I am not a socialist that I believe these things. I think the only way we can prevent 
communism is by some action as that”  (64). Yet if his private thoughts were evolving from 
progressivism towards social democracy that fact was never registered in his public policies, 
he allowed his administration to close in “ a riot of reaction” (65). Wilson’s head of the 
Committee of Public Information, George Creel, commented wisely, thus, “ what I see - with 
all my heart I hope I am wrong - is a tragedy of disappointment” (66). A comment that can 
be used to describe very many of Wilson’s political actions, but which is perhaps uniquely 
correct when examining his dealings with organised labour.
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